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 Abstract	
 
 
The	 aim	 of	 this	 thesis	 is	 to	 provide	 a	 general	 framework	 for	 the	 analysis	 and	
interpretation	 of	 the	 determinants	 that	 help	 to	 define	monetary	 stability	 goals.	 The	
main	 issue	 is	 that	money	 supply,	 and	 therefore	 inflation	 are	 not	 exogenous;	 rather,	
they	depend	on	interactions	between	monetary	institutions	and	other	economic	agents	
(including	governments,	 commercial	banks,	 trade	unions,	 etc.),	 as	determined	by	 the	
institutional	 rules	 and	 by	 the	 socioeconomic	 structure.	 This	 approach	 requires	
identifying	factors	that	help	to	define	the	greater	(or	 lesser)	desirability	of	 long‐term	
inflation	control	goals.	
In	this	regard,	certain	fundamental	determinants	characterizing	the	political,	social,	
and	 economic	 context	 of	 decisions	 on	 monetary	 policy	 should	 be	 further	 analysed.	
Factors	 such	 as	 social	 sensitivity	 to	 the	 costs	 and	 benefits	 of	 inflation,	 the	 degree	 of	
political	 instability,	 the	 existence	 of	 asymmetrical	 information	 between	 the	
policymaker	 and	 the	 public	 influence	 the	 ability	 to	 be	 constrained	 by	 a	 rule	 or	 an	
institution.	
This	work	is	therefore	an	attempt	to	carry	out	a	theoretical	and	empirical	analysis	of	
the	 implications	 of	 these	 determinants	 for	 both	 the	 institutional	 design	 and	 the	
inflation	 rate.	 This	 is	 a	 very	 important	 issue,	 certain	 countries	 have	 often	 borrowed	
their	institutional	designs	from	others,	but	without	achieving	the	same	results	in	terms	
of	control	over	inflation.	
More	specifically,	this	thesis	consists	of	four	parts:	
1.	Monetary	Policy	in	the	presence	of	Imperfect	Observability	of	the	Objectives	of	
Central	Bankers.	
2.	On	the	Determinants	of	Central	Bank	Independence	in	open	economies.	
3.	Political	institutions	and	Central	Bank	Independence	revisited.	
4.	Political	Stabilization	by	an	independent	Central	Bank.	
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Introduction	
Ever	since	they	were	first	created,	the	primary	goal	of	the	“institutions”	in	charge	of	
money	 governance	 has	 been	 to	 protect	 the	 value	 of	 currency,	 both	 internal	 and	
external.	 In	 the	 gold	 standard	 era	 (1879‐1914),	 this	 goal	 was	 pursued	 through	 an	
endeavour	 to	 ensure	 the	 convertibility	 of	 bank	 notes	 into	 gold	 at	 pre‐set	 exchange	
rates.	 The	purchasing	 power	 of	 a	 currency	 vs.	 commodities,	 i.e.	 the	 price	 index,	was	
only	pursued	indirectly	by	the	monetary	authority	because	gold	was	seen	as	the	true	
nominal	 anchor.	 However,	 if	 no	 fluctuations	 of	 gold’s	 value	 vs.	 commodities	 were	
recorded,	 maintaining	 a	 fixed	 parity	 between	 bank	 notes	 and	 gold	 equalled	 price	
stability.		
Following	a	gradual	decline	of	the	gold	standard	during	the	first	half	of	the	twentieth	
century,	as	well	as	the	introduction	of	a	system	founded	on	both	the	non‐convertibility	
of	bank	notes	and	 the	note‐issuing	monopoly	of	Central	Banks,	 the	goal	of	monetary	
policy	was	expressly	reconsidered	with	respect	to	price	stability.	Thereafter,	the	value	
of	the	notes	issued	by	Central	Banks	was	nothing	but	the	reverse	of	the	price	level	of	a	
given	bundle	of	goods;	therefore	the	monetary	authority	undertook	to	achieve	a	given	
price	level,	or	inflation	target.	
In	their	pursuit	of	the	goal	to	keep	the	value	of	their	currencies	unchanged,	Central	
Banks	 were	 always	 subject	 to	 major	 pressures	 with	 respect	 to	 their	 relations	 with	
governments	and	with	commercial	banks.	Such	pressures	were	caused	by	the	existence	
of	 possible	 incentives	 to	 use	 monetary	 policy	 for	 purposes	 other	 than	 controlling	
inflation.	
According	 to	 Cukierman	 (1992),	 four	 main	 causes	 can	 be	 identified	 for	 a	 pro‐
inflationary	 attitude	 of	 monetary	 institutions:	 employment‐related	 reasons,	 fiscal	
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reasons,	 and	 reasons	 connected	 with	 the	 balance	 of	 payments	 and	 with	 financial	
stability,	respectively.	While	the	first	two	reasons	concern	a	policymaker	that	is	only	in	
charge	of	monetary	policy,	for	the	other	two	the	policymaker	is	responsible	for	setting	
the	 exchange	 rate	 and	 defining	 the	 banking	 surveillance	 policy,	 respectively.	 All	
decisions	by	a	monetary	policymaker	are	therefore	the	result	of	comparisons	between	
the	 benefits	 of	 a	 generally	 stable	 price	 level	 and	 the	 cost	 connected	 with	 the	
achievement	of	such	stability.	
The	 aim	 of	 this	 thesis	 is	 to	 provide	 a	 general	 framework	 for	 the	 analysis	 and	
interpretation	of	the	determinants	that	help	define	monetary	stability	goals.	The	main	
issue	 is	 that	 money	 supply,	 and	 therefore	 inflation,	 are	 not	 exogenous;	 rather,	 they	
depend	 on	 interactions	 between	 the	 monetary	 institutions	 and	 the	 other	 economic	
agents	 (including	governments,	 commercial	banks,	 trade	unions,	 etc.),	 as	determined	
by	the	institutional	rules	and	by	the	socioeconomic	structure.	This	approach	requires	
identifying	 factors	 that	 help	 define	 the	 greater	 or	 lesser	 desirability	 of	 long‐term	
inflation	control	goals.	
A	 fair	 relation	 between	 Central	 Banks	 and	 governments	 is,	 perhaps,	 the	 most	
important	 institutional	determinant	from	the	political	viewpoint.	During	the	past	two	
centuries,	 multiple	 factors	 have	 had	 a	 significant	 impact	 on	 relations	 between	 the	
government	 and	 the	 Central	 Bank.	 These	 have	 included	 the	 prevalence	 of	 certain	
political	 conditions,	 such	 as	 war	 or	 peace,	 the	 dominant	 political	 and	 economic	
doctrines,	 and	 the	 exchange	 rate	 regime	 in	 force.	 These	 factors	 have	 contributed,	 in	
different	 circumstances,	 to	 a	 higher	 or	 lower	 degree	 of	 independence	 of	 the	 Central	
Bank	from	the	political	power	(Capie	et	al.,	1994).	
A	debate	has	developed	over	time,	in	parallel	with	the	issue	of	the	independence	of	
the	 Central	 Bank,	 on	 the	 choice	 between	 rules	 and	 discretion	 in	 implementation	 of	
monetary	 policy.	 This	 debate	 originated	 in	 nineteenth‐century	 England,	 where	 two	
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schools	of	 thought,	 the	Currency	School	and	the	Banking	School,	engaged	 in	a	heated	
argument	 that	 involved	 several	 scholars,	 as	 well	 as	 British	 policymakers	 and	
businessmen	 of	 the	 time	 (Ciocca,	 1983).	 The	 debate	 on	 rules	 and	 discretion	 further	
developed	 between	 the	 late	 1950s	 and	 the	 early	 1970s	 in	 the	 famous	 controversy	
between	Keynesians	and	Monetarists.	
Both	debates	started	from	a	perceived	failure	of	the	system	to	achieve	the	desired	
goal,	 i.e.	 monetary	 stability	 (Capie	 et	 al.,	 1994).	 The	 nineteenth‐century	 monetary	
debate	 originated	 from	 discussions	 and	 analyses	 of	 the	 causes	 and	 effects	 of	 the	
suspension	of	note/gold	convertibility	in	the	United	Kingdom	in	the	1797‐1821	period,	
as	well	as	 from	its	relation	with	the	 inflation	rates	recorded	at	 that	 time;	and	 it	 later	
developed	 with	 analysis	 of	 the	 causes	 underlying	 the	 monetary	 disturbances	 that	
characterized	the	1820‐1831	period.	
Similarly,	 the	 debate	 between	 Keynesians	 and	 Monetarists	 developed	 with	 the	
continuous	 and	 widespread	 worsening	 of	 the	 inflationary	 experience	 to	 which	
developed	economies	were	exposed	from	the	early	1970s	onwards	(Capie	et	al.,	1994).	
In	both	cases,	the	supporters	of	the	Currency	School	and	of	Monetarism	essentially	
emphasized	 the	monetary	 causes	 of	 inflation.	 Since	 both	 schools	 of	 thought	 claimed	
that	 the	 reason	 for	 the	 failure	of	monetary	 stability	was	 the	 failure	of	money	 supply	
management,	 i.e.	 excessive	 growth	 rates	 of	 the	 relevant	monetary	 aggregates	 –	bank	
notes	 in	 the	 nineteenth	 century	 and	 some	 specific	 monetary	 aggregates	 (M)	 in	 the	
twentieth	–	 the	obvious	proposed	solution	was	 to	 introduce	appropriate	controls,	 i.e.	
rules	governing	increase	of	the	money	supply	(Toniolo,	1988).	
On	the	other	hand,	the	Banking	School	and	the	Keynesians	focused	on	non‐monetary	
shocks	on	the	supply	side,	including	negative	yields	of	crops	and	wars	for	the	Banking	
School,	 and	 oil	 shocks	 for	 the	 Keynesians.	 Moreover,	 according	 to	 both	 schools,	 a	
monetary	 authority	 is	 only	 necessary	 if	 it	 can	 act	 on	 its	 own	discretion,	 in	 that	 they	
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both	 stressed	 that	 it	 is	 impossible	 to	 come	 up	 with	 a	 non‐varying	 definition	 of	 the	
money	stock.	This	rationale	denies	not	so	much	the	possibility	of	identifying	the	object	
of	monetary	 control,	 as	 the	possibility	 of	 exercising	 such	 control	 under	pre‐set	 rules	
(Ciocca,	1983).	
The	 economic	 literature	 on	 incentive	 issues	 and	 on	monetary	 policy	 credibility	 in	
the	1980s	and	1990s	reconsidered	the	debate	on	whether	rules	or	discretion	should	be	
applied	in	the	implementation	of	monetary	policy.	According	to	this	literature,	rules	act	
as	 a	 commitment	 mechanism	 that	 prevents	 the	 monetary	 authority	 from	 issuing	
money	 surprises	 to	 obtain	 revenues	 from	 the	 inflation	 rate	 or	 benefits	 in	 terms	 of	
increases	in	employment.1	The	most	severe	financial	crisis	of	the	post‐war	era,	due	to	
the	 bankruptcy	 of	 the	 Lehman	 Brothers	 investment	 bank	 in	 2007,	 revamped	 this	
debate	and	showed	that	rules	should	be	more	flexible	so	that	the	monetary	policy	can	
react	to	a	broader	variety	of	variables,	besides	price	stability,	in	certain	circumstances		
(Alesina	 and	 Stella,	 2010;	 and	 Fisher,	 2010).	 Indeed,	 the	 debate	 between	 rules	 and	
discretion	in	this	literature	is	complementary	to	the	relation	between	the	government	
and	the	Central	Bank.	
In	this	regard,	certain	fundamental	determinants	characterizing	the	political,	social,	
and	 economic	 context	 of	 decisions	 on	 monetary	 policy	 should	 be	 analysed	 further.	
Factors	 such	 as	 social	 sensitivity	 to	 the	 costs	 and	 benefits	 of	 inflation,	 the	 degree	 of	
political	 instability,	 the	 existence	 of	 asymmetrical	 information	 between	 the	
policymaker	 and	 the	 public	 influence	 the	 ability	 to	 be	 constrained	 by	 a	 rule	 or	 an	
institution.	
                                                 
1	This	strand	of	literature,	which	started	with	the	works	of	Kydland	and	Prescott	(1977)	and	Barro	and	
Gordon	 (1983a,	 1983b),	 focused	almost	 entirely	 on	 the	 “time	 inconsistency”	 features	 of	discretionary	
monetary	 policies	 and	 claimed	 that	 these	 policies	 imply	 a	 positive	 inflationary	 bias.	 Indeed,	 if	 the	
objective	function	of	the	policymaker	is	characterized	by	specific	incentives	and	goals,	the	attempt	to	use	
monetary	 policy	 to	 pursue	 such	 goals	 is	 likely	 to	 generate	 higher	 inflation	 rates,	 with	 no	 permanent	
benefits	 on	 the	 other	 macroeconomic	 variables.	 Later,	 different	 solutions	 were	 suggested	 in	 the	
literature	to	address	the	issue	of	the	time	inconsistency	of	monetary	policy.	See	Drazen	(2000)	Persson	
and	Tabellini	(2000)	and	Alesina	and	Stella	(2010)	for	a	survey.	
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This	work	is	therefore	an	attempt	to	carry	out	a	theoretical	and	empirical	analysis	of	
the	 implications	 of	 these	 determinants	 for	 both	 the	 institutional	 design	 and	 the	
inflation	 rate.	 This	 is	 a	 very	 important	 issue,	 in	 that	 certain	 countries	 have	 often	
borrowed	 their	 institutional	 designs	 from	 others,	 but	 without	 achieving	 the	 same	
results	in	terms	of	control	over	inflation.	
More	 specifically,	 this	 thesis	 consists	 of	 four	 parts.	 Part	 one	 is	 a	 theoretical	
contribution	on	the	determinants	that	may	influence	the	willingness	of	a	“society”	to	be	
bound	by	 the	design	of	a	given	monetary	 institution.	The	goal	 is	 to	demonstrate	 that	
the	 existence	 of	 a	 non‐homogeneous	 private	 sector,	 vs.	 the	 observability	 of	 the	
parameter	 reflecting	 the	 relative	 preferences	 of	 the	 Central	 Banker,	 can	 deeply	
influence	 the	 Banker	 in	 the	 evaluation	 of	 the	 short‐term	 benefits	 –	 or	 costs	 –	 of	
inflation,	as	opposed	to	long‐term	consequences	on	its	reputation.	
Part	 two	 contains	 an	 empirical	 analysis,	 based	 on	 a	 sample	 of	 approximately	 60	
countries,	 of	 the	 degree	 of	 independence	 of	 the	 Central	 Bank	 and	 of	 certain	
institutional	 determinants.	 This	 part	 conducts	 an	 empirical	 investigation	 of	 the	
conditions	under	which	certain	“societies”	have	selected	certain	institutional	designs	to	
manage	 their	 monetary	 policy.	 In	 particular,	 the	 analysis	 considers	 the	 impact	 of	
different	variables	on	the	degree	of	 independence	of	the	Central	Bank	and,	 therefore,	
on	the	ability	of	a	country	to	abide	by	a	commitment.	The	main	variables	are:	imperfect	
observability	 of	 the	 goals	 of	 the	Central	Bank,	 the	political	 stability	of	 a	 country,	 the	
degree	 of	 openness	 of	 the	 economy,	 the	 synchronization	 of	 economic	 cycles	 in	 the	
different	countries,	and	past	inflation.	
Part	three	also	contains	an	empirical	analysis.	This	is	based	on	a	sample	of	24	OECD	
countries,	and	 is	carried	out	 for	 the	1980‐2005	period.	The	political	and	institutional	
systems	 of	 individual	 countries	 are	 also	 crucial	 for	 determining	 the	 degree	 of	
independence	of	the	central	bank.	Research	in	this	field	is	limited	to	a	few	studies.	The	
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aim	of	 this	part	 is	 to	 investigate	 this	 issue.	Three	 types	of	 innovation	are	 introduced	
with	respect	to	past	studies:	the	first	concerns	the	timeframe	of	the	analysis,	which	was	
carried	 out	 until	 2005;	 the	 second	 is	 that	 political	 and	 institutional	 variables	 are	
examined	alongside	economic	ones;	the	third	concerns	the	statistical	method	adopted	
to	select	the	variables	for	the	empirical	analysis.	
Part	four	is	an	extension	of	the	Gabillon	and	Martimort	model	(2004),	which	studies	
how	 the	 independence	 of	 the	 institution	 in	 charge	 of	monetary	 policy	may	 stabilize	
inflationary	 fluctuations	 due	 to	 political	 uncertainty	 when	 the	 economy	 is	
characterized	by	lobbies	that	seek	to	promote	their	own	interests	to	the	detriment	of	
the	general	interests	of	society.	
1 
Chapter I:   
Monetary policy in the presence of imperfect 
observability of the objectives of central 
bankers 
 
 
 
1.1.	Introduction		
As	shown	by	the	literature	on	the	institutional	designs	of	monetary	policy,	there	are	
various	 arguments	 in	 favour	of	 delegating	monetary	policy	 to	 agents	 independent	 of	
the	 government,	 within	 an	 institutional	 framework	 which	 not	 only	 guarantees	 that	
independence	but	also	imposes	precise	objectives	and	constraints	on	the	operations	of	
a	 Central	 Banker.	 The	 advantages	 of	 delegation	 to	 an	 independent	 banker	 more	
inflation‐averse	than	the	government,	or	‘society’,	arise	from	the	desire	to	prevent	the	
stagflation	problems	usually	associated	with	time	inconsistency	and	the	prevalence	of	
a	 ‘discretion	 equilibrium’.	 However,	 this	 approach	 has	 been	 criticised	 in	 light	 of	
considerations	concerning	the	distribution	of	the	benefits	and	costs	of	inflation	within	
a	 society	made	 up	 of	 heterogeneous	 agents.	 For	 example,	 from	 the	 positive	 point	 of	
view,	 Adam	 Posen	 (1995)	 argues	 that	 what	 matters	 in	 the	 long	 run	 in	 the	 struggle	
against	 inflation	 is	 the	presence	of	 a	 strong	 financial	 sector	with	 an	 interest	 in	price	
stability	and	willing	and	able	to	induce	the	monetary	policy	authorities	to	pursue	that	
objective.	From	this	standpoint,	the	independence	of	the	Central	Bank	and	its	inflation‐
control	 targets	 are	 unconnected	 with	 the	 interests	 of	 society	 as	 a	 whole,	 and	 the	
convenience	 of	 a	 particular	 institutional	 arrangement	 derives	 not	 from	 normative	
considerations	but	from	the	political	influence	of	a	particular	interest	group.	This	point	
of	 view	 has	 been	 analysed	 further	 in	 the	 literature	 that	 connects	 the	 design	 of	
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monetary	institutions	with	the	field	of	political	economics	(see	Persson	and	Tabellini,	
2000;	Drazen,	2000;	Alesina	and	Gatti,	1995).	
Yet	 the	 view	 of	 institutions	 as	 produced	 by	 “special	 interests	 politics”	 is	 not	
necessarily	antithetical	to	the	credibility‐based	approach	(Kydland	and	Prescott,	1977;	
Barro	and	Gordon,	1983a,	b;	Rogoff,	 1985a;	Lohmann,	1992).	 It	 is	possible	 in	 fact	 to	
hypothesise	 that	 even	 in	 the	 presence	 of	 heterogeneous	 agents	 (debtors	 versus	
creditors,	financial	system	versus	firms'	system,	agents	whose	wages	are	fixed	by	long‐
period	 contacts	 versus	 agents	 whose	 remuneration	 is	 fixed	 in	 flexible	markets),	 the	
time‐inconsistency	 problem	 and	 its	 solution	 of	 strategic	 delegation	 (commitment)	
continues	to	play	a	significant	role	in	the	design	of	monetary	policy	institutions.	
This	 paper	 analyses	 a	 simple	 time	 inconsistency	 model	 in	 which	 institutional	
reforms	–	i.e.	the	process	of	strategic	delegation	to	an	independent	Banker	constrained	
in	 its	 decisions	 to	 monetary	 stability	 goals	 –	 come	 about	 in	 the	 presence	 of	 agents	
heterogeneous	 in	 their	ability,	or	willingness,	 to	 invest	resources	 in	order	to	observe	
and	understand	 those	reforms.	 In	 the	presence	of	agents	not	all	of	which	are	able	 to	
observe	 and	 understand	 the	 effects	 of	 reform	 of	 the	 monetary	 institutions	 on	 the	
behaviour	 of	 the	 Central	 Banker	 in	 terms	 of	 its	 decisions,	 monetary	 policy	 is	
implemented	in	the	presence	of	the	Banker's	partial	private	information,	with	respect	
to	private	agents,	about	monetary	policy	objectives.	
The	aim	of	the	paper	is	therefore	to	analyse	the	effect	of	the	imperfect	observability	
of	 Central	 Bank	 preferences	 by	 the	 private	 sector	 on	 the	 decisions	 taken	 by	 the	
monetary	 authority	 and	 therefore	 on	 the	 inflation	 rate.	 In	 the	 case	 of	 a	 Banker's	
multiperiod	appointment	and	imperfect	observability	of	its	goals	on	the	part	of	private	
agents,	 the	 latter,	 to	the	extent	that	 they	are	not	directly	 informed	about	those	goals,	
may	infer	them	from	the	decisions	taken	by	the	Central	Banker.	
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The	paper	considers	in	particular	the	case	of	an	economy	in	which	a	Central	Banker	
is	 appointed	 for	 two	 periods	 and	 information	 about	 its	 objectives	 is	 distributed	 in	
society	as	follows:	an	exogenous	fraction	p	of	agents	has	incentives	and	the	capacity	to	
invest	 resources	 in	 the	 observation	 of	 the	 objectives	 assigned	 to	 the	 independent	
institution	and	 take	account	of	 that	 information	when	 formulating	 their	expectations	
about	the	inflation	rate.	A	fraction	1	–	p	of	agents	does	not	have	this	information	and	
therefore	in	the	first	period	formulate	expectations	about	the	inflation	rate	according	
to	 their	 a	 priori	 beliefs	 about	 the	 type	 of	 Banker,	 while	 in	 the	 second	 period	 their	
expectations	are	conditioned	by	the	Banker's	behaviour	in	the	first	period.	
The	monetary	policy	game	describe	therefore	divides	into	two	periods	and	has	the	
characteristics	typical	of	signalling	games.	The	temporal	sequence	of	the	decisions	is	as	
follows:	 at	 time	 t	 =	 0	 monetary	 policy	 is	 delegated	 to	 an	 independent	 Banker	 with	
particular	 preferences	 regarding	 the	 trade‐off	 between	 inflation	 and	 output	
(unemployment)	and	which	remains	in	office	for	two	periods.	At	time	t	=	1,	given	the	
agents'	expectations,	the	Central	Banker	fixes	an	inflation	rate	considering	that	future	
expectations	 (at	 time	 t	 =	 2)	 of	 fraction	 1	 –	 p	 (those	 that	 do	 not	 observe	 the	 BC's	
preferences	at	t	=	0)	will	be	conditioned	by	observation	of	the	current	decision	of	the	
Central	 Banker.	 At	 time	 t	 =	 2,	 the	 Central	 Banker	 decides	 the	 money	 supply,	 the	
macroeconomic	results	are	achieved	and	the	game	concludes.		
Introducing	 the	 hypothesis	 of	 heterogeneity	 in	 the	 private	 sector,	 in	 a	 standard	
monetary	policy	model	(Vickers,	1986),	extended	to	the	case	of	a	continuous	support	of	
types	 (Mailath,	 1987)	 enables	 one	 to	 analyse	 the	 behaviour	 of	 a	 just‐appointed	
policymaker,	 or	 of	 institutions	 created	 ex	 novo	 at	 a	 given	 point	 in	 time	 and	 in	 a	
particular	 place.2	 The	 presence	 in	 the	 economy	 of	 private	 agents	 with	 a	 different	
                                                 
2	An	extension	of	signalling	models	for	monetary	policy	to	the	case	of	a	continuous	support	of	types	is	
also	 present	 in	 D'Amato	 and	 Pistoresi	 (1996)	 and	 Sibert	 (2002).	 Both	 models	 substantially	 confirm	
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degree	of	observability	with	respect	to	the	Central	Banker's	preferences	gives	rise	to	a	
private	 learning	process	which	generates	more	or	 less	strong	 incentives	 for	 the	 just‐
appointed	policymaker,	or	the	new	institutions,	to	acquire	a	reputation.	
With	respect	to	the	previous	literature	(D'Amato	and	Pistoresi,	1996;	Sibert,	2002),	
therefore,	the	contribution	of	this	paper	from	a	technical	point	of	view	consists	in	two	
extensions:	 first,	 it	 considers	 the	 case	 of	 agent	 heterogeneity	 in	 terms	 of	 the	
information	set;	second,	it	studies	and	resolves	the	game	without	imposing	restrictions	
on	 the	 support	 of	 the	 distribution	 of	 the	 agents'	 beliefs	 across	 the	 possible	 types	 of	
Central	 Banker.	 These	 extensions	 will	 enable	 me	 to	 characterize	 the	 nature	 and	
properties	of	a	‘semi‐separating’	equilibrium	(also	called	‘partial	pooling’),	and	also	to	
study	 the	 relationships	 between	monetary	 policy	 strategies	 in	 the	 presence	 of	 time	
inconsistency	and	the	degree	of	 transparency	and	observability	of	 the	objectives	of	a	
Central	Banker	in	a	simple	economy.	
The	 results	of	 the	model	 show	 that,	 in	 the	 case	of	 an	economy	characterized	by	a	
large	 number	 of	 private	 agents,	 about	 which	 the	 Central	 Banker	 possesses	 private	
information,	 the	hypothesis	of	 a	 continuum	of	Central	Bankers	 signifies	 that	 it	 is	not	
economically	 convenient	 for	 the	 ‘tougher’	 types	 (strongly	 inflation‐averse),	 within	 a	
given	support,	to	separate	themselves	from	each	other,	because	this	gives	rise	to	high	
signalling	costs3,	whereas	it	is	instead	optimal	for	them	join	with	the	type	which	sets	a	
nil	inflation	rate.	Instead,	each	‘wet’	type	(those	most	sensitive	to	the	level	of	economic	
activity)	 in	 the	 support,	 obviously	 excluding	 the	worst	 possible	 type,	 separates	 from	
the	one	closest	to	it.4	
                                                                                                                                                      
Vickers'	result	(separating	equilibrium)	that	the	presence	of	wet	types	disciplines	the	behaviour	of	tough	
types.	
3	 In	monetary	policy	models	 the	 cost	 of	 the	 signal	 is	 represented	by	 the	 fall	 of	 the	 employment	 level	
below	the	natural	rate.	
4	In	substance,	the	equilibrium	obtained	represents	a	‘partial	pooling’	or	‘semi	separating’.	
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Conversely,	 as	 the	 private	 sector's	 uncertainty	 about	 the	 true	 identity	 of	 the	
monetary	 decreases	 (economy	 characterized	 by	 a	 large	 number	 of	 agents	 informed	
about	 the	 type	 of	 Central	 Banker),	 the	 model	 converges	 on	 the	 results	 obtained	 by	
D'Amato	 and	 Pistoresi	 (1996)	 and	 Sibert	 (2002):	 that	 is,	 it	 produces	 a	 complete	
separating	 equilibrium,	 so	 that	 once	 again	 the	 presence	 of	wet	 types	 disciplines	 the	
behaviour	of	tough	types.	
The	 introduction	 of	 partial	 observability	 also	 has	 implications	 for	 the	 strategic	
delegation	 that	 would	 emerge	 in	 equilibrium.	 The	 presence	 of	 signalling	 costs	
substantially	 alters	 the	 incentives	 for	 commitment	 and	 depends	 on	 the	 degree	 of	
observability.	This	study	will	not	concern	itself	with	deriving	the	government's	optimal	
strategy.	 It	 restricts	 itself	 to	 pointing	 out	 that,	 in	 the	 case	 where	 the	 economy	 is	
characterized	by	situations	in	which	observation	by	the	private	sector	is	close	to	being	
perfect,	 introducing	a	commitment	mechanism	into	monetary	policy	may	be	a	way	to	
evade	signalling	costs.	Otherwise,	there	may	arise	commitment	costs	sufficiently	high	
to	induce	the	government	to	reduce	the	use	of	delegation	and	assign	inflation‐control	
targets	less	stringent	than	in	the	case	of	high	transparency.	
This	 interpretation	 may	 help	 explain	 why	 in	 the	 industrialized	 countries,	 where	
institutional	 conditions	 are	 such	 to	 guarantee	 the	 high	 observability	 of	 the	 policy‐
makers'	 preferences,	monetary	policy	 is	 often	 characterized	by	 the	presence	of	 legal	
rules,	 or	 by	 institutions	 created	 by	 constitutional	 laws	 (Central	 Banks	 independent	
from	 political	 power,	 pegging	 of	 the	 exchange	 rate	 to	 a	 strong	 currency,	 etc.)	which	
essentially	serve	the	purpose	of	specifying	a	partial	commitment	mechanism.	
The	rest	of	the	paper	is	organized	as	follows.	Section	2	presents	the	monetary	policy	
game,	while	in	Section	3	the	model	is	solved	for	a	separating	equilibrium	and	a	pooling	
equilibrium	 in	 the	monetary	policy	game.	A	number	of	 simulations	are	performed	 in	
Section	 4	 in	 order	 to	 analyse,	 other	 conditions	 remaining	 equal,	 the	 impact	 on	 the	
6 
inflation	 rate	 of	 an	 increase	 in	 the	observability	 of	 the	Central	Banker's	 preferences.	
Section	5	sets	out	the	conclusions.	
	
1.2.	A	monetary	policy	signalling	game	
The	 game	of	monetary	 policy	 analyzed	 here	 describes	 the	 relationship	 between	 a	
Central	Banker	appointed	for	two	periods	and	the	private	sector.		
The	starting‐point	is	the	monetary	authority's	pay‐off	functions	–	which	are	widely	
used	in	the	literature	and	were	proposed	for	the	first	time	by	Barro‐Gordon	(1983a)	–	
in	which	a	welfare	function	is	assigned	for	each	period	t.	
CB:	The	welfare	of	the	Central	Banker	(CB)	in	period	t	depends	on	actual	inflation	and	
unexpected	inflation.	We	thus	have	the	following	functions:	
);( etttt wW   	 (1.1)
where	 πt	 represents	 the	 inflation	 rate	 in	 each	 period	 t,	 which	 by	 hypothesis	 is	
completely	controlled	by	the	monetary	authority,	and	 et 	 is	 the	 inflation	expected	by	
the	 private	 sector.5	 It	 is	 therefore	 assumed	 that	 positive	 inflation	 is	 a	 cost	 for	 the	
Central	Banker,	whilst	so‐called	"surprise	inflation",	 ett   ,	gives	rise	to	welfare.6	
To	 simplify	 the	 analysis,	 it	 is	 also	 assumed	 that	 the	 welfare	 function	 is	 linear	 in	
unemployment,	 rather	 than	 quadratic	 as	 in	 Barro	 and	 Gordon	 (1983a).	 This	
assumption,	which	has	been	made	by	Barro	and	Gordon	(1983b)	and	Vickers	(1986),	is	
attractive	 for	our	model	because	 it	 ensures	 that	 the	Banker	has	 a	dominant	 strategy	
                                                 
5	 The	 description	 by	 the	 particular	 function	 of	 macroeconomic	 payoff	 adopted	 clearly	 represents	 a	
considerable	simplification	but	it	has	the	disadvantage	of	not	being	strictly	microfounded.	Nevertheless,	
this	structure	is	widely	used	in	the	literature	to	study	the	problem	of	the	credibility	of	monetary	policy.	
See	Cukierman	(1992)	for	an	extensive	discussion	of	this	issue.	
6	"Surprise	inflation"	is	a	benefit	for	the	monetary	authority	because	it	pushes	unemployment	below	the	
natural	rate,	which	 is	assumed	to	be	too	high.	Alternatively,	 the	benefit	can	be	 interpreted	 in	terms	of	
advantages	connected	with	the	presence	of	debt	stock	issued	in	nominal	terms	or	short‐period	rigidity	
of	the	tax	system.	In	the	rest	of	the	analysis,	the	model	will	use	mainly	the	first	of	these	interpretations.	
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during	 the	 final	 period	 in	 which	 it	 is	 in	 office,	 and	 therefore	 enables	 the	 expected	
inflation	of	the	previous	period	to	be	considered	a	constant.	Hence	Wt	has	the	following	
functional	form:	
)(2
1 2 e
ttttW   	 (1.2)
where	α	 ≥	 0	 is	 the	 parameter	 of	 preferences	 that	 the	 Banker	 assigns	 to	 unexpected	
inflation,	 and	 therefore	 to	 the	 trade‐off	 between	 inflation	 and	 unemployment,	 and																	
t	=	1;	2.	
Private	sector:	This	parameter	α	 is	only	 in	part	private	 information	for	the	Central	
Banker.	In	fact,	from	the	point	of	view	of	private	agents,	for	the	fraction	of	agents	equal	
to	1‐p,	 it	is	distributed	assuming	a	priori	`beliefs'	about	the	distribution	function	F(α)	
defined	 in	 a	 continuous	 support	  BCAa, 7;	whilst	 the	 fraction	p	 of	 private	 agents	
possesses	 complete	 information	 about	 the	 type	of	Banker	because	 it	 observes	 at	 the	
moment	when	the	Central	Banker	is	appointed	and	then	behaves	rationally.	
There	 are	 several	 reasons	 for	 considering	 the	 private	 sector	 as	 divided	 into	 two	
parts,	 most	 notably	 Posen’s	 hypothesis	 that	 a	 crucial	 role	 is	 played	 in	 society	 by	
nominal	net	creditors	(such	as	banks	and	 financial	companies),	which	have	a	greater	
interest	 in	gathering	 information	about	 the	preferences	of	 a	newly‐appointed	policy‐
maker.	In	fact,	financial	institutions	rely	for	their	existence	on	the	possibility	to	borrow	
in	 the	 short	 term	 from	 savers	 and	 then	 grant	 long‐term	 loans	 to	 firms.	 They	 are	
therefore	severely	damaged	if	unexpected	increases	in	inflation	occur.8	
The	possibility	that	the	financial	sector	has	more	information	about	monetary	policy	
than	other	private‐sector	agents	has	already	been	evidenced	by	various	authors.	In	an	
                                                 
7	Both	the	distribution	function	and	the	support	constitute	knowledge	shared	by	the	players	and	can	be	
arbitrarily	 defined.	 However,	 it	 can	 be	 shown	 that	 the	 conditions	 for	 the	 existence	 of	 a	 separating	
equilibrium,	under	the	hypothesis	of	a	continuum	of	types,	can	restrict	the	support	(Mailath,	1987).	
8	Kane	(1980)	argues	that	constructors	and	building	worker	unions	form	an	anti‐inflation	interest	group	
interest	for	similar	reasons.	Alternatively,	the	division	of	the	private	sector	into	two	parts	can	be	seen	as	
the	presence	in	the	economy	of	a	fraction	of	agents	p	which	fixes	nominal	long‐term	contracts	ahead	of	
monetary	 policy	 decisions	 and	 is	 therefore	 necessarily	 interested	 in	 knowing	 Central	 Banker’s	
preferences	from	the	moment	when	it	takes	office.	
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empirical	 study,	 Peek	 et	 al.	 (1999)	 discussed	 the	 information	 complementarity	
between	 the	 banking	 sector	 and	 the	 Federal	 Reserve.	 They	 showed	 that	 constant	
exchange	of	information	between	banks	and	the	monetary	authorities	is	beneficial	for	
both	the	conduct	of	monetary	policy	and	bank	supervision.	
Gabillon	and	Martimort	 (2004)	discuss	a	similar	 information	structure	 in	order	 to	
analyse	 the	 institutional	 design	 of	 monetary	 policy.	 In	 their	 model,	 anti‐inflation	
financial	 groups	 are	 able	 to	 access	 data	 important	 for	 the	management	 of	monetary	
policy	with	 respect	 to	other	agents	 in	 the	economy.	Moreover,	 these	groups	have	no	
incentive	to	disseminate	information	to	other	agents	because	they	try	to	collude	with	
the	monetary	authorities	in	order	to	defend	their	interests.	
Timing	 of	 the	 game:	 The	 time	 structure	 of	 events	 has	 the	 usual	 sequence	 of	
monetary	policy	games9:	the	private	agents	form	their	expectations	on	the	first‐period	
inflation	 rate,	 e1 (first	 stage),	 the	 Central	 Banker	 observes	 e1 	 and	 then	 chooses	 the	
effective	first‐period	inflation	π1	(second	stage).	In	the	first	stage	of	the	second	period,	
private	 agents	 form	 their	 inflation	 expectation,	 which	 will	 be	 equal	 to:	
)|()1()|( 1222  EppEe  :	 that	 is,	 the	fraction	of	 informed	private	agents	fixes	
expectations	 about	 the	 inflation	 rate	 conditioned	 by	 the	 type	 of	 Banker	 α	 observed	
from	the	time	when	it	takes	office,	while	the	fraction	of	private	agents	not	informed	at	
the	time	of	the	Banker’s	appointment	will	form	their	expectations	on	the	basis	of	what	
they	observed	in	the	previous	period,	 i.e.	π1,	but	not	α.	Finally,	 in	the	second	stage	of	
the	 second	 period,	 the	 Central	 Banker	 observes	 e2 	 and	 then	 chooses	 the	 effective	
inflation.	
                                                 
9	See	Backus	and	Driffill	(1985),	Vickers	(1986),	D'Amato	and	Pistoresi	(1996),	Sibert	(2002).	
9 
In	formulating	their	expectations,	conditioned	by	their	 information	set,	 the	private	
agents	 minimize	 the	 cost	 of	 the	 inflation	 rate	 forecast	 error	 through	 the	 following	
quadratic	function	of	the	pay‐offs	for	each	period	t:	
2)( etttu   	 (1.3)
The	 solution	 concept	 used	 to	 determine	 the	 optimal	 strategies	 is	 the	 Bayes‐Nash	
perfect	 equilibrium.	Obtained	 in	 this	way	 is	 a	 couple	 of	 inflation	 rates	played	by	 the	
Central	Banker,	s	=	{π1	(α),	π2	(α)},	and	a	couple	of	expected	inflation	rates	played	by	
the	 private	 agents,	  eee 21 , ,	 where	 )()1()|( 111  EppEe  is	 the	 expected	
inflation	in	the	first	period	for	the	entire	private	sector,	calculated	on	the	basis	on	the	
distribution	 function	 of	a	priori	 beliefs	 for	 non‐informed	 private	 agents,	 and	 instead	
conditioned	 to	 the	 type	 α	 of	 Central	 Banker	 for	 informed	 private	 agents;	 while	
)|()1()|( 1222  EppEe  	 represents	 the	 expected	 inflation	 of	 the	 second	
period,	which	 for	 informed	agents	once	again	depends	on	the	type	α,	and	 instead	for	
non‐informed	 agents	 on	 inference	 of	 the	 Central	 Banker’s	 preferences	 using	 the	
inflation	rate	observed	in	the	first	period.	
Finally,	 it	 is	assumed	 for	 simplicity	 that	 the	players	do	not	discount	 the	 future,	 so	
that	 the	 pay‐offs	 function	 over	 the	 game’s	 entire	 time	 horizon	 is	 as	 follows:	
21 WWW  .10	
	
1.3.	 Equilibrium	 in	 the	 monetary	 policy	 signalling	
game	
As	 said,	 the	 model	 considered	 is	 a	 typical	 signalling	 game	 applied	 to	 monetary	
policies.	 It	may	therefore	produce	different	equilibria:	separating,	pooling,	or	 ‘hybrid’.	
                                                 
10	Both	Vickers	(1986)	and	D'Amato	and	Pistoresi	(1996)	use	the	same	hypothesis	to	resolve	the	game.	
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The	 analysis	 focuses	 mainly	 on	 the	 separating	 equilibrium	 and	 on	 the	 ‘hybrid’	
equilibrium;	that	is,	on	those	in	which	decisions	on	the	inflation	rate	in	the	first	period	
are	constrained	by	a	non‐trivial	subset	of	types	of	banker	in	the	support	  BCA,0 .		
In	this	section,	I	determine	the	conditions	under	which	in	the	entire	support	  BCA,0 	
there	 exists	 a	 complete	 separating	equilibrium	characterized	by	a	 strictly	monotonic	
strategy	 in	 the	 type	 of	 banker:   1 .	 I	 then	 analyse	 the	 strategies	 of	 a	 ‘hybrid’	
equilibrium,	   1 ,	 where,	   	 satisfies	 the	 compatibility	 constraint	 of	 the	
incentives	only	in	one	subset	    BCAk ,0 .	
The	possible	type	of	optimal	strategy	for	the	CB	can	be	determined	by	resolving	the	
game	backwards:	in	fact,	the	equilibrium	value	of	the	inflation	rate	for	the	second	stage	
of	the	second	period	can	be	easily	obtained	by	solving	the	following	programme:	
)(2
1max 22222
2
eW   	 (1.4)
whose	first‐order	condition	is:	
 2 	 (1.5)
that	is,	 in	the	period	t	=	2,	there	is	no	future	to	consider,	so	that	the	Central	Banker’s	
dominant	strategy	corresponds	to	(5).	
At	this	point	in	the	first	stage	of	the	second	period,	the	informed	fraction	of	private	
agents	p	fixes	the	expected	inflation	rate	on	the	basis	of	the	type	α	that	it	has	observed	
at	the	moment	of	the	appointment:  )|( 2E ,	while	the	uninformed	private	agents	
(1	–	p)	anticipate	the	choice	of	the	inflation	rate	  2 	and	minimize	the	forecasting	
error,	fixing	their	modified	expectations	on	the	basis	of	the	Bayes	rule:	that	is,	on	the	
basis	 of	 the	 inflation	 rate	 observed	 in	 the	 first	 period:  ˆ)|()|( 112  EE .	 It	
follows	that	the	non‐informed	agents	infer	the	‘type’	of	BC	from	observation	of	π1.	
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In	 general,	 the	 fraction	 of	 agents	 (1	 –	 p)	 conjectures	 that	 in	 the	 first	 period	 the	
Central	Banker’s	strategy	is	 )(1   11	in	the	case	of	a	separating	equilibrium.	Instead,	
in	 the	 case	 of	 a	 ‘hybrid’	 equilibrium,	 for	 a	 subset	 of	 types	 of	 bankers,	 i.e.   k ,	 it	
holds	 that	   1 ,	 where	      	 and   AA  ,	 while	 for	   k ,	   	 is	 a	
constant	 function	 of	 the	 space	 of	 types	 to	 that	 of	 the	 strategies,	 so	 that	 in	 this	 case	
     .	
In	 the	 second	 stage	 of	 the	 first	 period,	 the	 Central	 Banker	 takes	 expectations	 as	
given,	 but	 takes	 account	 of	 learning	 by	 the	 fraction	 of	 private	 agents	 (1	 –	 p)	 for	
formation	 of	 inflation	 expectations	 in	 the	 second	period,	 and	may	 therefore	 have	 an	
incentive	to	signal	its	type.12	
Given	the	equilibrium	result	of	 the	second	period,	 the	reduced	form	of	 the	Central	
Banker’s	pay‐off	function	in	the	first	period	is	given	by:	
  ˆ)1(2
1)(2
1~max 21121
1
ppW e  	 (1.6)
Using	the	definition	of	the	separating	equilibrium	strategy,	 )(1   ,	and	the	Bayes	
rule,	 )(ˆ 11   13	the	first‐order	condition	is	obtained	for	the	Central	Banker:	
0ˆ)1(  

d
dp 	 (1.7)
which,	 valued	 in	 equilibrium,	 in	 the	point  ˆ 	 determines	 the	 following	 first‐order	
homogeneous	 non‐linear	 differential	 equation,	 whose	 solution	 satisfies	 a	 separating	
equilibrium:	





 )1( p
d
d 	 (1.8)
                                                 
11	This	is	a	biunivocal	function:	that	is,	there	is	a	one‐to‐one	correspondence	between	the	space	of	types	
and	that	of	strategies	(see	Mailath,	1987),	so	that	 BCA  111 0)(ˆ  .	
12	 The	 two‐period	 of	 monetary	 policy	 game	 examined	 here	 therefore	 comprises	 a	 single‐period	
signalling	game.	
13	This	expresses	the	second‐period	beliefs	of	the	uninformed	private	agents	about	the	type	of	Central	
Banker.	
12 
In	the	continuous	support	  BCAa, ,	with	 0a 	there	exists	a	monotonic	function
  BCA 0 	that	represents	the	solution	of	equation	(8).	
This	 equation	 can	 in	 fact	 be	 resolved	 analytically	 by	 separating	 the	 variables	 and	
integrating	so	as	to	obtain	the	implicit	function	describing	the	separating	strategy.	The	
selection	of	the	relevant	branch	of	the	implicit	function	as	the	only	separating	strategy	
equilibrium	can	be	obtained	using	Mailath’s	 second	condition	 (1987)14	 and	an	 initial	
condition.	
The	initial	value	condition	will	be	given	by	the	equality	 BCBCBC AAA  )()( 1 ,	that	
is,	in	a	separating	equilibrium	of	separation,	the	worst	possible	type	of	Central	Banker	
has	 no	 incentive	 to	 signal	 itself	 and	 fixes	 the	 inflation	 rate	 at	 the	 same	 level	 that	 it	
would	do	if	the	game	had	been	with	complete	information.	
In	particular,	given	that	





1
1 p
d
d 	and	setting	 x
 ,	 from	which	 x  ,	 it	 follows	
that:	  xddxd  .	Therefore,	after	some	algebraic	steps,	it	is	possible	to	rewrite	(8)	
in	the	following	separable	form:	
dx
xxp
xd 21
11

 	 (1.9)
Integrating	both	members	of	(9)	yields:	
dx
xxp
xd    21 11  	 (1.10)
The	 integral	of	 the	right‐hand	side	of	 the	(10)	admits	 three	solutions	according	 to	
whether	Δ	is	greater	than,	smaller	than,	or	equal	to	zero.	
The	first	is	with	Δ	<	0,	i.e.	Δ	=	1	–	4	(1	–	p)	<	0;	from	which	it	follows	that	 4
3p ,	and	
therefore	(10)	will	be	equal	to:	
                                                 
14	 The	 monotonicity	 condition	 of	 the	 types	 allows	 one	 to	 establish	 that	 the	 relevant	 stretch	 of	 the	
solution	of	the	differential	equation	has	a	positive	slope	(for	details	see	the	section	in	the	1.6	Appendix).	
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The	 second	 solution	 of	 the	 integral	 of	 (10)	 is	with	 Δ	 =	 0	 from	which	 it	 follows	 that	
4
3p ,	and	therefore	(10)	will	be	equal	to:	
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Finally,	 the	 third	solution	of	 the	 integral	of	 (10)	 is	with	Δ	>	0	 ,	 from	which	 it	 follows	
that	 4
3p 	and	therefore	we	have:	
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Consequently,	 on	 eliminating	 the	 auxiliary	 variable	 x,	 one	 obtains	 the	 implicit	 final	
form	of	 the	 solution	 in	 the	original	 variables	of	 (10),	which	 too	will	 clearly	 admit	 to	
three	solutions.		
The	first,	with	 4
3p ,	will	be:	
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The	second,	with	 4
3p ,	will	be:	
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The	third,	with	 4
3p ,	will	be:	
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where	c1,	c0	 and	 c2	 respectively	 represent	 the	 constants	 of	 integration,	which	 can	be	
obtained	fixing	the	initial	value	condition	 BCBC AA )( .	
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In	 defining	 the	 support15,	 on	 which	 it	 is	 possible	 to	 determine	 a	 separating	
equilibrium	 in	 the	 first	 period,	 we	 proceeded	 by	 not	 specifying	whether	 or	 not	 a	 is	
greater	than	zero.		
In	effect,	as	said,	 two	different	cases	exist.	The	 first	 is	 the	one	 in	which	 0a 	and
 0 	and	is	part	of	the	function	   ;	therefore,	in	the	support	  BCA,0 	the	equilibrium	
is	completely	separating.	The	second	is	the	case	in	which 0 sa  ,	with	
s
lim   0 ,	
given	 the	 strict	monotonicity	of	 function   .	 In	 this	 second	 case,	we	have	a	 ‘hybrid	
equilibrium’:	 in	fact,	for	  s ,0 	a	pooling	strategy	exists,	while	for	 BCs A  	a	
separating	equilibrium	continues	to	exist.	
Characterization	 of	 both	 these	 cases	 requires	 that	 in	 equilibrium	 0''  .16	 This	
result	is	such	that	for	 BCBC AA )( ,	the	relevant	branch	of	the	separating	strategy	   	
is	an	increasing	monotonic	convex	function.	
The	results	derived	can	be	synthesized	into	two	Propositions.	
	
Proposition	1	In	the	case	in	which	¾	≤	p	≤	1,	in	the	support	  BCA,0 	of	F(α),	a	
complete	separating	equilibrium	exists.	The	complete	characterization	of	the	separating	
equilibrium	is	given	by	the	following	strategies:	  )(),( *21  sss  ,	  eese 21 , ,	where	
)()(1  s ,17	  )(*2 ,	 )()1()|()( 111  EppEe  ,	
)|()1()|()( 1222  EppEe  .	
	
To	 demonstrate	 that	 the	 separating	 equilibrium	 of	 Proposition	 1	 exists	 and	 is	
unique,	 one	 must	 use	 both	 Mailath’s	 regularity	 conditions	 (1987),	 and	 the	 second‐
                                                 
15	i.e.:	  BCAa, .	
16	The	 control	of	 the	second‐order	condition	on	equation	 (8),	with	 the	purpose	of	demonstrating	 that	
0''  ,	 i.e.	 the	convexity	of	the	function	   ,	 is	shown	in	the	Appendix.	This	condition	derives	from	
the	simplified	expression	proposed	by	Mailath	(1987,	p.1355).	
17	More	specifically,	if	 43p ,	   )(21 .	If	 43p ,	   )(2
341 p .	See	the	section	
in	the	Appendix.		
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order	condition	of	 (8),	which	 implies	 that	    2
341  p 	 (see	 the	Appendix	 for	
the	derivation	of	these	conditions).	Figures	1	and	2	show,	respectively	for	two	different	
regimes	 of	p	 considered,	 the	 relevant	 part	 of	 the	 contour	 diagram	 of	 the	 solution	 of	
equation	(8)	in	the	signal‐types	space.	
	
Figure	1‐1:	Case	with	 4
3p :	Complete	Separating	Equilibrium.	
π*:	inflation	level	with	complete	information.	
)( :	inflation	level	in	separating	equilibrium.	
	
Figure	1‐2:	Case	with	 4
3p :Complete	Separation	Equilibrium.	
π*:	inflation	level	with	complete	information.	
)( :	inflation	level	in	separating	equilibrium.	
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The	Central	Banker’s	separating	strategy	 is	such	that	 in	 the	 first	period	the	 ‘types’	
comprised	 in	 the	 interval	 BCA 0 ,	will	 choose	 a	 lower	 inflation	 rate	 than	 in	 the	
case	of	complete	information,18	thereby	reducing	the	inflationary	distortion.19	
In	other	words,	the	risk	that	the	public	may	revise	its	beliefs	negatively	serves	as	a	
commitment	 mechanism	 for	 the	 monetary	 authority.	 The	 fraction	 of	 private	 agents											
(1	–	p),	that	is,	those	not	informed	when	the	Banker	is	nominated,	will	anticipate	this	
behaviour	and	in	the	first	period	they	will	fix	a	lower	expected	level	of	inflation.		
This	 result	 extends	 the	work	 of	 D’Amato	 and	 Pistoresi	 (1996)	 and	 Sibert	 (2002),	
where	 in	both	cases	a	complete	separating	equilibrium	is	obtained,	but	by	arbitrarily	
restricting	 the	 initial	 support	 to	 that	 part	 in	which	 the	 single	 crossing	 condition20	 is	
strictly	 satisfied	 for	 every	 type	 of	 banker.	 In	 my	 case,	 instead,	 the	 equilibrium	 of	
complete	 separation	 is	obtained	without	any	 restriction.	The	difference	 is	due	 to	my	
assumption	of	the	partial	observability	of	the	banker’s	objectives	by	the	private	sector.	
In	fact,	if	the	fraction	of	informed	agents	is	large	(i.e.	 4
3p ),	the	distortion	due	to	the	
incentive	 compatibility	 constraint	 in	 the	 support	  BCA,0 	 does	 not	 violate	 the	 single	
crossing	property.	Therefore,	for	the	entire	support	there	exists	a	complete	separating	
equilibrium	 in	which	 every	 type	α	 of	 Central	Banker	 is	 distinguished	 from	 that	 type	
closest	to	it.		
                                                 
18	Note	that	the	‘tougher’	  0 and	the	‘weaker’	  BCA 	type	play	the	same	strategy	with	respect	
to	the	case	of	complete	information	(Barro‐Gordon).	 In	fact,	whatever	the	economy’s	parameters,	they	
always	have	as	their	dominant	strategy	respectively	 0)0(  	and	   BCBC AA  .	
19	The	separating	strategy	 introduces	a	 lower	constraint	    2
341  p 	 for	p	>	3/4	and	 instead	
   2
1 in	the	case	of	p=3/4.	
20 The single crossing condition is one of the regularity conditions of Mailath (1987). See the Appendix for the 
definition of this condition. 
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Characterization	 of	 the	 equilibrium	 in	 the	 case	 where 4
3p 	 is	 slightly	 more	
complex.	In	this	case,	in	fact,	the	model	produces	a	‘hybrid’	equilibrium.	This	result	can	
be	synthesized	in	Proposition	2.	
	
Proposition	2	In	the	case	where 430  p 	,	for	the	support	  BCA,0 	of	F(α),	there	exists	
a	‘hybrid’	equilibrium.	In	the	interval BCs A  ,	where	αs>0	,	there	exists	a	separating	
equilibrium	that	satisfies	(8).	The	equilibrium	strategies	in	this	interval	are	therefore	the	
following:	  )(),( *21  sss  	  eese 21 , ,	where	   )()(1  s ,	
)()1()|()( 111  EppEe  ,	 )|()1()|()( 1222  EppEe  .	In	the	interval	
 s,0 ,	with	 2
BC
s A 	,	there	exists	a	pooling	equilibrium	which	satisfies	(8).	More	
specifically,	outside	equilibrium	beliefs	[i.e.	  11  	],	   0 .21	
	
To	 show	 that	 the	 separating	 equilibrium	   	 of	 Proposition	 2,	 in	 the	 interval	
BCs A  ,	exists	and	is	unique,	it	is	again	necessary	to	bear	in	mind	both	Mailath’s	
regularity	conditions	(1987)	and	the	second‐order	condition	on	(8)	satisfied	for	α	>	αs.	
Considering	 that	      	 in	 the	 interval	 BCs A  ,	 one	 resolves	 the	 same	
problem	as	Proposition	1	(see	the	Appendix	for	details).	
In	 the	 case	 of	 pooling,	 the	 strategy	 expressed	 by	   0 ,	 will	 be	 instead	 be	 an	
equilibrium	if	the	monetary	authority	has	no	incentive	to	deviate	from	the	equilibrium,	
given	the	specification	of	 the	out‐of‐equilibrium	 ‘beliefs’.	This	 therefore	requires	 that	
)()(  PD ww  22	for	 s 0 23	(see	the	Appendix	for	the	proof).	
The	pooling/separating	strategy	is	shown	in	figure	3.	
                                                 
21	The	concept	of	perfect	Bayesian	equilibrium	does	not	 impose	any	restriction	on	the	specification	of	
out‐of‐equilibrium	beliefs,	except	those	that	support	the	equilibrium.	
22 Where Pw is welfare from pooling strategy and Dw are the benefits from deviation of  the pooling strategy. 
23	In	this	signalling	game	there	may	exist	a	pooling	equilibrium	for	the	entire	support	[a,	ABC].	This	case	is	
not	 analysed	 here,	 but	 has	 been	 thoroughly	 discussed	 in	 D’Amato	 and	 Pistoresi	 (1996)	 and	 Sibert	
(2002).	
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Figure	1‐3:		 Case	with	 4
3p :	Partial	Pooling	Equilibrium.	
π*:	inflation	level	with	complete	information.	
				   )(  :	inflation	level	in	separating	equilibrium.	
	
The	 information	 context	 in	 which	 the	 signalling	 game	 develops	 is	 essential	 in	
determining	 the	 model’s	 different	 equilibria.	 The	 economic	 intuition	 is	 very	 simple.	
The	signalling	cost	that	the	different	types	of	bankers	are	prepared	to	bear	in	order	not	
to	be	mistaken	for	bankers	who	are	weaker	than	their	type	 is	higher,	 the	smaller	the	
fraction	p	of	informed	agents	in	the	economy.	
If	 4
3p ,	 the	 signalling	 effect	 that	 reduces	 inflation	 in	 the	 first	 period,	 becomes	
excessively	 costly	 for	 tough	 types,	 that	 is,	 for	 s 0 .	 In	 fact,	 the	 separating	
equilibrium	 collapses	 in	 this	 part	 of	 interval	 and	 a	 pooling	 strategy	   0 instead	
arises.24		
Therefore,	 the	 difference	 between	 the	 result	 obtained	 here	 and	 that	 of	 Vickers	
(1986),	is	that	in	Vickers	the	pooling	equilibrium	comes	about	with	a	positive	inflation	
                                                 
24	See	the	red	segment	in	figure	3.	This	segment	states	that	for s  	there	exist	some	types	of	bankers	
who	have	no	incentive	to	increase	their	future	reputations	and	they	decide	in	the	first	period	to	choose	
the	 same	 strategy,	 that	 is,	 a	 nil	 rate	 of	 inflation.	 They	 in	 fact	 to	 separate	 themselves	 should	 play	 a	
negative	inflation	rate	in	the	first	period,	which	become	too	expensive	for	even	the	tough	types.		
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rate	 in	 the	 period	 t	=	 1,	 and	 the	 player	with	 ‘small’	α	 (the	 toughest	 type)25	 can	 still	
separate	by	playing	a	 lower,	 though	still	positive,	 inflation	rate.	 In	Vickers,	deviating,	
choosing	to	separate,	is	always	advantageous	with	respect	to	the	pooling	equilibrium.	
This	does	not	happen	in	the	model	considered	here,	where	a	hybrid	pooling/separating	
equilibrium	is	instead	obtained.26		
An	 implication	 of	 the	 pooling/separating	 equilibrium	 obtained	 is	 that	 it	 is	 the	
‘intermediate’	 types	 that	 signal	 themselves	 most,	 and	 are	 therefore	 those	 with	 the	
widest	 gap	 between	 the	 actual	 inflation	 rate	 and	 the	 time‐consist	 inflation	 rate	 à	 la	
Barro‐Gordon.	
A	 further	 conclusion	 to	 be	 drawn	 from	 the	 analysis	 of	 the	 different	 information	
contexts	 in	which	 the	monetary	policies	game	 takes	place	 (i.e.	with	݌ ⋛ ଷସ)	 is	 that	 the	
closer	 one	 approaches	 the	 case	 of	 perfect	 observability	 of	 the	 Central	 Banker’s	
preferences	(i.e.	with	increasingly	higher	values	of	p),	the	more	the	marginal	cost	of	the	
signal	diminishes27	(compare	in	this	regard	figures	1,	2	and	3).	
This	 result	 can	 be	 confirmed	 by	 performing	 a	 comparative	 statics	 exercise	 to	
analyse	 –	 as	 the	 number	 of	 private	 agents	 in	 the	 economy	 increase	 and	 observe	 the	
Central	Banker	during	his	term	of	office	–	how	the	results	of	the	equilibria	determined	
may	 change.	 From	 an	 analytical	 point	 of	 view,	 this	 involves	 considering	 the	 total	
differential	of	the	implicit	solution	of	the	differential	equation	(8):	



F
F
dp
ddpFFd pp  0 	 (1.17)
where	F	refers	to	the	RHS	of	14,	15	or	16.	
                                                 
25	In	Vickers’	model,	the	types	that	the	BC	can	assume	are	only	two:	a	‘tough’	type	and	a	‘weak’	type.	
26	 This	 result	 can	 again	 be	 compared	with	 those	 of	 D’Amato	 and	 Pistoresi	 (1996)	 and	 Sibert	 (2002),	
where	 the	 part	 of	 the	 support	  s,0 ,	 which	 in	 both	 cases	 is	 arbitrarily	 eliminated	 to	 derive	 the	
strategy,	 )( 	is	used	here	to	determine	a	pooling	region.	
27	This	represents	the	marginal	cost	of	fixing	the	inflation	rate	below	the	optimal	level	of	the	complete	
information	case,	that	is,	less	than	α.	
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Unfortunately,	neither	the	sign	of	Fp,	nor	that	of	 F 	can	be	determined	analytically	in	
an	unequivocal	manner.	Consequently,	 in	the	next	section	I	shall	perform	simulations	
to	determine	the	impact	of	a	variation	p	on	the	equilibrium	determined.	
	
1.4.	Some	simulations	
This	section	reports	some	results	obtained	using	simulations28	which	enable	us	 to	
characterize	the	effects	of	a	variation	in	the	exogenous	variable	p:	that	is,	the	number	
of	agents	informed	about	the	Banker’s	preferences	at	the	moment	of	its	appointment,	
in	 




 )1( p
d
d .	
Given	that	our	model	focuses	on	the	case	in	which	the	Central	Banker’s	preferences	
are	only	in	part	private	information,	we	analyse	the	impact	on	the	equilibrium	inflation	
rate	 of	 an	 increase	 in	 the	 observability	 of	 the	 Banker’s	 preferences	 for	 the	 private	
sector.	In	other	words,	from	an	analytical	point	of	view,	we	analyse	
dp
d .	
Figure	4	illustrates	a	numerical	simulation	of	equation	(8)	which	shows	the	relevant	
part	of	 the	 contour	diagram	of	 the	 equation,	 that	 is,	 the	Central	Banker’s	 strategy.	 It	
will	be	noted	 that	 if	p	=	0.1,	 the	separating	strategy )( 	 cuts	 the	α‐axis	at	 the	point																							
αs	=	0.5.	
Figure	 5	 shows,	 within	 the	 interval	 of	 the	 current	 parameters,	 the	 impact	 of	 an	
increase	 in	observability	 (p	=	0.2).	 In	 this	 case,	αs	=	0.45.	Figure	6	 shows	 the	case	of																
p	 =	 0.5,	 and	 therefore	 αs	 =	 0.2.	 Finally,	 Figure	 7	 considers	 the	 three	 simulations	
simultaneously	in	a	single	graph.	
	 	
                                                 
28	The	simulations	were	obtained	using	the	Mathematica	4.0	program.	
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Figure	1‐4:	Simulation	1:	p	=	0.1	
		
Figure	1‐5:	Simulation	2:	p	=	0.2	
	
		
	
Figure	1‐6:	Simulation	3:	p	=	0.5	
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Figure	1‐7:	Comparison	of	simulations	1,	2	and	3.	
	
	 
	
This	suggests	that	 0
dp
d 	and	that	 0
dp
d s .	
As	expected,	the	greater	is	p,	i.e.	the	number	of	agents	informed	at	t	=	0,	the	more	the	
central	 banker	 separation	 strategy	 approaches	 to	 the	 result	 of	 the	 monetary	 policy	
game	in	the	case	of	perfect	information	(Barro‐Gordon:	  1 ).	
The	 intuition	 of	 this	 result	 is	 very	 simple:	 if	 within	 an	 economy,	 the	 fraction	 of	
agents	 informed	 about	 the	 banker’s	 preferences	 is	 high,	 in	 the	 event	 of	 a	 significant	
increase	in	the	first	period	of	the	"surprise	inflation",	i.e.,	 e11   ,	the	cost	in	terms	of	
loss	of	reputation	for	the	banker	is	lower.29	Consequently,	the	central	banker	distorts	
less,	 and	 therefore	 the	 rate	 of	 inflation	 is	 higher,	 since	 it	 reduces	 the	 incentive	 to	
maintain	his	reputation.	
	
	 	
                                                 
29	Loss	of	reputation	is	represented	by	an	increase	in	the	second	period	of	inflation	expectations,	 e2 .	
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1.5.	Conclusions	
The	paper	has	presented	an	extension	of	the	monetary	policy	models	presented	by	
D’Amato	 and	Pistoresi	 (1996)	 and	by	 Sibert	 (2002)	 to	 the	 case	 in	which	 the	private	
sector	 is	 not	 homogeneous	 in	 regard	 to	 the	 observability	 of	 the	 Central	 Banker’s	
preferences.	More	 precisely,	 it	 has	 assumed	 that	 there	 are	 two	different	 fractions	 of	
private	agents:	one	completely	 informed	about	 the	 type	of	Central	Banker	when	 it	 is	
appointed;	 and	 one	 about	 which	 the	 Central	 Banker	 has	 private	 information.	 The	
results	obtained	show	that	the	information	context	and	the	degree	of	transparency	and	
observability	of	the	processes	that	lead	to	the	strategic	delegation	of	monetary	policy	
significantly	influence	the	nature	of	the	equilibrium.	
In	 the	 case	 in	 which	 the	 economy	 is	 characterized	 by	 high	 uncertainty	 among	
private	agents	about	 the	 identity	of	 the	Central	Banker	(i.e.	an	economy	with	a	small	
number	 of	 agents	 that	 observe	 the	 type	 α	 at	 the	moment	 of	 the	 appointment),	 one	
obtains	a	hybrid	pooling/separating	equilibrium	 in	which	 the	weaker	 types	 separate	
from	 each	 other,	 while	 the	 tougher	 types	 behave	 as	 an	 intermediate	 type	 which	
chooses	 an	 inflation	 rate	 equal	 to	 zero.	 In	 equilibrium,	 therefore,	 no	 Central	 Banker	
utilizes	a	strategy	with	an	inflation	rate	less	than	zero	(as	shown	by	Figure	3).	This	is	in	
substance	 an	 example	 in	which,	 even	 though	 there	 are	 infinite	 types	 of	 Banker	 and	
infinite	 actions,	 each	 type	 does	 not	 select	 a	 different	 type	 in	 order	 that	 it	 can	 be	
identified.	 In	 effect,	 only	 the	 less	 inflation‐averse	 types	 reveal	 their	 identity	
unequivocally	to	the	public.		
In	the	case	where	one	moves	towards	situations	of	the	monetary	authority’s	perfect	
observability	–	in	other	words,	there	is	a	large	number	of	agents	informed	about	type	α	
in	the	economy	–	the	pooling	equilibrium	breaks	down	and	there	emerges	a	complete	
separating	 equilibrium	 where	 each	 type	 selects	 an	 inflation	 rate	 lower	 than	 that	
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selected	by	the	wet	type	closest	to	it.	In	both	equilibria	(partial	pooling	and	complete	
separating),	it	is	the	intermediate	types	that	greatly	reduce	the	inflation	rate	compared	
to	the	case	in	which	preferences	are	fully	known	(Barro‐Gordon).	
As	pointed	out	in	the	introduction,	the	observability	of	commitment	and	the	nature	
of	 the	 Banker’s	 equilibrium	 strategies	 influence	 the	 design	 of	 the	 government’s	
strategic	delegation.	
An	 interesting	 problem	 for	 future	 research	 is	 modification	 of	 the	 game	 by	
introducing	 an	 initial	 stage	 in	which	 a	 continuum	 of	 governments	 appoint	 a	 Central	
banker	whose	preferences	 are	not	perfectly	 observable	by	 the	private	 sector.	 In	 this	
case,	 does	 a	 government	 with	 certain	 preferences	 have	 the	 incentive	 to	 appoint	
Bankers	with	preferences	different	from	its	own?	
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1.6. Appendix 
1.6.1.	Regularity	conditions	on	the	Central	Banker’s	welfare	
function	
	
As	said	in	Sections	2,	and	3	in	order	to	demonstrate	that	the	separating	equilibrium	
exists	and	is	unique,	one	must	check	Mailath’s	(1987)30	regularity	conditions	defined	
on	equation	(8),	which	are:	belief	monotonicity,	type	monotonicity,	and	single	crossing.		
	
Belief	monotonicity	condition	
0)1(~ˆ  pW  	
This	 condition	 represents	 the	 Central	 banker’s	 incentive	 to	 be	 believed	 ‘tough’	 in	
combating	 inflation.	 In	 effect,	 α(1	 –	 p)	 represents	 the	 marginal	 cost	 of	 the	 loss	 of	
reputation;	given	α,	the	marginal	cost	is	decreasing	in	p.	
	
Type	monotonicity	condition	
01~ 1 W 	
This	condition	represents	the	marginal	benefit	due	to	the	inflation	surprise,	for	each	
given	belief,	that	private	agents	have	about	the	type	of	Central	Banker.	This	condition	
states	 that	 the	 greater	 the	 weight	 that	 the	 monetary	 authority	 assigns	 to	
unemployment,	 the	 greater,	 at	 the	margin,	 is	 the	 positive	 effect	 of	 inflation	 for	 each	
given	belief	that	1	–	p	agents	have	about	the	type	of	Central	Banker.		
	
	
                                                 
30 Mailath (1987) provides two results that are useful in proving the existence of separating equilibria and 
characterizing such equilibria for a broad class of signaling games. A key element in the analysis of separating 
equilibria is the examination of the implied incentive compatibility constraints. It is shown that these 
constraints together with one of two conditions imply differentiability of strategies when the set of possible 
types is an interval. The first condition, implied by sequentiality in many games, is an initial value condition on 
the informed agent's strategy. The second condition is a monotonicity condition that turns out to be necessary 
and sufficient for there to be a strictly monotonic strategy satisfying the incentive compatibility constraints. 
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Single	crossing	condition	
0)1()~~( 21ˆ1  pWW  	
This	condition	is	satisfied	in	that	it	does	not	change	sign	for	 0)(1   :	that	is,	we	
restrict	the	analysis	to	positive	inflation	rates.	The	marginal	substitution	rate	between	
an	increase	in	inflation	in	the	first	period	and	the	consequent	loss	of	reputation	in	the	
second	period	is	an	increasing	monotonic	function	in	α.	In	other	words,	the	weaker	the	
Central	Banker,	the	greater	the	cost	that	it	must	bear	in	terms	of	future	reputation	for	
one	additional	unit	of	current	inflation.		
Under	these	conditions	a	single	equilibrium	of	separation	exists	and	is	described	by	
the	solution	of	the	differential	equation	(8).	
	
The	second‐order	condition	on	(8)	
The	equilibrium	characterization	of	complete	separating	and	"hybrid"	equilibrium:	
pooling	/	separating	requires	that	the	function	   31	is	convex	i.e.:	   0''  .	
It	can	be	shown	after	simple	algebra	that	   0''  32	if	    
 ' .	
By	 evaluating	 the	 inequality	 at	 (8)	 It	 is	 therefore	 necessary	 to	 consider	 the	 integral	
equation33:		
   dxxxp xd 21 11  	
that	is	defined	for	different	intervals	according	to	that:	∆ ⋚ 0.	
                                                 
31	 This	 is	 the	 function	 that	 solves	 the	 equation	 (8),	 given	 the	 initial	 condition BCBC AA )( .	 Also	
remember	that	in	the	case	in	which:	 4
3p 	the	function	      .	
32        2
'
'' 11

 
 pp 	 
33	With	 10  x ,	where	  
x ,		
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With	Δ	<	0	i.e.	 4
3p ,	the	fraction	of	integral34	dx	is	always	verified	with	 10  x ,	and	
then	   0''  	for	   10  
 .			
With	Δ	>0	i.e.	 4
3p 35,	the	fraction	of	integral	dx	is	verified	only	for	 


  2
341 ;0 px 	
and	



  1 ;2
341 p
x .	The	initial	condition	   BCBC AA  	requires	that	x	=	1	is	part	
of	equilibrium	and	then	for	 4
3p ,	we	have	that	inequality	    
 ' 	it	satisfied	for	



  1 ;2
341 p
x 	which	implies	that   0''  .		
With	 Δ=0	 i.e.	 4
3p ,	 the	 fraction	 of	 integral	 dx	 is	 verified	 only	 for	 

 2
1 ;0x and	


 1 ;2
1x .	
The	initial	condition	   BCBC AA  	requires	that	x=1	is	part	of	equilibrium	and	the	for	
4
3p ,	we	have:	 

 1 ;2
1x 	which	again	implies	   0''  .	
	
Separating equilibrium for different information contexts  
If	 4
3p ,	the	second‐order	condition	examined	in	the	previous	section	implies	that:	
 2
341  p
	
In	 this	 case,	 the	 definition	 of	  BCs A;0 ,	 such	 that	
s
lim   0 ,	 is	 verified	 for	
0s .	For	this	reason,	the	function	   ,	i.e.	the	solution	of	the	differential	equation	
(8),	is	the	separating	strategy	for	the	support	of	  BCA,0 .	
                                                 
34 i.e., 21
1
xxp
x

  
35	In	this	case	we	would	have	that	the	roots	of	x	will	be:	
2
341  px  ,	i.e.	



 



  1;2
341
2
341;0 ppx .	
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If	 4
3p 	second‐order	condition	examined	in	the	previous	section	implies	that:	
 2
1 	
In	 this	 case,	 too,	 definition	 of	  BCs A,0 ,	 such	 that	
s
lim   0 ,	 is	 verified	 for	
0s .	Hence,	 once	again	 the	 function	   	 is	 the	 separating	 strategy	 for	 the	 entire	
interval	of	  BCA,0 .	
If	 4
3p ,	 then	      	 is	 only	 a	 separating	 equilibrium	 in	 the	 interval	
BCs A  .	In	fact,	the	single	crossing	property	constrains	the	separating	strategy,	in	
that	it	imposes	positive	inflation	rates,	i.e.	   0 .	If	   0s ,	then	
s
lim   p1'  .	
Moreover,	for	   0 ,	then	 0lim   0'  	and	 BCAlim    ' .	Given	the	continuity	
of	the	two	functions	   	and	   ' 	it	is	necessary	that	   p1'  for	 BCs A 0 .	
This	demonstrates	that	      	satisfies	equation	(8)	for	 BCs A  .	
	
The	Central	Banker’s	incentive	of	to	deviate	from	the	pooling	equilibrium		
It	 was	 stressed	 in	 the	 third	 section	 that	 for	 the	 strategy	   0 ,	 in	 the	 interval	
s 0 ,	to	be	a	pooling	equilibrium,	it	must	be	that:	
)()(  PD ww  	with	 s 0 	 (1.18)
that	is,	the	monetary	authority	does	not	need	to	have	an	incentive	to	deviate	from	the	
inflation	 rate	 equal	 to	 zero.	 To	 demonstrate	 (18),	 it	 is	 first	 necessary	 to	 discuss	 the	
following	lemma.	
	
Lemma	1	In	a	‘hybrid’	equilibrium,	the	pooling	region	is	limited	by	 2
BC
s A .	
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The	function	   	is	a	monotonic	and	convex	function	in	the	interval	 BCs A  	(for	
p<3/4);	therefore,	given	the	initial	condition	   BCBC AA  ,	it	must	be	that:	
      ssBC BCs A Ap  1 	 (1.19)
from	which	follows:		
      dzzpdzzdzz
A
Azzdz s
AA A A
s
sBC
BC BC
s
BC Bc
s
BC
 


     10 0 	 	 (1.20)	
This	 inequality	 is	 verified	 for	 






 2;12
1 BCBCs AA
p
p .	 From	 which,	 given	 the	
definition	of	 s 	 as	 the	 critical	 value	 for	 equation	 (8),36	we	have	 that	 in	 equilibrium:	
2
BC
s A .	
It	is	now	possible	to	verify	(18).		
In	 the	 case	 of	 a	 pooling	 equilibrium	 such	 that	   01   p ,	 the	 regime	 of	
expectations	 in	 the	 first	 period,	 for	 the	 entire	 private	 sector,	 can	 be	 synthesised	 as	
follows:	
   EppE pp )1()( 11  	
where:	        dFE
BCA

0
.	
It	is	therefore	necessary	to	determine	the	optimal	deviation,	given	the	specification	
of	out‐of‐equilibrium	beliefs,	where	the	entire	private	sector,	after	having	observed	a	
positive	rate	of	inflation,	sets	 )(ˆ 11   .	
This	 specification	of	 out‐of‐equilibrium	beliefs	 is	 highly	 intuitive	 for	 those	private	
agents	that	do	not	have	information	about	type	α	at	the	moment	of	appointment,	that	
is,	 the	 (1	 –	 p).	 In	 fact,	 for	 whatever	 type	 belonging	 to	 the	 interval	 s 0 ,	 its	
                                                 
36	The	 exact	 value	of	αs	 depends	on	 the	parameter	p	 and	on	 the	 initial	 condition.	 If	we	normalize	 the	
support	 to	 1,	 i.e.	ABC	 =1	 and	 consider	 p	 =	 0,	αs,	 the	 point	 that	 divides	 the	 separation	 region	 from	 the	
pooling	region,	will	be	equal	to	0.504.	
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deviation	in	 favour	of	a	positive	inflation	rate	 is	 interpreted	by	the	fraction	1‐p	as	an	
equilibrium	strategy	     0  	chosen	by	a	type	 > s .	
The	 specification	 of	 out‐of‐equilibrium	 beliefs	 is	more	 complex	 if	 imposed	 on	 the	
fraction	equal	to	p.	In	this	case,	we	assume	that	such	agents,	after	a	deviation	played	by	
a	banker,	do	not	exploit	the	information	available	to	them	at	moment	of	the	banker’s	
appointment	to	infer	the	type	α;	but	they	too	use	the	observed	inflation	rate	to	fix	their	
future	 expectations	 of	 inflation.	 From	 this	 we	 have	 that:	
   )(ˆ0,|)0|( 1112122   EEe .	
It	is	therefore	possible	to	obtain	the	following	function	of	the	welfare	deriving	from	
the	deviation	strategy:	
        )0|(1211)(21 1221121   EpEppW pDDD (1.21)
Maximization	of	(21)	with	respect	to	 D1 yields	the	optimal	deviation,	which	will	be:	
 D1 	 (1.22)
If	 a	 deviation	 from	 01 p 	 exists,	 it	 will	 be	 BCD A1 ,	 i.e.	 the	 case	 of	 the	 worst	
possible	type.	
The	pay‐off	 function	 in	 the	case	of	deviation,	given	the	equilibrium	strategy	of	 the	
second	period	and	the	beliefs	of	the	private	sector	after	the	deviation,	is	equal	to	:	
      )0|()1(211)(21 12212   EpEpAAW BCBCD 	 (1.23)
The	pay‐off	function	in	the	case	of	pooling	for	 01  ,	given	the	equilibrium	strategy	
of	the	second	period	and	the	beliefs	of	the	private	sector,	is	equal	to:	
     )0|()1(2
11 1221   EpEpW p 	 (1.24)	
31 
At	 this	 point,	 using	 (24)	 and	 (23),	 it	 is	 possible	 to	 verify	 that )()(  PD ww  	 for	
s 0 .	 In	 fact,	after	some	algebraic	steps,	one	 finds	 that	 this	 inequality	 is	always	
verified	in	the	case	in	which	 2
BC
s A 	.	
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Chapter	II: 		
On	 the	 determinants	 of	 central	 bank	
independence	in	open	economies	
 
 
 
2.1.	Introduction	
Several	studies	have	documented	how	the	independence	of	the	monetary	authority	
is	an	essential	part	of	the	explanation	for	why	inflation	rates	differ	among	countries.37	
In	 particular,	 Cukierman,	Webb	 and	 Neyapti	 (1992)	 show	 that	 inflation	 is	 generally	
higher	in	the	high‐income	countries	with	less	independent	central	banks,	whereas	the	
relation	does	 not	 hold	 for	 other	 countries.	Moreover,	 this	 empirical	 literature	 shows	
that	there	is	no	relation	between	central	bank	independence	and	volatility	of	the	real	
economy,	 at	 least	 in	 the	 subset	 of	 high	 income	 countries.	 This	 finding	 has	 been	
interpreted	to	indicate	that	guaranteeing	the	central	bank’s	independence	gives	a	‘free	
lunch’,	in	that	average	inflation	is	reduced	without	entailing	a	cost	in	terms	of	greater	
output	instability.	All	these	studies	suggest	the	idea	that	central	bank	independence	is	
a	way	out,	possibly	a	“quick	fix”,	of	the	inflationary	equilibrium	outcome.	Nevertheless,	
there	exists	significant	variation	in	central	bank	independence	across	countries.		
The	aim	of	this	paper	is	to	contribute	to	the	empirical	study	of	the	determinants	of	
central	bank	independence	in	open	economies.	Following	the	bulk	of	the	literature	on	
this	problem,	we	follow	the	perspective	in	Rogoff	(1985a)	and	interpret	delegation	of	
monetary	 policy	 as	 a	 commitment	 device	 to	 eradicate	 the	 inflationary	 bias.	 Among	
others,	 Cukierman	 (1994)	 develops	 a	 rich	 conceptual	 framework,	 based	 on	 the	
                                                 
	 A	 shorter	 version	 of	 this	 chapter	 (with	M.	 D'Amato	 and	 B.	 Pistoresi)	 was	 published	 in	 2009	 in	 the	
International	Journal	of	Finance	&	Economics.	
37	 Most	 notable	 among	 them	 are	 Bade	 and	 Parking	 (1988),	 Grilli,	 Masciandaro	 and	 Tabellini	 (1991),	
Cukierman,	Webb	and	Neyapti	(1992),	and	Alesina	and	Summers	(1993).	
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commitment	hypothesis,	that	allows	us	to	formulate	a	hypothesis	that	can	account	for	
cross	 country	 variation	 in	 Central	 banker	 degree	 of	 independence	 in	 a	 closed	
economy.38	That	central	bankers	have	to	be	interpreted	as	a	commitment	device	in	the	
hands	of	the	political	body	to	refrain	from	inflation	temptations	has	been	assumed	in	
the	literature	on	monetary	institutions	at	least	since	the	time	of	Ricardo	(1824).		
Despite	the	presence	of	many	empirical	studies	on	the	determinants	of	Central	Bank	
independence,	 the	 evidence	 that	 there	 is	 indeed	 a	 strategic	 pre‐commitment	
mechanism	at	the	root	of	the	delegated	power	is	not	strong.	The	failure	of	the	indexes	
of	 central	 bank	 independence	 to	 affect	 long	 run	 inflation	 in	 countries	 other	 than	 the	
highly‐industrialized	ones	may	suggest	that	commitment	is	irrelevant	in	the	economies	
lagging	behind	in	the	process	of	development.		
In	his	interpretation	of	the	determinants	of	long	run	inflation,	Romer	(1993)	argues	
that	commitment	contributed	to	overcome	the	inflationary	bias	only	in	the	most	highly	
industrialized	 countries.	 He	 finds	 that	 the	 same	 mechanism	 does	 not	 seem	 to	 have	
been	at	work	in	other	countries	and	notices	that	“the	data	are	not	at	all	supportive	of	
the	 view	 that	 the	 extent	 to	 which	 countries	 have	 solved	 the	 dynamic	 inconsistency	
problem	 is	a	smoothly	 increasing	 function	of	 their	 level	of	development”,	 leaving	 the	
question	 of	 what	 drives	 the	 incentives	 to	 adopt	 the	 institutional	 solution	 open.	
Campillo	 and	Miron	 (1997)	 in	 their	 detailed	 empirical	 study	 on	 the	 determinants	 of	
long	 run	 inflation	 conclude	 that	 the	 data	 suggest	 that	 there	 is	 no	 quick	 fix	 to	 be	
                                                 
38	To	explain	cross	country	variation	in	the	observed	degree	of	independence	the	commitment	approach	
(Rogoff,	 1985a;	 Lohmann,	 1992)	 argues	 that	 the	 costs	 of	 an	 independent	 Central	 Bank,	 from	 the	
government’s	 point	 of	 view,	 consist	 mainly	 of	 the	 loss	 of	 flexibility	 in	 monetary	 policymaking.	 The	
balance	 between	 flexibility	 and	 credibility	 determines	 the	 equilibrium	 degree	 of	 central	 bank	
independence	 in	 a	 country	 (see	 Alesina	 and	 Grilli,	 1993),	 for	 a	 median	 voter	 interpretation	 of	 the	
Rogoff’s	 model).	 The	 balance	 between	 costs	 and	 benefits	 in	 delegating	 the	 power	 to	 manage	 paper	
money	may	depend	on	many	aspects	of	the	economy	and	on	its	institutional	framework.	Any	economic	
factor	increasing	the	inflationary	bias	and	reducing	the	exogenous	source	of	variability	should,	coeteris	
paribus,	 increase	the	incentive	to	commitment.	Theoretical	studies	on	central	bank	independence	have	
focused	on	both	political	and	economic	factors	shaping	the	incentives	to	commitment.	They	mainly	rely	
on	articulated	models	of	political	equilibria,	focusing	on	closed	economy	determinants	of	the	inflationary	
bias,	 on	 the	 redistributive	 aspects	 of	monetary	 policy	 and	 on	 political	 institutions	 (Cukierman,	 1992;	
Cukierman,	1994;	Drazen,	2000;	De	Haan	and	van’t	Haag,	1995).		
34 
exploited	for	the	solution	of	the	inflationary	bias,	casting	some	doubts	on	the	empirical	
relevance	of	the	commitment	hypothesis	for	all	the	economies	in	their	sample.	Daniels	
et	 al.	 (2005)	 argue	 that	 the	 index	 of	 central	 bank	 independence	 is	 relevant	 for	
understanding	 the	 relationship	 between	 openness	 and	 the	 sacrifice	 ratio	 faced	 by	
policy	makers.		
Why	 then	 have	 only	 some	 countries	 solved	 the	 dynamic	 inconsistency	 problem	
whereas	others	have	not?	 Is	 the	commitment	hypothesis	empirically	relevant	 for	our	
understanding	of	the	institutional	framework	of	monetary	policy	around	the	world?	
To	 verify	 whether	 the	 commitment	 is	 empirically	 relevant	 and	 to	 address	 what	
incentives	 may	 drive	 its	 adoption,	 we	 study	 some	 positive	 implications	 of	 the	
commitment	 hypothesis	 for	 the	 design	 of	 monetary	 institutions	 in	 open	 economies	
testing	for	the	determinants	of	central	bank	independence	on	a	sample	of	55	countries.		
Our	 approach	 follows	 quite	 closely	 the	 empirical	 strategy	 in	 Romer	 (1993),	
relocating	 his	 analysis	 of	 the	 inflationary	 bias	 at	 the	 commitment	 level.	 Testing	 the	
implications	of	the	commitment	hypothesis	is	as	important	as	testing	the	implications	
of	 the	 inflationary	 bias	 hypothesis,	 for	 at	 least	 two	 reasons.	 On	 the	 one	 hand,	
commitment	 is	one	of	 the	most	 influential	policy	 implications	of	 the	 inflationary	bias	
literature	and	testing	its	empirical	relevance	is	crucial.	On	the	other	hand,	this	allows	
us	to	address	important	questions	like	why,	as	Romer	(1993)	puts	it,	only	high	income	
countries	seem	to	have	solved	the	credibility	problem	through	commitment?	
To	 this	aim	we	extend	previous	empirical	work	 in	 three	directions:	 (a)	 the	role	of	
openness	 in	 the	 incentives	 to	 commitment,	 (b)	 the	 related	 issue	 of	 synchronicity	 of	
business	 cycles	 among	 countries	 as	 a	 driving	 force	 of	 the	 institutional	 design	 of	
monetary	authorities	and	(c)	the	determinants	of	the	effectiveness	of	the	commitment	
technology.	 Specifically,	 we	 study	 three	 testable	 implications	 of	 the	 commitment	
hypothesis	 that	 have	 not	 been	 investigated	 in	 previous	 contributions	 by	 focusing	 on	
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the	 implications	of	the	game	theoretic	analysis	of	 the	pre‐commitment	strategies	and	
on	the	determinants	of	 the	 inflationary	bias	and	related	 incentives	to	commitment	 in	
open	economies.	
The	 first	 testable	 implication	 is	 derived	 from	 the	 game	 theoretic	 frame	 of	
commitment	 choices.	 In	 order	 to	 be	 valuable	 as	 a	 commitment	 device	 in	 the	
government’s	 hand,	 a	 delegated	 institution	 has	 to	 be	 visible	 and	 credible	 among	 the	
general	 public.	 Coeteris	 paribus,	 the	 more	 transparent39	 to	 the	 general	 public	 the	
institution	is,	the	larger	the	equilibrium	level	of	commitment	is	expected	to	be,	i.e.	the	
larger	 the	 independence	 and	 the	 scope	 of	 the	 delegated	 power	 to	 that	 institution 
(Fershtman	and	Kalai,	1997).	
The	 other	 testable	 implications	 we	 focus	 on	 refer	 to	 specific	 features	 of	 the	
incentives	 to	 commitment	 of	monetary	policy	 in	 open	 economies.	 If	 theory	 suggests,	
and	data	confirm,	that	openness	is	relevant	for	understanding	the	inflationary	bias,	 it	
must	be	also	relevant	for	understanding	the	incentives	to	commitment.	Rogoff	(1985b)	
and	Romer	(1993),	have	argued	and	documented	that	the	inflationary	bias	has	specific	
features	 in	 open	 economies	 that	 are	 not	 taken	 into	 account	 in	 the	 closed	 economy	
formulation,	due	to	the	interdependence	in	the	stabilization	monetary	policy.	Campillo	
and	Miron	(1997)	and	Lane	(1997)	provide	additional	empirical	evidence	in	support	of	
this	 view.	Dolado,	Griffith	 and	Padilla	 (1994)	 and	D’Amato	 and	Martina	 (2005)	 have	
explored	 the	 implications	 of	 openness	 for	 the	 equilibrium	 degree	 of	 commitment	 of	
monetary	policy.		
                                                 
39	 Geraats	 (2000)	 has	 classified	 different	meanings	 that	 the	 term	 “transparency”	may	 refer	 to	 in	 the	
context	 of	 monetary	 policy	 making.	 Here	 we	 focus	 on	 what	 Geraats	 (2000)	 defines	 as	 “political	
transparency”,	 meaning	 the	 capacity	 of	 the	 general	 public	 to	 understand	 policy	 objectives	 and	
institutional	 arrangements	 that	 shape	 monetary	 policy	 reply	 and	 then	 the	 inflationary	 bias.	 We	 use	
average	 daily	 newspaper	 circulation	 in	 a	 country	 to	 measure	 the	 degree	 of	 visibility	 of	 a	 monetary	
institution	 among	 the	 general	 public.	 This	 is	 admittedly	 quite	 an	 approximate	 measure,	 especially	
because	it	may	capture	other	effects	other	than	the	degree	of	transparency	of	a	monetary	institution.	A	
detailed	discussion	of	this	issue	is	postponed	to	the	following	section.	
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In	particular,	the	second	implication	is	derived	from	a	straightforward	extension	of	
the	model	in	Romer	(1993):	incentives	to	commitment	have	to	be	inversely	related	to	
the	degree	of	openness	in	the	economy	since,	under	flexible	exchange	rate,	the	terms	of	
trade	 mechanisms	 are	 a	 “self‐built‐in	 check”	 on	 inflation	 temptations.	 The	 third	
implication	 of	 a	 commitment	 model	 in	 open	 economies	 requires	 the	 degree	 of	
independence	 to	 be	 positively	 related	 to	 the	 size	 of	 the	 worldwide	 common	
components	 in	 the	 business	 cycles	 of	 each	 country.	 This	 latter	 hypothesis	 is	 a	 less	
straightforward	implication	of	the	model	in	Romer	(1993)	and	rests	on	the	idea	that,	in	
the	presence	of	common	components,	stabilization	policy	provided	in	one	country	has	
a	positive	spill‐over	on	the	amount	of	stabilization	policy	provided	abroad	at	no	costs	
in	terms	of	credibility.	Because	of	this	strategic	externality,	each	country	in	the	world	
economy	will	try	to	free	ride	on	the	stabilization	provided	by	central	bankers	abroad	to	
save	on	credibility	costs	at	home	and	it	will	appoint	more	independent	central	bankers,	
with	 strong	 commitment	 to	 anti	 inflationary	 objectives.	 The	 size	 of	 this	 incentive	
directly	 depends	 on	 the	 relative	 size	 of	 the	 common	 component	 over	 the	 country	
specific	component	of	the	business	cycle	in	each	economy,	(see	D'Amato	and	Martina,	
2005,	for	further	details).		
In	our	analysis	we	use	 the	data‐set	constructed	by	Cukierman,	Webb	and	Neyapty	
(1992)	as	for	the	overall	index	of	Central	Banker	degree	of	independence	covering	the	
period	1980‐89.40	It	has	to	be	noticed	that	a	few	institutional	reforms	of	central	bank	
institutions	 has	 occurred	 in	 several	 countries	 in	 the	 last	 decade	 not	 covered	 by	 the	
index	above	whose	analysis	may	be	of	interest.41	The	reason	why	we	decided	to	limit	
                                                 
40	See	the	Appendix	for	the	definition.	
41	 Several	 countries	 in	 our	 sample	 were	 interested	 by	 institutional	 reforms	 in	 the	 degree	 of	 CB	
independence	 during	 the	 nineties.	 Most	 notable	 among	 them	 are	 the	 establishment	 of	 the	 European	
Central	Bank	1998;	others	are	Argentina	1992,	Chile	1989,	Colombia	1992,	Egypt	1992,	Honduras	1995,	
Indonesia	1998,	 Japan	1998,	Korea	1998,	Mexico	1994,	New	Zealand	1989,	Pakistan	1994,	Peru	1992,	
Philippines	1993,	 South	Africa	 1989,	 Sweden	1998,	Turkey	1989,	Uganda	1993,	U.K.	 1998,	Venezuela	
1992.		
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our	 investigation	of	 the	determinants	 of	 central	 bankers’	 degree	of	 independence	by	
using	 the	 original	 Cukierman,	Webb	 and	Neyapty	 (1992)	 data	 set	 is	 twofold.	 Firstly,	
our	 aim	 is	 to	 analyze	 the	 determinants	 of	 what	 these	 authors	 define	 as	 actual	
independence	(compared	to	legal	independence)	and,	as	far	as	we	are	aware	of,	there	
exist	no	updated	data	set	for	the	overall	index	covering	the	whole	sample	used	in	our	
analysis.42	 The	 other	 reason	 is	 that	 our	 investigation	 is	 aimed	 at	 testing	 the	
implications	 of	 the	 commitment	 hypothesis	 on	 a	 data	 set	 commonly	 adopted	 in	
previous	 studies	 and	 we	 prefer	 to	 preserve	 homogeneity	 in	 order	 to	 compare	 our	
results	and	interpretation	with	the	benchmark	literature.		
Our	 findings	 show	 that	 all	 the	 predictions	 above	 are	 supported	 in	 the	 data.	
Controlling	 for	 other	 variables,	 openness,	 the	 degree	 of	 synchronization	 among	
business	cycles	and	a	measure	of	institutional	transparency	turn	out	to	be	significant	in	
the	 regression	 for	 the	 degree	 of	 monetary	 authority	 dependence,	 with	 the	 signs	
predicted	by	the	commitment	hypothesis.	Therefore,	even	if	the	commitment	approach	
does	not	seem	to	be	relevant	in	the	data	for	explaining	long	run	inflation	in	countries	
other	 than	 the	 highly‐industrialized	 ones,	 our	 exploration	 of	 the	 determinants	 of	
independence	is	consistent	with	the	view	that	strategic	delegation	is	indeed	at	the	root	
of	the	delegated	power	and	objectives	of	the	monetary	institutions	across	all	countries.	
The	 point	 is	 that	 in	 some	 countries	 it	 is	 more	 effective	 than	 in	 others	 because	 of	
economic	and	strategic	reasons.	
                                                 
42	Indeed	a	few	studies	have	updated	the	index	of	central	banks’	legal	independence.	Specifically,	Polillo	
and	 Guillen	 (2005)	 update	 the	 Cukierman’s	 legal	 index	 up	 to	 2000,	 Arnone,	 Laurens	 and	 Segalotto	
(2006)	update	 both	 the	Cukierman’s	 legal	 index	up	 to	 2003	 and	 the	Grilli,	Masciandaro	 and	Tabellini	
(1991)	index	up	to	2003.	This	latter	index	covers	the	original	sample	(18	countries	in	the	OECD	group)	
considered	by	Grilli	et	al.	(1991).	A	few	developing	countries	(Brazil,	Egypt,	India,	Israel,	Mexico,	Peru,	
Philippines,	South	Africa)	have	been	considered	in	the	latter	study	but,	in	this	case,	the	index	only	covers	
the	 decade	 of	 the	 90s.	 Therefore,	we	 cannot	 use	 these	 indexes	 as	 a	 proxy	 of	 actual	 independence	 to	
enlarge	our	time	span	because	this	interpretation	is	debatable	(Cukierman,	1992)	since	it	would	reduce	
significantly	the	size	of	our	sample.	
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The	rest	of	the	paper	is	organized	as	follows:	Section	2	summarizes	the	theoretical	
framework	and	the	relevant	related	literature.	Section	3	sets	out	the	empirical	results	
of	the	analysis.	Section	4	presents	the	conclusions.	
	
 
2.2.	A	 framework	 for	 the	analysis	of	 commitment	 in	
open	economies	and	related	literature		
In	 this	 section	 we	 cast	 a	 framework	 for	 the	 estimated	 empirical	 model.	 The	
explanation	of	cross	country	differences	in	central	bank	degree	of	independence	relies	
on	 several	 variants	 of	 the	 commitment	 hypothesis	 put	 forward	 by	 Rogoff	 (1985a).	
Cukierman	 (1994)	 summarizes	 testable	 implications	derived	 from	 this	approach.	We	
reappraise	here	some	of	these	implications	with	a	specific	focus	on	open	economies.	To	
this	aim	we	additionally	consider:	1)	the	determinants	of	inflationary	bias	in	an	open	
economy	and	2)	the	degree	of	observability	of	the	institutional	strategic	commitment.		
Several	 factors,	 influencing	 the	 inflationary	 bias	 and	 thus	 enter	 the	 regression	 for	
the	 degree	 of	 dependence	 as	 the	 endogenous	 variable.	 The	measure	 of	 central	 bank	
degree	of	dependence,	we	consider,	 is	 the	one	 constructed	by	Cukierman,	Webb	and	
Neyapti	 (1992)	 and	 also	 used	 by	 Romer	 (1993),	 Lane	 (1997).43	 We	 use	 this	 index	
because	it	is	reported	for	the	largest	number	of	countries	covering	both	OECD	and	non‐
OECD	economies.	On	 the	basis	of	 this	 framework,	 the	 following	 testable	 implications	
can	be	obtained:		
	
                                                 
43	 The	 theoretical	 literature	 distinguishes	 between	 the	 political	 independence	 and	 the	 functional	
independence	of	 the	central	bank.	Political	 independence	 is	 the	 freedom	of	a	central	bank	to	pursue	a	
monetary	 policy	 strategy	 consistently	 with	 price	 stability.	 Functional	 independence	 concerns	 tactics:	
that	 is,	 the	 freedom	 to	 choose	 the	 monetary	 control	 instruments	 and	 techniques	 which	 enable	
achievement	of	a	given	objective.	The	indices	used	by	the	empirical	literature	to	measure	the	degree	of	a	
central	bank’s	independence	consider	both	types	of	independence.	
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a.	Central	bank	dependence	is	larger	the	larger	the	degree	of	openness		
According	 to	Romer	 (1993)	and	Lane	 (1997)	a	 larger	degree	of	openness	 reduces	
the	 inflationary	bias	 for	 the	Central	Banker	 and	 therefore,	 as	 shown	 in	D’Amato	 and	
Martina	(2005),	reduces	the	incentive	to	commitment	for	the	Government.	As	a	proxy	
for	 the	 degree	 of	 openness	 we	 use	 the	 same	 index	 as	 in	 Romer	 (1993)	 that	 is	 the	
import	share	over	the	GDP.	
The	 impact	 of	 openness	 on	 the	 incentive	 to	 commitment	 also	 works	 through	 an	
alternative	channel:	the	level	of	synchronization	between	the	country’s	business	cycle	
and	the	world	business	cycle.	
	
b.	 Central	 bank	 dependence	 is	 larger	 the	 lower	 the	 degree	 of	 business	 cycles	
synchronization	across	countries		
The	size	of	the	world‐wide	common	component	in	the	business	cycle	will	turn	out	to	
be	 a	 crucial	 variable	 for	 the	 understanding	 of	 why	 institutional	 solutions	 to	 the	
inflationary	bias	problem	have	been	adopted	only	in	highly	industrialized	countries.	To	
understand	why	this	is	relevant	consider	that	when	the	correlation	between	the	shocks	
to	 the	 level	 of	 economic	 activity	 at	 home	 and	 abroad	 is	 positive,	 Governments	 will	
rationally	 expect	 their	 economies	 to	 be	 in	 the	 same	 state	 of	 the	 world	 (booms	 or	
slumps)	 as	 foreign	 economies.	 The	 inflationary	 bias	 hypothesis	 predicts	 that	 more	
stabilization	 abroad	 entails	 larger	 flexibility	 of	 the	 policy	 response	 by	 the	 national	
Central	Banker.44	Hence	all	Governments	in	each	country	have	a	strategic	incentive	to	
commit	 monetary	 policy	 in	 order	 to	 try	 to	 free‐ride	 on	 the	 stabilization	 provided	
abroad	 and	 gain	 credibility	 at	 home.	 The	 larger	 the	 degree	 of	 correlation	 among	
                                                 
44	Consider	the	case	of	bad	shocks	abroad.	An	increase	in	money	supply	by	the	foreign	Central	Banker	
reduces	the	perceived	cost	of	 inflation	for	the	CB	at	home	because	of	the	terms	of	trade	effect	and	the	
associated	deflation	on	the	CPI	index.	This	mechanism	the	same	as	in	Romer	(1993)	and	Rogoff	(1985b)	
induces	complementarities	in	the	policy	response	by	CBs.	See	D’Amato	and	Martina	(2005)	for	further	
details	on	this	issue	and	a	formal	derivation	of	the	result	summarized	in	the	text.	
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shocks,	 the	 larger	 the	 incentives	 to	 commitment.	 To	 proxy	 the	 size	 of	 the	 common	
component	in	the	business	cycle	in	the	countries	included	in	our	sample,	we	compute	
the	 correlation	 between	 real	 GDP	 growth	 rate	 in	 each	 country	 and	 the	 analogous	
measure	for	the	US.45		
The	 third	 testable	 implication	 of	 the	 commitment	 hypothesis	 considered	 in	 our	
analysis	relates	to	the	formal	game	theoretic	argument	about	strategic	conditions	that	
make	commitment	profitable:		
		
c.	 Central	 bank	 dependence	 is	 larger,	 the	 lower	 the	 degree	 of	 observability	 of	 the	
delegated	institution		
This	is	another	crucial	variable	that	enable	us	to	test	for	the	strategic	commitment	
approach	to	central	bank	independence.	As	it	is	well	known,	the	results	obtained	in	the	
literature	 on	 commitment	 and	 observability	 (Bagwell,	 1995;	 Fershtman	 and	 Kalai,	
1997)	show	that	the	benefits	accruing	to	a	player	from	constraining	its	actions	through	
commitment	 (via	 delegation)	 are	 crucially	 linked	 to	 the	 likelihood	 that	 the	
commitment	choice	will	be	observed	by	other	players.46	In	the	case	of	monetary	policy,	
therefore,	if	the	commitment	approach	to	institutional	design	has	empirical	relevance,	
one	 would	 expect	 a	 positive	 relation	 between	 the	 extent	 to	 which	 delegation	 is	
observable	by	the	private	sector	and	the	equilibrium	level	of	commitment.	Intuitively,	
the	larger	the	degree	of	observability	of	the	Government’s	choice,	the	higher	will	be	its	
incentive	 to	 commit	 (direct	 effect).	 There	 is	 also	 an	 indirect	 effect:	 the	 larger	 the	
                                                 
45	 A	 possible	 alternative	 proxy	 is	 the	 correlation	 between	 the	 GDP	 growth	 in	 each	 country	 and	 a	
weighted	average	of	the	growth	rates	of	the	economies	in	the	sample.	As	we	will	see	the	choice	of	the	
proxy	does	not	affect	our	results.		
46	This	is	the	result	obtained	by	Fershtman	and	Kalai	(1997)	and	it	contrasts	with	the	one	obtained	by	
Bagwell	(1995).	In	this	latter	model,	followers	face	a	small	probability	of	error	about	the	leader’s	action.	
This	 small	 probability	makes	 the	 information	 about	 the	 action	 useless:	 the	 incentive	 to	 commitment	
collapse.	By	contrast,	in	Fershtman	and	Kalai	(1997)	model	there	is	also	a	probability	that	the	player	is	
informed	about	his	opponent’s	action	but,	and	this	 is	the	crucial	difference,	when	a	player	is	 informed	
about	his	opponent’s	action	this	information	is	accurate.	This	accuracy	restores	the	incentives	to	commit	
and	commitment	is,	intuitively,	increasing	in	the	probability	that	one	player’s	action	is	observed.		
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degree	 of	 observability	 of	 the	 Central	 Banker’s	 objectives	 the	 more	 difficult	 is	 to	
engineer	 an	 inflation	 surprise,	 the	 worse	 the	 inflationary	 bias	 equilibrium	 from	 the	
point	 of	 view	 of	 the	 government.47	 As	 a	 proxy	 for	 the	 degree	 of	 observability	 of	
institutions	 by	 the	 general	 public	 we	 use	 is	 the	 average	 per	 capita	 circulating	 daily	
newspapers	which	measures	of	 the	 strength	of	 the	public	opinion.	This	 is,	 of	 course,	
not	 close	 to	our	 ideal	proxy	 for	 the	variable	 in	question.	The	main	problem	 is	 that	 it	
may	 be	 correlated	 with	 other	 variables	 also	 affecting	 the	 incentive	 to	 strategic	
commitment.	 In	particular,	 per	 capita	daily	newspapers	may	 capture	different	 forces	
related	 to	 the	 level	 of	 development	 of	 the	 economy	 and	 its	 financial	 system,	 the	
efficiency	of	the	tax	system	and	other	variables	that	may	influence	the	inflationary	bias.	
To	 disentangle	 these	 effects,	 we	will	 also	 include	 real	 per	 capita	 GDP	 as	 a	 separate	
variable	in	our	equations.	
We	include	also	a	set	of	control	variables	to	capture	other	factors	considered	in	the	
literature	 as	 potentially	 relevant	 for	 understanding	 the	 inflationary	 bias	 and	 the	
delegation	choice.	
	
d.	Central	bank	dependence	and	the	past	experience	of	inflation	
There	are	two	different	explanations	 for	why	past	 inflation	may	be	 important	as	a	
determinant	of	current	institutional	arrangements,	under	the	commitment	hypothesis.		
Following	 Cukierman	 (1992),	 we	 may	 argue	 that	 inflation,	 when	 sufficiently	
sustained,	will	erode	central	bank	independence.	High	and	sustained	inflation	leads	to	
the	 evolution	 of	 automatic	 or	 semi‐automatic	 accommodative	 mechanisms,	 like	
indexation	of	contracts	in	the	labor	and	capital	markets	to	the	general	price	level	or	to	
                                                 
47	This	argument	 follows	from	a	straightforward	modification	of	 the	streamlined	version	of	the	Rogoff	
(1985a)	model	along	the	lines	of	the	model	by	Fershtman	and	Kalai	(1997)	where	the	delegation	choice	
is	observed	only	by	a	fraction	of	agents.		
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the	 price	 of	 foreign	 exchange.48	 Society	 becomes	 accustomed	 to	 inflation,	 thereby	
reducing	opposition	to	inflation	and	public	pressure	for	an	independent	central	bank.		
	
De	Haan	and	van’t	Hag	(1995)	and	Hayo	(1998)	on	the	other	hand	argued	that	the	
experience	of	high	levels	of	inflation,	for	prolonged	periods	of	time,	generates	popular	
support	for	anti‐inflationary	monetary	policies.	Countries	which	have	experienced	high	
rates	of	inflation	in	the	past	may	be	more	aware	of	its	harmful	consequences	and	may	
therefore	 develop	 greater	 aversion	 to	 the	 problem.	 This	 idea	 is	 frequently	 used	 to	
explain	the	 low	inflation	rates	recorded	 in	Germany	after	 the	Second	World	War	and	
the	 independence	 of	 the	 Bundesbank	 (Issing,	 1993).	 The	 idea	 that,	 after	 periods	 of	
hyperinflation,	a	‘culture’	in	favor	of	price	stability	in	‘society’	may	arise	(Hayo,	1998)49	
suggests	that	there	is	a	positive	relation	between	past	inflation	and	the	central	bank’s	
degree	of	independence.		
Both	 these	positions	 find	empirical	 support.	We	have	no	prior	 about	which	of	 the	
two	mechanisms	described	above	has	empirical	relevance	and	we	leave	the	answer	to	
our	data.	
	
e.	Central	bank	dependence	and	political	instability	
The	 relationship	 between	 political	 instability	 and	 the	 level	 of	 dependence	 is	 not	
clear‐cut	 in	 the	 commitment	 literature.	 On	 the	 one	 hand,	 the	 high	 variability	 of	 the	
political	environment	may	 imply	a	 lower	ability	 to	achieve	commitment	of	monetary	
policy	 through	 delegation	 to	 an	 independent	 institution.	 On	 the	 other	 hand,	 a	 larger	
political	instability	may	increase	the	benefits	to	commitment.	From	an	empirical	point	
                                                 
48	Countries	such	as	Brazil,	Argentina,	and	Israel	experienced	elaborate	indexation	for	many	years.	But	
even	in	countries	with	relatively	mild	inflationary	experiences	such	United	States,	Italy,	France,	Britain	
an	increase	in	the	proportion	of	indexed	contracts	followed	the	inflationary	experience	of	the	1970s.	
49	In	fact,	after	Germany’s	inflation	explosion	of	1923,	monetary	stability	was	not	a	goal	pursued	by	the	
Bundesbank	alone	but	a	priority	for	society	as	a	whole.	On	this	point	also	see	the	literature	cited	in	De	
Haan	and	van’t	Hag	(1995).	
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of	 view,	 the	 relation	 between	 political	 instability	 and	 Central	 bank	 independence	 is	
ambiguous	 and	 it	 mainly	 depends	 on	 the	 variable	 used	 to	 proxy	 instability.50	 For	
example,	Cukierman	(1992,	1994)	predicts	and	verifies	empirically	that	a	high	level	of	
party	political	 instability	 induces	a	 larger	 level	of	 independence,	whereas	 the	regime	
political	instability	has	a	negative	effect	on	Central	Bank	independence.	A	partial	list	of	
similar	studies,	in	which	different	measure	of	political	instability	and	several	indices	of	
central	bank	independence	are	used,	includes	De	Haan	and	van’t	Hag	(1995),	De	Haan	
and	Siermann	(1996),	Bagheri	and	Habibi	(1997),	Farvaque	(2002).	We	use	the	index	
of	 regime	 political	 instability	 as	 in	 Romer	 (1993).	 A	 richer	 analysis	 of	 the	 political	
determinants	of	the	incentives	to	commit	would	have	severely	limited	the	size	of	our	
sample.		
	
f.	Central	bank	dependence	is	larger	the	lower	the	Government’s	debt	and	deficit	
From	the	empirical	point	of	view,	a	 large	body	of	empirical	evidence	(Poterba	and	
Rotemberg;	 1990;	 Grilli,	 Masciandaro	 and	 Tabellini,	 1991;	 Cukierman,	 1992)	 shows	
that	 cross‐country	 differences	 in	 average	 inflation	 rates	 relate	 with	 considerations	
based	on	the	level	of	optimal	taxation.	Countries	with	weak	public	budget	suffer	from	
an	excessive	 inflationary	bias	which	may	 increase	the	 interest	burden.	Therefore,	 the	
benefits	 from	commitment	will	 tend	 to	be	 larger	 (Barro,	1983;	Cukierman,	1994).	 In	
our	 empirical	 specification	we	will	 use	 the	 level	 of	public	 expenditure	over	GDP,	 the	
level	 of	 public	 deficit	 over	 the	 GDP	 as	 a	 measure	 for	 the	 governmental	 financial	
position	because	we	were	not	able	 to	 reconstruct	public	debt	 for	many	countries	 for	
which	 the	 index	 of	 central	 bank	 dependence	 exists.	 Similar	 arguments	 hold	 for	 the	
                                                 
50	Party	political	 instability	refers	 to	 the	 frequent	changes	of	government	between	competing	political	
parties	 democratically	 elected	within	 a	 given	 constitutional	 context,	 while	 regime	 political	 instability	
reflects	changes	in	a	country’s	political‐institutional	system	brought	about	by	non‐democratic	methods.	
We	consider	the	regime	political	instability	see	the	Appendix	for	details.	
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expected	 impact	 of	 the	 share	of	banking	 sector	 credit	 held	by	 the	private	 sector	 (i.e.	
M2/GDP)	as	a	nominal	asset	and	a	tax	base	for	the	inflation	tax.	
	
g.	Central	bank	dependence	and	the	level	of	development	
From	 the	 point	 of	 view	 of	 the	 inflationary	 bias	 approach	 to	 monetary	 policy	 the	
impact	of	per	capita	GDP	on	average	inflation	is	not	clear‐cut.	On	the	one	hand,	a	higher	
level	 of	per	 capita	 income	 level	 entails	 a	 lower	degree	of	 (real	 and	 financial)	market	
failures	in	the	economy,	a	more	efficient	fiscal	system	and	therefore	a	lower	incentive	
to	create	inflation	for	the	central	banker.	On	the	other	hand,	economic	agents	in	high	
income	countries	might	be	better	hedged	against	 inflation,	so	 their	 inflation	aversion	
may	be	lower	(Campillo	and	Miron,	1997).	Opposite	effects	on	the	inflationary	bias	in	
monetary	 policy	 entail	 opposite	 effects	 on	 the	 incentives	 to	 pre‐commit	 monetary	
policy.	We	 consider	 the	 real	 GDP	 per	 capita	 as	 an	 indicator	 of	 a	 general	measure	 of	
development.	In	Romer	(1993,	table	III,	p.	882)	a	larger	per	capita	GDP	has	a	negative	
impact	 on	 inflation.	 Lane	 (1997,	 table	 5,	 p.	 343)51	 and	 Campillo	 and	 Miron	 (1997)	
obtain	a	positive	sign	for	the	log	per	capita	GDP	on	average	inflation.	
	
h.	Central	bank	dependence	is	larger	the	larger	the	size	of	the	economy	
Size	captures	the	importance	of	the	terms	of	trade	effect	(Lane,	1997),	i.e.	the	larger	
the	real	exchange	rate	depreciation	after	monetary	surprise,	the	lower	the	inflationary	
bias.	A	lower	inflationary	bias	reduces	the	incentives	to	commit	monetary	policy.	Also	
notice	that	since	openness	and	size	are	correlated	variables	in	the	data,	omitting	size	
from	 the	 regression	 would	 introduce	 a	 bias	 into	 the	 estimation	 of	 the	 effect	 of	
                                                 
51	In	Romer	(1993)	a	negative	impact	of	GDP	on	average	inflation	is	obtained	except	for	the	case	of	the	
Asian	 countries	 subsample.	 In	 Lane	 (1997)	 a	 positive	 impact	 of	 GDP	 on	 average	 inflation	 is	 obtained	
except	for	the	subsample	of	“rich	countries”.	
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openness	on	the	degree	of	central	bank	independence.	In	the	empirical	analysis,	we	use	
the	real	total	GDP	as	a	proxy	for	the	size.		
Finally	note	that	we	do	not	include	closed	economy	determinants	of	the	inflationary	
bias	 in	 our	 regressions.	 The	 reason	 is	 twofold.	 Firstly,	 due	 to	 data	 constraints,	 their	
inclusion	would	 severely	 limit	our	 sample.	 Secondly	 the	empirical	evidence	available	
for	 the	 importance	 of	 these	 variables	 points	 against	 them.	 De	 Haan	 and	 van’t	 Hag	
(1995)	 show	 that,	 in	 regressions	 for	 central	 bank	 independence	 as	 a	 dependent	
variable,	 the	 coefficients	 of	 proxies	 for	 average	 employment‐motivated	 inflationary	
bias52	are	insignificant	in	a	cross‐section	of	OECD	countries.		
The	 next	 section	 presents	 the	 empirical	 evidence	 for	 the	 hypotheses	 formulated	
above.	
	
	
2.3.	Empirical	specification	and	procedure	
We	examine	the	determinants	of	central	bank	degree	of	dependence	as	measured	by	
Cukierman	 et	 al.	 (1992)	 overall	 index	 for	 the	 period	 1980‐89	 (dependent	 variable:	
CBD).	This	index	varies	between	0	and	1.	A	high	value	measures	a	lower	level	of	central	
bank	 independence	 for	 a	 country.	 This	 measure	 is	 available	 for	 a	 sample	 of	 63	
countries.	Our	study	is,	however,	performed	on	a	sample	of	55	countries53	because	of	
limits	in	the	availability	in	other	variables	included	in	the	empirical	analysis.	Moreover,	
following	Romer	(1993)	and	Campillo	and	Miron	(1997),	we	split	our	sample	into	two	
                                                 
52	The	two	proxies	for	the	inflationary	bias	in	their	study	are	the	equilibrium	rate	of	unemployment,	as	
estimated	by	Layard,	Nickell	 and	 Jackman	(1991),	 for	nineteen	 industrial	 countries	and	 the	difference	
between	the	actual	and	the	equilibrium	rate	of	unemployment	during	the	1980s.	
53	The	list	of	countries	is	in	the	2.6.2.	section	of	the	Appendix.	
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subsamples,	made	of	23	OECD	countries	and	32	non‐OECD,	respectively,	to	explore	the	
relationship	between	incentives	to	commitment	and	development.		
The	 general	 specification	 for	 our	 regression	 contains	 the	 following	 explanatory	
variables:	 an	 index	 of	 political	 instability	 for	 the	 period	1961‐85	 (INSTABILITY),	 the	
correlation	 between	 the	 GDP	 growth	 rates	 of	 each	 country	 and	 the	 U.S	 GDP	 growth	
rates	 for	 1961‐79	 (CORRELATION),	 the	 average	 inflation	 rate	 for	 1961‐1979	
(INFLATION),	 the	 average	 stock	 of	 M2	 over	 the	 GDP	 for	 1970‐79(LIQUIDITY),	 the	
average	 public	 deficit	 over	 the	GDP	 for	 1970‐79	 (DEFICIT),	 the	 average	 government	
expenditure	over	the	GDP	for	1970‐79	(EXPENDITURE),	the	average	daily	newspapers	
per‐capita	for	1972‐88	(TRANSPARENCY),	the	average	real	GDP	per‐capita	for	1960‐79	
(DEVELOPMENT),	the	average	level	of	real	GDP	for	1960‐79	(SIZE),	the	average	share	
of	import	over	the	GDP	for	the	period	1970‐79	(OPENNESS).	For	a	detailed	definition	
of	the	variables	and	the	source	of	our	database	see	the	Appendix.		
It	may	be	noticed	that,	in	order	to	take	potential	endogeneity	problems	into	account,	
some	of	 the	covariates	are	 lagged	with	 respect	 to	 the	 time	period	covered	by	 the	CB	
dependence	 index.	 For	 instance,	 since	 the	 innovation	 to	 the	 GDP	 growth	 rate	 is	
endogenous	 with	 respect	 to	 the	 monetary	 policy	 reply,	 CORRELATION	 has	 been	
constructed	for	the	period	spanning	from	1961	to	1979,	whereas	the	Cukierman	index	
refers	to	the	period	1980‐1989.	The	same	strategy	has	been	adopted	for	all	the	other	
variables	except	for	INSTABILITY	and	TRANSPARENCY.	These	are	safely	assumed	to	be	
exogenous	with	respect	to	CBD:	political	turmoil	are	not	likely	to	depend	on	the	legal	
framework	for	monetary	authority	and	transparency	(proxied	by	the	daily	circulation	
of	newspapers)	certainly	does	not	depend	on	CBD.		
The	estimation	technique	is	Ordinary	Least	Squares.	No	correction	for	the	estimated	
standard	 errors	 is	 required,	 since	 all	 our	 regressions	 pass	 the	 tests	 for	
homoscedasticity	and	normality	of	the	residuals	(tests	reported	in	the	output	tables).	
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Following	Romer	(1993),	Lane	(1997)	and	Campillo	and	Miron	(1997),	we	examine	
different	 specifications	 using	 either	 levels	 or	 logs	 for	 INFLATION,	 SIZE	 and	
DEVELOPMENT	(semilog‐specification).	The	results	do	not	change	in	a	significant	way,	
we	 reported	 them	 for	 the	 sake	 of	 completeness	 and	 as	 an	 indication	 of	 robustness.	
Another	 indication	 of	 the	 good	 performance	 of	 our	 specifications	 on	 the	 data	 is	 the	
relatively	high	level	of	the	adjusted	R‐square	ranging	from	a	minimum	of	0.45	for	the	
non‐OECD	 sample	 to	 0.68	 for	 the	 full	 sample.	 For	 the	 OECD	 economies,	 all	 the	
specifications/models	deliver	adjusted	R‐square	around	0.6.		
In	each	table,	we	report	different	estimated	models:	from	a	general	model	(Model	1)	
to	a	final	parsimonious	model.	The	final	model	is	suggested	by	the	higher	adjusted	R‐	
square.	 The	 model	 reduction	 strategy	 is	 performed	 deleting	 the	 variables	 with	 the	
lowest	t‐values	(one	or	two	variables	are	deleted	at	each	deletion	step).	
	
	
2.4.	Results	
Tables	1	and	2	review	the	results	for	the	full	sample	of	countries.	In	particular,	Table	
1	 presents	 the	 outcome	 for	 the	 specification	 in	 levels,	whereas	Table	 2	 presents	 the	
semilogs	specification.	Tables	3	and	4	report	the	results	for	the	OECD	sub‐sample	and	
Tables	 5	 and	 6	 the	 outcome	 for	 the	 non‐OECD	 sub‐sample.	 There	 is	 no	 significant	
difference,	 both	 in	 terms	 of	 signs	 and	 precision	 of	 the	 coefficients,	 between	 the	 two	
specifications	(levels	and	semilogs).	In	terms	of	adjusted	R	square,	the	specification	in	
levels	 may	 be	 preferred	 in	 each	 sample.	 Remarkable	 stability	 in	 the	 sign,	 size	 and	
significance	of	the	coefficients	emerges	across	models	within	each	table.		
In	particular,	Tables	1	and	2	show	that	OPENNESS	and	TRANSPARENCY	are	highly	
significant	and	have	the	expected	signs	consistent	with	the	commitment	interpretation	
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of	 the	 monetary	 policy	 institution.	 Transparency	 captures	 the	 core	 of	 the	 strategic	
aspect	of	the	hypothesis	of	commitment,	i.e.	its	observability.	Openness	turns	out	to	be	
a	 substitute	 for	 commitment.	 CORRELATION	has	 the	 expected	 sign:	 the	 larger	 is	 the	
common	 component	 in	 the	 GDP	 growth	 among	 the	 economies,	 the	 larger	 is	 the	
commitment	incentive.	However,	this	variable	is	not	significant.	This	outcome	suggests	
that	commitment	by	governments	in	open	economies	does	not	take	into	account,	to	a	
sizeable	 extent,	 strategic	 externalities	 induced	by	 the	 terms	of	 trade	 effects	 at	world	
scale.	 From	 the	 literature	 on	 the	 international	 business	 cycle,	we	 know	 that	 “Poorer	
economies	are	more	 likely	 to	experience	country‐specific	 cycles.	Evidently,	 there	 is	a	
world	business	cycle,	and,	unsurprisingly	it	reflects	economic	activity	in	the	developed	
economies”	(Kose	et	al.,	2003).	Therefore,	we	expect	correlation	to	play	a	major	role	in	
the	subset	of	OECD	countries.		
Past	 INFLATION	 is	 also	 highly	 significant	 and	 positively	 affects	 the	 degree	 of	
dependence	 suggesting	 that	 the	 persistency	 of	 the	 determinants	 of	 current	 inflation	
emphasized	by	Campillo	and	Miron	 (1997)	 is	also	at	work	at	 the	 institutional	design	
stage.		
The	measures	of	SIZE	and	DEVELOPMENT	of	an	economy	are	statistically	negligible.	
As	 for	the	role	of	development	 in	affecting	the	 incentive	to	 institutional	commitment,	
the	 data,	 as	 in	 Romer	 (1993),	 do	 not	 support	 the	 view	 that	 the	 extent	 to	 which	
countries	have	solved	the	dynamic	inconsistency	problem	is	an	increasing	function	of	
their	development	 level.	As	 in	 the	 case	of	OPENNESS	and	CORRELATION,	 a	different	
role	for	DEVELOPMENT	will	emerge	in	the	two	subsamples.		
Political	INSTABILITY	has	a	positive	sign:	the	larger	the	level	of	instability	the	lower	
the	 incentive	 of	 commitment.	 However,	 this	 factor	 plays	 a	 mild	 role	 in	 terms	 of	
explanatory	power.		
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Table	2‐1:	All	Countries	
	
Dependent	variable	CBD	
	
Explanatory	variables	 Model	1	 Model	2	 Model	3*	 Model	4	 Model	5	
Constant	 0.164	(6.41)	
0.165***	
(6.77)	
0.164***	
(6.74)	
0.15***	
(6.52)	
0.127***	
(7.36)	
INSTABILITY	 0.06	(1.43)	
0.060	
(1.48)	
0.057	
(1.42)	
0.070*	
(1.73)	
0.081**	
(2.02)	
CORRELATION	 ‐0.020	(‐0.78)	
‐0.020	
(‐0.87)	 ____	 ____	 _____	
INFLATION	 0.0018***	(5.05)	
0.0018***	
(5.14)	
0.019***	
(5.29)	
0.0019***	
(5.63)	
0.0019***	
(5.45)	
LIQUIDITY	 ‐0.045	(‐1.04)	
‐0.051	
(‐1.36)	
‐0.054	
(‐1.46)	 _____	 ____	
DEFICIT	 ‐0.028	(‐1.007)	
‐0.003	
(‐1.28)	
‐0.003	
(‐1.39)	 ____	 _____	
EXPENDITURE	 ‐0.015	(‐1.36)	
‐0.001	
(‐1.69)*	
‐0.001*	
(‐1.84)	
‐0.001	
(‐1.49)	 ____	
TRANSPARENCY	 ‐0.171**	(‐2.12)	
‐0.188***	
(‐3.29)	
‐0.189***	
(‐3.30)	
‐0.253***	
(‐5.36)	
‐0.268***	
(‐5.73)	
DEVELOPMENT	 ‐0.935e‐06	(‐0.33)	 ____	 ____	 ____	 ____	
SIZE	 0.301e‐11	(0.21)	 _____	 _____	 _____	 ____	
OPENNESS	 0.0012***	(3.41)		
0.0012***	
(3.69)	
0.001***	
(3.85)	
0.001***	
(3.49)	
0.001***	
(3.24)	
R2	 0.73	 0.72	 0.72	 0.70	 0.68	
Adjusted	–	R2		 0.66	 0.68	 0.68	 0.67	 0.66	
Jarque‐Bera/	
Salmon‐KieferTest	
2(2)=	1.174	
cv5%=5.99	
2(2)=	1‐145	
cv5%=5.99	
2	(2)=0.1.37	
cv5%=5.99	
2	(2)=1.81	
cv5%=5.99	
2	(2)=2.00	
cv5%=5.99	
Breusch‐PaganTest	 2	(10)=7.93	cv5%=18.31	
2	(8)=6.59	
cv5%=15.51	
2	(7)=5.90	
cv5%=14.07	
2	(5)=4.23	
cv5%=11.7	
2	(4)=2.72	
cv5%=9.49	
	
Notes:	*	10%,	**	5%,	***1%	significant	level;	(t‐value);	Model*:	final	specification.		 	
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Table	2‐2:	All	Countries	Semilog	specification	
	
Dependent	variable:	CBD	
Inflation,	Size	and	Development	are	in	logs	
	
Explanatory	variables	 Model	1	 Model	2*	 Model	3	 Model	4	 Model	5	
Constant	 ‐0.134	(‐1.13)	
‐0.060	
(‐0.63)	
‐0.011	
(‐0.12)	
0.070*	
(1.98)	
0.043	
(1.46)	
INSTABILITY	 0.069	(1.58)	
0.070*	
(1.63)	
0.077*	
(1.78)	
0.078*	
(1.84)	
0.082*	
(1.92)	
CORRELATION	 ‐0.020	(‐0.75)	 _____	 ____	 ____	 ____	
INFLATION	 0.040	(3.54)***	
0.041***	
(3.83)	
0.041***	
(3.74)	
0.042***	
(3.96)	
0.047***	
(4.65)	
LIQUIDITY	 ‐0.088*	(‐1.92)	
‐0.075*	
(‐1.71)	
‐0.063	
(‐1.45)	
‐0.054	
(‐1.35)	 ____	
DEFICIT	 ‐0.003	(‐1.38)	
‐0.003	
(‐1.36)	 _____	 ____	 ____	
EXPENDITURE	 ‐0.001	(‐1.52)	
‐0.001*	
(‐1.74)	
‐0.0008	
(‐1.08)	 _____	 ____	
TRANSPARENCY	 ‐0.261***	(‐3.59)	
‐0.265***	
(‐3.69)	
‐0.283***	
(‐3.98)	
‐0.236***	
(‐4.46)	
‐0.262***	
(‐5.33)	
DEVELOPMENT	 0.016	(1.18)	
0.020	
(1.59)	
0.013	
(1.13)	 ____	 ____	
SIZE	 0.005	(1.05)	 ____	 _____	 ____	 _____	
OPENNESS	
0.001***	
(3.66)	
	
0.001***	
(3.82)	
0.0012***	
(3.60)	
0.0012***	
(3.51)	
0.0012***	
(3.40)	
R2	 0.70	 0.69	 0.68	 0.66	 0.65	
Adjusted	–	R2		 0.63	 0.63	 0.63	 0.63	 0.62	
Jarque‐Bera/Salmon‐
Kiefer	Test	
2	(2)=	
0.58	
(cv5%=5.99)	
2	(2)=	1.03	
(cv5%=5.99)	
2	(2)=	1.73	
(cv5%=5.99)	
2	(2)=	1.18	
(cv5%=5.99)	
2	(2)=	0.70	
(cv5%=5.99)	
Breusch‐Pagan	Test	 2	(10)=10.70	(cv5%=18.31)	
2	(8)=	7.78	
(cv5%=15.51)	
2	(7)=5.31	
(cv5%=14.07)	
2	(5)=	11.07	
(cv5%=11.07)	
2	(4)=	9.49	
(cv5%=9.49)	
Sample	 55	 55	 55	 55	 	
	
Notes:	*	10%,	**	5%,	***1%	significant	level;	(t‐value);	Model*:	final	specification.			 	
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The	 estimated	 signs	 for	 the	 coefficients	 of	 the	 variables	 (LIQUIDITY,	 DEFICIT,	 G)	
relating	 the	 inflationary	 bias	 to	 considerations	 regarding	 public	 finance,	 optimal	
taxation	and	seignorage,	are	consistent	with	the	commitment	hypothesis:	the	larger	the	
inflationary	bias	coming	out	of	public	finance	considerations,	the	larger	the	incentive	to	
commit.	However,	all	these	estimates	are	weakly	significant.		
As	 for	 the	 two	 different	 sub‐samples,	 tables	 3	 and	 4	 report	 results	 for	 the	 OECD	
sample,	tables	5	and	6	report	results	for	the	non‐OECD	sample.	A	scrutiny	of	Table	3	to	
6	 (OECD	vs	non‐OECD	samples)	confirms	 that	our	empirical	 strategy	allows	us:	1)	 to	
support	 our	 working	 hypothesis	 about	 the	 relevance	 of	 strategic	 commitment	 for	
understanding	 monetary	 institution,	 and	 2)	 to	 spell	 out	 our	 contribution	 to	 the	
understanding	 of	 why	 the	 institutional	 solution	 has	 been	 adopted	 only	 in	 highly	
industrialized	countries	over	the	period	under	analysis.		
The	empirical	relevance	of	strategic	commitment	emerges	in	both	sub‐samples	and	
across	 models:	 the	 degree	 of	 observability	 of	 institutional	 objectives	 of	 the	 Central	
Banker	 (TRANSPARENCY),	 the	 variables	 related	 to	 openness	 (OPENNESS	 and	
CORRELATION)	 and	 the	 effect	 of	 past	 inflation	 (INFLATION)	 remain	 statistically	
significant	and	with	the	expected	signs.		
As	 for	 the	 explanation	 of	why	 the	 institutional	 solution	 has	 been	 adopted	 only	 in	
highly	industrialized	countries,	a	different	mechanism	appears	to	operate	in	relation	to	
the	variables	related	to	openness.	In	the	regressions	for	the	OECD	countries,	the	size	of	
the	 common	 component	 in	 the	 international	 business	 cycle	 (CORRELATION)	 is	
statistically	 significant	with	 the	 expected	 (negative	 impact	 on	 the	 dependence)	 sign.	
The	 degree	 of	 openness	 (OPENNESS)	 also	 has	 the	 correct	 sign	 but	 it	 is	 statistically	
negligible.	 The	 opposite	 pattern	 emerges	 among	 the	 non‐OECD	 countries	where	 the	
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common	component	in	the	world	business	cycle	is	irrelevant54,	whereas	the	degree	of	
openness	(OPENNESS)	is	highly	significant.		
Therefore,	our	analysis	supports	 the	view	that	 the	 level	of	development	 is	not	 the	
right	determinant	of	 the	 incentives	 to	 strategic	 commitment	 in	open	economies.	The	
reason	why	the	problem	of	dynamic	inconsistency	of	optimal	monetary	policy	has	been	
solved	by	strategic	commitment	only	in	highly	developed	countries	has	to	do	with	the	
features	of	the	business	cycle	in	these	countries.	As	explained	in	the	previous	section,	a	
large	degree	of	 synchronization	of	 the	business	 cycle,	coeteris	paribus,	 reinforces	 the	
incentives	to	commitment	in	open	economies.	In	non‐OECD	countries	this	mechanism	
does	 not	 operate	 since	 their	 degree	 of	 integration	 with	 the	 world	 economy	 is	 low.	
Indeed,	 in	 these	 latter	 countries,	 commitment	 is	 mainly	 affected	 by	 OPENNESS.	 As	
shown	by	Romer	(1993),	a	large	degree	of	openness	reduces	the	inflationary	bias	and	
in	turn	weakens	the	incentives	to	commit:	openness	and	commitment	are	substitute	in	
the	eyes	of	the	political	body	delegating	monetary	policy.		
As	already	mentioned,	 there	are	other	differences	 in	 the	relevant	variables	 for	 the	
explanation	of	 the	observed	degree	of	commitment	emerging	 in	 the	 two	subsamples.	
These	differences	do	not	contradict	the	picture	emerged	so	far.		
For	 the	 OECD	 sample,	 Tables	 3	 and	 4,	 the	 variables	 related	 to	 public	 finance	
considerations	 (LIQUIDITY,	 DEFICIT,	 G)	 as	well	 as	 DEVELOPMENT	 and	 SIZE	 are	 not	
significant.	 Political	 instability	 becomes	 more	 relevant	 than	 in	 the	 full	 sample,	
confirming	the	result	in	Cukierman	(1992).	For	the	non‐OECD	countries,	on	the	other	
hand,	variables	related	to	public	finance	considerations	have	the	same	signs	as	in	the	
full	 sample	 and	 a	 larger	 statistical	 significance:	 in	 the	 face	 of	 less	 developed	 fiscal	
                                                 
54	These	results	do	not	depend	on	the	proxy	for	the	common	component.	Similar	results	are	obtained	by	
using	as	a	proxy	the	correlation	between	the	GDP	growth	in	each	country	and	a	weighted	average	of	the	
growth	 rates	 of	 the	 economies	 in	 the	 sample.	 The	 weights	 used	 are	 the	 GDP	 levels	 in	 each	 country	
delivering	the	following	formula	for	the	world	growth	rate:	
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system	a	commitment	mechanism	is	at	work	for	monetary	policy.	Also	notice	that	the	
real	 GDP	 per‐capita,	 proxy	 for	 the	 level	 of	 development	 (DEVELOPMENT),	 has	 a	
positive	and	significant	effect	on	the	level	of	dependence.	Concerning	the	positive	sign	
of	DEVELOPMENT,	this	is	consistent	with	the	commitment	interpretation	of	the	results	
in	 Romer	 (1993)	 where	 a	 larger	 per	 capita	 GDP	 has	 negative	 impact	 on	 average	
inflation	that	is	reduced	the	inflationary	bias.		
Table	2‐3:	OECD	Countries	
	
Dependent	variable:	CBD	
	
Explanatory	variables	 Model	1	 Model	2	 Model	3	 Model	4*	
Constant	 0.124*	(1.99)	
0.123*	
(2.70)	
0.130***	
(3.42)	
0.095***	
(4.25)	
INSTABILITY	 0.116	(1.42)	
0.117*	
(1.80)	
0.115*	
(1.88)	
0.132**	
(2.31)	
CORRELATION	 ‐0.054	(‐1.46)	
‐0.052**	
(‐2.23)	
‐0.052**	
(‐2.38)	
‐0.044**	
(‐2.18)	
INFLATION	 0.00245	(1.22)	
0.023	
(1.33)	
0.003*	
(1.81)	
0.033	
(2.45)**	
LIQUIDITY	 ‐0.035	(‐0.88)	
‐0.036	
(‐1.008)	
‐0.0035	
(‐1.08)	 ____	
DEFICIT	 ‐0.0006	(‐0.23)	
‐0.0009	
(‐0.38)	 _____	 ____	
EXPENDITURE	 0.0003	(0.29)	
0.0003	
(0.30)	 _____	 ____	
TRANSPARENCY	 ‐0.129*	(‐1.92)	
‐0.130**	
(‐2.50)	
‐0.141***	
(‐3.01)	
‐0.135***	
(‐2.96)	
DEVELOPMENT	 ‐0.351e‐06	(‐0.093)	 _____	 _____	 ____	
SIZE	 0.312e‐10	(0.258)	 _____	 _____	 ____	
OPENNESS	 ‐	0.0004	(‐0.469)	
‐0.0005	
(‐0.69)	
‐0.0002	
(‐0.48)	 _____	
R2	 0.72	 0.72	 0.71	 0.69	
Adjusted	–	R2		 0.49		 0.56	 0.60	 0.62	
Jarque‐Bera/Salmon‐Kiefer		
Test	
2	(2)=	0.152	
(cv5%=5.99)	
2	(2)=	0.164	
(cv5%=5.99)	
2	(2)=0.241	
cv5%=5.99)	
2	(2)=0.218	
cv5%=5.99)	
Breusch‐Pagan	Test	 2	(10)=11.20	(cv5%=18.32)	
2	(8)=11.08	
(cv5%=15.51)	
2	(6)=10.05	
cv5%=12.9)	
2	(4)=8.20	
cv5%=9.49)	
Sample	 23	 23	 23	 23	
Notes:	*	10%,	**	5%,	***1%	significant	level;	(t‐value);	Model*:	final	specification.	 	
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Table	2‐4:	OECD	Countries	Semilog	specification	
	
Dependent	variable:	CBD	
Inflation,	Size	and	Development	are	in	logs	
	
Explanatory	variables	 Model	1	 Model	2	 Model	3	 Model	4*	
Constant	 0.583	(1.039)	
0.107	
(1.52)	
0.096*	
(1.70)	
0.055	
(1.36)	
INSTABILITY	 0.08	(1.00)	
0.12	
(1.75)*	
0.120**	
(2.02)	
0.127**	
(2.13)	
CORRELATION	 ‐0.0265	(‐0.66)	
‐0.052**	
(‐2.11)	
‐0.050**	
(‐2.23)	
‐0.043**	
(‐2.00)	
INFLATION	 0.006	(0.19)	
0.018	
(0.86)	
0.024	
(1.36)	
0.033**	
(2.11)	
LIQUIDITY	 ‐0.021	(‐0.46)	
‐0.004	
(‐1.03)	
‐0.035	
(‐1.04)	 ____	
DEFICIT	 ‐0.0014	(0.51)	
‐0.0013	
(‐0.55)	 ____	 ____	
EXPENDITURE	 0.0006	(0.49)	
0.0002	
(0.22)	 ____	 ____	
TRANSPARENCY	 ‐0.008	(‐1.18)	
‐0.128**	
(‐2.36)	
‐0.14***	
(‐2.92)	
‐0.131**	
(‐2.76)	
DEVELOPMENT	 ‐0.04	(‐0.88)	 ____	 ____	 ____	
SIZE	 ‐0.003	(‐0.36)	 ____	 ____	 _____	
OPENNESS	 ‐0.0009	(‐0.72)	
‐0.0005	
(‐0.60)	 _____	 _____	
R2	 0.72	 0.70	 0.69	 0.66	
Adjusted	–	R2		 0.49		 0.53	 0.59	 0.59	
Jarque‐Bera/Salmon‐
Kiefer	Test	
2	(2)=	0.147	
(cv5%=5.99)	
2	(2)=	0.157	
(cv5%=5.99)	
2	(2)=	0.25	
(cv5%=5.99)	
2	(2)=	0.126	
(cv5%=5.99)	
Breusch‐Pagan	Test	 2	(10)=13.72	(cv5%=18.31)	
2	(8)=	13.79	
(cv5%=15.51)	
2	(5)=	11.03	
(cv5%=11.07)	
2	(4)=	11.09	
(cv5%=9.49)	
Sample	 23	 23	 23	 23	
	
Notes:	*	10%,	**	5%,	***1%	significant	level;	(t‐value);	Model*:	final	specification.		 	
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Table	2‐5:	Non‐OECD	Countries	
	
Dependent	variable:	CBD	
	
Explanatory	variables	 Model	1	 Model	2	 Model	3	 Model	4*	
Constant	 0.162***	(5.46)	
0.159***	
(5.47)	
0.157***	
(5.44)	
0.152***	
(5.44)	
INSTABILITY	 ‐0.120	(‐0.24)	 ____	 ____	 _____	
CORRELATION	 0.035	(0.88)	
0.034	
(0.37)	 ____	 _____	
INFLATION	 0.002***	(4.52)	
0.019***	
(4.72)	
0.019***	
(4.77)	
0.020***	
(5.35)	
LIQUIDITY	 ‐0.099	(‐1.01)	
‐0.098	
(‐1.03)	
‐0.069	
(‐0.77)	 _____	
DEFICIT	 ‐0.010**	(‐2.09)	
‐0.010**	
(‐2.18)	
‐0.009**	
(‐2.12)	
‐0.009*	
(‐2.02)	
EXPENDITURE	 ‐0.004*	(‐2.00)	
‐0.004**	
(‐2.12)	
‐0.003*	
(‐2.01)	
‐0.003**	
(‐2.16)	
TRANSPARENCY	 ‐0.520**	(‐2.14)	
‐0.52**	
(‐2.18)	
‐0.41*	
(‐2.02)	
‐0.37*	
(‐1.89)	
DEVELOPMENT	 13.999e‐06**	(2.25)	
13.677e‐06**	
(2.29)	
11.607e‐06**	
(2.13)	
9.659e‐06*	
(2.02)	
SIZE	 6.545e‐11	(1.10)	
6.565e‐11	
(1.13)	
5.7453e‐11	
(1.09)	
5.521e‐11	
(0.98)	
OPENNESS	
0.001*	
(1.81)	
	
0.001***	
(3.02)	
0.001***	
(2.90)	
0.001**	
(2.89)	
R2	 0.629	 0.628	 0.616	 0.605	
Adjusted	–	R2	 0.46		 0.48	 0.48	 0.49	
Jarque‐Bera/Salmon‐Kiefer	
Test	
2	(2)=	5.85	
(cv5%=5.99)	
2	(2)=	4.30	
(cv5%=5.99)	
2	(2)=2.27	
cv5%=5.99)	
2	(2)=2.48	
cv5%=5.99)	
Breusch‐Pagan	Test	 2	(10)=12.83	(cv5%=18.31)	
2	(9)=9.70	
(cv5%=16.92)	
2	(8)=7.16	
cv5%=15.51)	
2	(7)=6.14	
cv5%=14.07)	
Sample	 32	 32	 32	 32	
	
Notes:	*	10%,	**	5%,	***1%	significant	level;	(t‐value);	Model*:	final	specification.		 	
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Table	2‐6:	Non‐OECD	Countries	Semilog	specification	
	
Dependent	variable:	CBD	
Inflation,	Size	and	Development	are	in	logs	
	
Explanatory	variables	 Model	1	 Model	2*	 Model	3	 Model	4	
Constant	 ‐0.505**	(‐2.73)	
‐0.507***	
(‐2.81)	
‐0.521***	
(‐2.86)	
‐0.495**	
(‐2.78)	
INSTABILITY	 0.078	(0.16)	 ____	 ____	 ____	
CORRELATION	 0.038	(0.98)	
0.039	
(1.05)	
0.030	
(0.82)	 ____	
INFLATION	 0.048***	(3.61)	
0.048***	
(3.89)	
0.044***	
(3.66)	
0.043***	
(3.63)	
LIQUIDITY	 ‐0.152	(‐1.63)	
‐0.151	
(‐1.66)	
‐0.166*	
(‐1.82)	
‐0.147*	
(‐1.68)	
DEFICIT	 ‐0.009*	(‐1.97)	
‐0.009**	
(‐2.14)	
‐0.005*	
(‐1.82)	
‐0.005*	
(‐1.90)	
EXPENDITURE	 ‐0.002	(‐1.08)	
‐0.002	
(‐1.21)	 _____	 _____	
TRANSPARENCY	 ‐0.499**	(‐2.68)	
‐0.496**	
(‐2.73)	
‐0.539***	
(‐3.00)	
‐0.483***	
(‐2.92)	
DEVELOPMENT	 0.052***	(2.83)	
0.052***	
(2.91)	
0.046**	
(2.67)	
0.043**	
(2.56)	
SIZE	 0.011	(1.50)	
0.011	
(1.55)	
0.014*	
(1.98)	
0.014*	
(1.98)	
OPENNESS	
0.002***	
(3.47)	
	
0.002***	
(3.55)	
0.002***	
(3.44)	
0.002***	
(3.38)	
R2	 0.63	 0.63	 0.60	 0.59	
Adjusted	–	R2	 0.45		 0.48	 0.46	 0.47	
Jarque‐Bera/Salmon‐Kiefer	Test	
2	(2)=	0.35	
(cv5%=5.99)	
	
2	(2)=	0.31	
(cv5%=5.99)	
2	(2)=0.46	
cv5%=5.99)	
2	(2)=0.59	
cv5%=5.99)	
Breusch‐Pagan	Test	
2	(10)=7.47	
(cv5%=18.31)	
	
2	(9)=6.83	
(cv5%=16.92)	
2	(8)=6.35	
cv5%=15.51)	
2	(7)=5.17	
cv5%=14.07)	
Sample	 32	 32	 32	 32	
	
Notes:	*	10%,	**	5%,	***1%	significant	level;	(t‐value);	Model*:	final	specification.	
	
From	our	point	of	view,	the	reduced	inflationary	bias	lowers	the	incentive	to	commit	
with	positive	 impact	on	the	 level	of	dependence	of	 the	Central	Bank.	Also	notice	that	
this	 positive	 sign	 is	 consistent	 with	 the	 evidence,	 discussed	 above,	 regarding	 the	
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hypothesis	 that	 the	 level	 of	 development	 has	 little	 relevance	 for	 understanding	
commitment	in	highly	industrialized	countries.	
	
2.5.	Conclusions	
In	 this	 paper,	 we	 explored	 the	 determinants	 of	 central	 bank	 independence	 on	 a	
sample	 of	 55	 countries.	 In	 particular,	 we	 studied	 three	 testable	 implications	 of	 the	
commitment	 hypothesis	 for	 the	 institutional	 solution	 to	 the	 inflationary	 bias	 in	
monetary	 policy	 in	 open	 economies.	 The	 first	 testable	 implication	 comes	 from	 game	
theoretical	 models	 of	 commitment	 and	 concerns	 the	 positive	 impact	 of	 the	
observability	among	the	general	public	of	governmental	choices	about	monetary	policy	
delegation.	 This	 is	 strongly	 supported	 by	 the	 data	 in	 the	 full	 sample	 (and	 in	 each	
subsample	 of	 OECD	 and	 non‐OECD	 countries).	 Two	 other	 testable	 implications	 are	
derived	from	extensions	of	the	Rogoff	(1985a)	model	to	open	economies.	In	particular,	
our	data	deliver	 the	 following	 results:	1.	 the	degree	of	 independence	 turns	out	 to	be	
negatively	related	 to	openness	among	 the	non‐OECD	countries	 (in	accordance	with	a	
straightforward	 extension	 of	 the	 model	 by	 Romer,	 1993);	 2.	 The	 degree	 of	
independence	 is	 positively	 related	 to	 the	 strength	 of	 the	 correlation	 with	 the	
international	 business	 cycle	 in	 the	 sub	 sample	of	 the	OECD	 countries	 (in	 accordance	
with	D’Amato	and	Martina,	2005).	
All	our	 findings	support	 the	relevance	of	 the	commitment	hypothesis	and	Romer’s	
(1993)	results	that	openness	is	not	important	in	affecting	average	inflation	in	the	long	
run,	 among	 the	 highly‐industrialized	 countries.	Moreover,	 our	 analysis	 also	 suggests	
that	 the	reasons	why	 these	countries	are	 the	only	ones	 that	seem	to	have	solved	 the	
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inflationary	 bias	 problem	 of	 monetary	 policy	 through	 the	 institutional	 solution	 is	
definitely	consistent	with	the	commitment	hypothesis.		
Finally,	 whereas	 in	 the	 literature	 after	 Rogoff	 (1985a)	 the	 emphasis	 for	 the	
commitment	hypothesis	has	shifted	towards	the	political	determinants	of	Central	Bank	
independence,	our	results	document	fairly	consistent	empirical	evidence	in	support	of	
the	hypothesis	that	institutional	solutions	to	the	inflationary	bias	problem	in	different	
countries	are	related	to	the	strategic	and	economic	features	underlying	the	delegation	
process.	 Indeed,	 we	 show	 that	 it	 is	 affected	 by	 the	 game‐theoretical	 frame	 of	 the	
commitment	choice	and	by	the	features	of	the	business	cycles	in	the	economies	where	
the	institution	is	devised.		
Our	results	show	that	there	seems	to	be	a	fix	to	the	inflationary	bias	problem	but	it	
is	 far	 from	being	a	 “quick	 fix”	 at	 least	 in	 terms	of	 the	 incentives	political	 institutions	
have	 in	 adopting	 it.	How	effective	 the	 fix	 is,	 depends	on	many	economic	 factors	 that	
affect	 the	 balance	 between	 costs	 and	benefits	 of	 flexibility	 in	monetary	policy	 in	 the	
open	 economy.	 Fundamental	 economic	 features,	 like	 the	 degree	 of	 synchronization	
between	the	domestic	and	the	world‐wide	business	cycle,	and	the	strategic	aspects	of	
the	 specific	 game	 between	 public	 governments	 and	 private	 sector	 seem	 to	 be	 quite	
important	for	the	empirical	explanation	of	central	bank	independence.	Economic	forces	
and	the	related	strategic	issues	seem	to	be	quite	important	in	the	data	we	analyze	and	
they	downplay	the	role	of	explanations	mainly	based	on	procedural	and	formal	aspects	
of	modern	democracies.		
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2.6.	Appendix	
2.6.1.	Data	definition	and	sources	
CBD	 =	 Measure	 of	 central	 bank	 dependence	 over	 the	 period	 1980‐89.	 This	 index,	
proposed	 by	 Cukierman,	Webb	 and	 Neyaptis	 (1992),	 is	 based	 on	 two	 variables:	 the	
turnover	rate	of	central	bank	of	governor	and	index	of	legal	dependence.	The	weight	on	
the	 turnover	 and	 legal	 independence	 in	 this	 index	 are	 derived	 by	 regressions	 of	
average	 inflation	 on	 the	 two	 variables,	 using	 separate	 regressions	 for	 industrialized	
and	non‐industrialized	countries.	This	index	is	also	available	in	Romer	(1993).	
INSTABILITY	 =	 Measure	 of	 political	 instability.	 It	 is	 mean	 number	 of	 revolutions,	
terrorist	attack	and	coups	per	year	for	the	period	1960‐85.	Source:	Romer	(1993).	
DEVELOPMENT	=	Real	GDP	per	capita,	average	over	the	period	1960‐79.	Source:	Penn	
world	tables	6.1.	
POP	=	population	(1960‐79).	Source:	Penn	world	tables	6.1.	
SIZE	=	DEVELOPMENT	*	POP	(1960‐79).		
CORRELATION	=	Yearly	correlation	between	US	real	GDP	growth	and	country‐specific	
real	GDP	growth	(1961‐79).	Our	elaboration.		
CORRELATION***	=	Yearly	 correlation	between	World	 real	GDP	growth	and	Country	
specific	real	GDP	growth	(1961‐79).	Our	elaboration.		
TRANSPARENCY	=	Daily	 newspaper	 circulation	 per	 capita,	 average	 over	 the	 period	
1972‐1987.	Source:	Banks	(1999).	
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INFLATION	=	Change	in	the	GDP	deflator,	average	over	1961‐1979.	For	countries	for	
which	 this	 series	 is	 not	 available,	we	use	 the	 change	 in	 the	CPI	 instead.	 Source:	 IMF	
supplement	series,	n.12,	1986.	
OPENESS	 =	 Share	 of	 imports	 over	 the	 GDP,	 average	 over	 the	 period	 1970‐1979.	
Source:	IMF	supplement	series,	n.4,	1982.	
EXPENDITURE	=	 Total	 government	 expenditure	 as	percentage	of	GDP,	 average	over	
1970‐79.	Source:	IMF	supplement	series,	n.11,	1986.	
DEFICIT	=	Central	 government	 deficit	 as	 percentage	 of	 GDP,	 average	 over	 1970‐79.	
Deficit	is	defined	as	the	total	of	revenue	plus	grants	minus	the	total	of	expenditure	plus	
lending	minus	repayments.	Source:	IMF	supplement	series,	n.11,	1986.	
LIQUIDITY	=	M2	over	GDP,	average	over	the	period	1970‐79,	where	M2	is	money	plus	
quasi‐money	i.e.	the	sum	of	money	and	time,	savings	and	foreign	currency	deposit	with	
the	monetary	authorities	and	deposit	money	banks.	These	deposits	exclude	deposit	by	
the	 central	 government	 and	 by	 non‐residents.	 Source:	 IMF	 supplement	 series,	 n.5,	
1983.		
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2.6.2.	The	sample	of	55	countries	
	
	
	
	
Country	 OECD	membership	 Country	
OECD	
membership	
Argentina	 	 Malaysia		 	
Australia	  Mexico	 	
Austria	  Nepal	 	
Barbados	 	 Netherlands		 
Belgium	  NewZealad		 
Botswana	 	 Nicaragua	 	
Brazil		 	 Norway	 
Canada	  Pakistan	 	
Chile	 	 Panama	 	
Colombia	 	 Peru	 	
Costa	Rica	 	 Philippines	 	
Denmark	  Portugal		 
Egypt		 	 Singapore	 	
Finland	  South	Africa	 	
France	  Spain	 
Germany	  Sweden		 
Ghana	 	 Switzerland		 
Greece	  Tanzania	 	
Honduras	 	 Thailand	 	
Iceland	  Turkey	 
India	 	 UK	 
Indonesia	 	 USA	 
Ireland	  Uganda	 	
Israel	 	 Uruguay	 	
Italy	  Venezuela	 	
Japan	  Zambia	 	
Kenya	 	 Zimbabwe	 	
Korea		 	 	 	
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Chapter	III: 	
Political	 institutions	 and	 central	 bank	
independence	revisited	
 
 
 
 
3.1.	Introduction		
Research	 on	 “political	 macroeconomics”	 during	 the	 last	 twenty	 years	 showed	
growing	interest	in	factors	affecting	monetary	policy	and	its	performance.	
Several	 studies	 have	 examined	 the	 causes	 for	 monetary	 instability	 in	 different	
countries	and	at	different	historical	times.	To	account	for	differences	in	inflation	rates	
among	 countries,	 empirical	 analyses	 have	 highlighted	 the	 key	 role	 of	 Central	 Bank	
independence	(hereinafter	“CBI”):	in	fact,	it	is	widely	documented	that	a	higher	degree	
of	CBI	is	associated	with	a	lower	inflation	rate	in	developed	countries.55	
The	recognition	of	 this	 link	has	encouraged	 the	study	of	 factors	 that	 influence	 the	
CBI.	In	particular,	wide	empirical	literature	exists56,	analysing	the	economic	and	social	
determinants	that	cause	changes	in	the	degree	of	commitment	to	the	monetary	policy	
of	individual	countries.57	
The	institutional	systems	of	countries	also	represent	a	crucial	factor	in	determining	
the	 degree	 of	 independence	 of	 the	 central	 bank.	 Research	 on	 this	 topic	 is,	 however,	
                                                 
	A	shorter	version	of	this	chapter	(with	B.	Pistoresi	and	D.	Ferrari)	was	published	 in	2011	in	Applied	
Economics	Letters.	
55	For	a	survey	see	Cukierman	(1992)	and	Cukierman	(2008).	
56	Recent	works	on	this	topic	include:	D’Amato,	Pistoresi,	and	Salsano	(2009);	Polillo	and	Guillem	(2005).	
57	 To	 explain	 cross	 country	 variation	 in	 the	 observed	 degree	 of	 independence	 the	 theoretical	
commitment	approach	(Rogoff	1985a;	Lohmann	1992)	argues	that	the	costs	of	an	independent	Central	
Bank,	 from	 the	 government’s	 point	 of	 view,	 consist	 mainly	 of	 the	 loss	 of	 flexibility	 in	 monetary	
policymaking.	 The	 balance	 between	 flexibility	 and	 credibility	 determines	 the	 equilibrium	 degree	 of	
central	bank	independence	in	a	country.	The	balance	between	costs	and	benefits	in	delegating	the	power	
to	 manage	 paper	 money	 may	 depend	 on	 many	 aspects	 of	 the	 economy	 and	 on	 its	 institutional	
framework.	
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very	 limited.	Two	major	studies	exist:	Farvaque	(2002)	and	Moser	(1999),	who	have	
shown	 how	 the	 legal	 CBI	 is	 significantly	 higher	 in	 OECD	 countries	 where	 legal	
procedures	are	 characterized	by	extensive	 checks	and	balances58	and	 the	 state	has	a	
federal	form.	
The	aim	of	this	paper	is	to	investigate	this	issue	further.	Changes	with	respect	to	the	
works	by	Farvaque	(2002)	and	Moser	(1999)	develop	in	three	directions.	
The	first	concerns	the	time	horizon	of	the	analysis,	carried	out	until	2005	using	the	
update	 by	 Polillo	 and	 Guillem	 (2005)	 of	 the	 legal	 independence	 index	 of	 Cukierman	
(1992).	The	cross‐country	and	time‐series	dimensions	of	this	new	dataset	enable	us	to	
study	the	dynamic	behaviour	of	CBI	over	the	past	couple	of	decades.	During	this	period	
Central	 Banks	 in	 advanced	 economies	 continue	 to	 enjoy	 greater	 independence,	 in	
particular	at	the	end	of	2003,	all	country	groups	exhibit	a	higher	level	of	CBI	than	that	
reached	by	advanced	economies	in	the	late	1980s.		
The	second	concerns	the	fact	that	the	institutional	variables	are	examined	together	
with	 a	 number	 of	 economic	 variables	 that	were	 not	 considered	 by	 Farvaque	 (2002)	
and	 Moser	 (1999),	 including	 in	 particular	 the	 correlation	 between	 the	 country’s	
business	 cycle	 and	 the	 world	 business	 cycle.	 The	 goal	 is	 to	 analyse	 the	 impact	 of	
synchronization	of	 international	business	cycles	on	 the	 incentives	of	policymakers	 to	
pre‐commit	monetary	policies	 to	CBI.	As	 recently	described	by	D’Amato	and	Martina	
(2005),	the	correlation	of	economic	cycles	may	reinforce	or	countervail	the	traditional	
argument	 holding	 for	 the	 case	 of	 commitment	 in	 closed	 economies	 and	 they	 may	
contribute	 to	 explaining	 why	 some	 countries	 strategically	 commit	 monetary	 policy	
whereas	others	may	rationally	neglect	such	a	solution.	
                                                 
58	 In	 a	 checks	 and	 balances	 system	 the	 legislative	 function	 is	 equally	 divided	 between	 at	 least	 two	
decision‐making	bodies	(two‐chamber	parliamentary	system,	or	the	opportunity	for	the	active	voters	to	
request	a	referendum),	which	hold	veto	powers.	
64 
Finally,	 we	 use	 the	 least	 absolute	 shrinkage	 and	 selection	 operator	 (Lasso)	
(Tibshirani,	1996)	for	selecting	the	determinants	of	CBI	from	a	large	set	of	explanatory	
variables.	 Differently	 from	 traditional	 information‐theoretical	 procedures	 producing	
over‐fitting	models	 (with	 small	model	 bias	 but	 large	 variance),	 selection	 by	 Lasso	 is	
optimal	in	terms	of	balancing	such	a	trade‐off.		
The	main	contribution	of	the	present	paper	is	to	show	the	existence	of	an	economic	
“external	constraint”	 that	 seems	 to	account	 for	 the	 choice	of	 the	degree	of	CBI	 in	 the	
different	countries:	the	correlation	between	the	shocks	to	the	level	of	economic	activity	
and,	 for	 a	 sub‐sample	 of	 economies,	 the	 convergence	 criteria	 to	 join	 the	 European	
Monetary	Union	(EMU).	
	
	
3.2.	Data	and	methodology	
In	this	paper	the	CBI	is	considered	to	be	an	endogenous	variable,	measured	by	the	
legal	independence	index	of	Cukierman	(1992),	updated	by	Polillo	and	Guillem	(2005)	
until	 2003.	 The	 54	 exogenous	 variables	 considered	 are	 economic	 and	 institutional	
determinants	 of	 the	 CBI.	 Our	 sample	 includes	 24	 OECD	 countries59	 and	 spans	 from	
1980	to	2003.		
The	economic	variables	used	are	the	following:	the	world‐wide	common	component	
in	 the	business	cycle	 (i.e.,	 the	correlation	between	 the	country’s	GDP	growth	and	 the	
world	 GDP	 growth60),	 the	 past	 inflation,	 and	 the	 size	 of	 the	 economy	 (i.e.	 real	 GDP	
total).	They	have	been	selected	following	the	results	of	D’Amato,	Pistoresi,	and	Salsano	
                                                 
59	Australia,	Austria,	Belgium,	Canada,	Denmark,	Finland,	France,	Germany,	Greece,	Iceland,	Ireland,	Italy,	
Japan,	Korea,	Luxembourg,	Holland,	New	Zealand,	Norway,	Portugal,	Spain,	Sweden,	Switzerland,	UK,	US.	
60	We	use	the	correlation	between	the	GDP	growth	in	each	country	and	a	weighted	average	of	the	growth	
rates	of	the	economies	in	the	sample.	The	weights	are	the	GDP	levels	in	each	country.	The	result	does	not	
depend	 on	 the	 proxy	 for	 the	 common	 component.	 On	 this	 point,	 see	 D’Amato,	 Pistoresi,	 and	 Salsano	
(2009).	
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(2009),	which	 show	 how	 these	 are	 the	 relevant	 variables	 for	 the	OECD	 countries	 to	
account	for	the	CBI.61		
Sources	of	 such	data	 include	 IMF	 (2008)	 and	World	Bank	 (2008).	 In	 addition,	 the	
dummy	variable	EUROPEAN	MONETARY	UNION	(EMU)	is	considered,	which	takes	the	
value	 of	 1	 (in	 the	 1998‐2003	 period)	 for	 the	 countries	 that	 joined	 the	 EMU	 after	
complying	with	the	convergence	criteria	provided	for	by	the	Maastricht	Treaty.	
The	political	and	institutional	variables	are	taken	from	the	DPI	database	(2006)	of	
the	World	Bank.	Such	variables	are	basically	divided	into	seven	different	groups:	those	
relevant	 to	 the	 executive	 power,	 the	 parties	 that	make	 up	 the	 legislative	 power,	 the	
electoral	rules,	the	stability	of	the	political	system,	the	checks	and	balances	system,	and	
the	state	form,	i.e.,	whether	or	not	it	is	a	federal	state.62	These	last	two	groups	include	
the	variables	analysed	by	Farvaque	(2002)	and	Moser	(1999).		
To	select	the	determinants	of	the	CBI	from	the	database	of	54	potential	explanatory	
variables,	 we	 use	 the	 Lasso	 method	 for	 linear	 regression	 (Tibshirani,	 1996).	 This	
method	minimizes	the	sum	of	squared	errors,	with	a	bound	on	the	sum	of	the	absolute	
values	of	the	coefficients.	The	tightness	of	the	bound	depends	on	a	tuning	parameter,	
usually	selected	by	cross‐validation	(e.g.,	see	Hastie	et	al.,	2001),	as	is	the	case	in	this	
work.	Differently	from	traditional	information‐theoretical	procedures	producing	over‐
fitting	models	(with	small	model	bias	but	large	variance),	selection	by	Lasso	is	optimal	
in	terms	of	balancing	such	a	trade‐off.		
	
                                                 
61	See	D’Amato,	Pistoresi,	and	Salsano	(2009)	for	further	details	on	the	variables	and	their	relation	with	
the	CBI.	
62	 Please	 refer	 to	 the	 DPI	 (2006)	 for	 a	 definition	 of	 each	 variable	 included	 in	 the	 above‐mentioned	
groups.	The	previous	version	of	this	database	is	described	in	Beck	at	al.	(2001).	The	updated	DPI	(2006)	
by	Keefer	(2006)	is	maintained	at	the	URL:	http://go.worldbank.org/2EAGGLRZ40.	Note	that	we	use	the	
same	variable	definitions	when	we	comment	the	results.		
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3.3.	Regression	results	
The	Lasso	method	suggests	13	determinants	of	CBI	out	of	54	making	up	the	whole	
sample	considered.	Their	coefficients	are	estimated	by	OLS	and	presented	in	Table	1.	
We	exclude	the	outcome	from	the	reduced	specification,	(Model	2)	in	which	there	are	
no	significant	variables	from	Model	1.	
Table	3‐1:	Determinants	of	the	Central	Bank	Independence	(CBI)	optimally	
chosen	by	the	selection	operator	Lasso	
	
	 MODEL	1	 MODEL	2	
	 Estimate	(OLS)	 t‐value	 Estimate	(OLS)	 t‐value	
INTERCEPT	 0.41***	 13.91	 0.38***	 23.39	
Party	variables	 	 	 	 	
GOV2SEAT	 0.0007***	 3.65	 0.0007***	 4.09	
GOVOTHST	 ‐	0.0032***	 ‐	4.92	 ‐0.003***	 ‐	4.95	
OPPVOTE	 ‐0.0007 ‐1.35 ‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐	 ‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐
OPP2VOTE	 ‐0.0002	 ‐	0.18	 ‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐	 ‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐
OPP3VOTE	 ‐	0.007***	 ‐	4.58	 ‐0.008***	 ‐5.80	
EXECSPEC	 ‐	0.12***	 ‐	5.55	 ‐	0.11***	 	
	
Electoral	Rules	
	
	 	 	 	
PLURALITY	 0.08***	 4.96	 0.079***	 4.98	
HOUSESYSTEM	 ‐	0.16***	 ‐	9.80	 ‐0.17***	 ‐10.87	
	
Stability	‐	Checks	and	Balance	
	
	 	 	 	
TENSHORTLAX	 0.001	 0.47	 ‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐	 ‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐	
	
Federalism	
	
	 	 	 	
FEDERALISM	 0.091***	 5.74	 0.096***	 6.42	
	
Economic	variables	
	
	 	 	 	
PAST	INFLATION	 ‐	0.002**	 ‐	2.91	 ‐0.002**	 ‐2.93	
WORLD	CYCLE	
	 0.128***	 5.76	 0.131***	 6.08	
Monetary	institution	 	 	 	 	
EMU	 0.45***	 28.63	 0.38***	 23.39	
Degrees	of	freedom		 555	 	 563	 	
Adjusted	 R2 	 0.7045	 	 0.7048	 	
Notes:	Asterisks	denote	significance	at	the	1%	(***),	5%	(**)	level.		
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Central	 Bank	 independence	 is	 larger	 the	 higher	 the	 correlation	 between	 the	
country’s	business	cycle	and	the	world	business	cycle	(WORLD	CYCLE).	To	understand	
this	result,	consider	that	governments	expect	their	economies	to	be	in	the	same	state	
as	the	world’s	(booms	or	busts)	as	foreign	economies.	All	governments	in	each	country	
have	 a	 strategic	 incentive	 to	 commit	 monetary	 policy	 in	 order	 to	 free	 ride	 on	 the	
stabilization	 provided	 abroad	 and	 gain	 credibility	 at	 home.	 Hence,	 the	 larger	 the	
correlation	 is	 among	 shocks,	 the	 larger	 the	 incentive	 to	 hold	 a	 commitment	 (i.e.,	 the	
larger	the	CBI).		
A	negative	relation	between	CBI	and	PAST	INFLATION	supports	the	idea	stressed	by	
Cukierman	 (1992)	 that	 inflation	 leads	 to	 the	 evolution	 of	 automatic	 accommodative	
mechanisms	such	as	 indexation	of	 contracts	 in	 the	 labour	and	capital	markets	 to	 the	
general	price	 level.	Society	reduces	opposition	to	 inflation	and	public	pressure	for	an	
independent	Central	Bank.		
The	dummy	EMU	suggests	that	the	participation	in	the	EURO	encouraged	individual	
countries	to	change	the	 institutional	design	of	the	monetary	policy	 in	view	of	greater	
price	stability.	
We	 find	FEDERALISM	 is	 a	 significant	 element	of	 a	 country’s	 institution	associated	
with	CBI.	As	suggested	by	Farvaque	(2002)	and	Moser	(1999),	federalist	countries	may	
promote	a	stable	monetary	policy	by	constraining	fiscal	policy.	In	addition,	federalism	
determines	society’s	inclination	towards	price	stability	by	strengthening	the	influence	
of	the	financial	opposition	to	inflation	(Posen,	1995).	
Both	variables	 relevant	 to	 the	electoral	 systems	are	highly	 significant:	PLURALITY	
and	HOUSESYSTEM.	
PLURALITY	 (which	 points	 to	 the	 presence	 of	 a	 uninominal	 majority	 electoral	
system)	 is	positively	 correlated:	The	 countries	whose	governments	are	elected	using	
the	majority	system	are	generally	supported	by	strong	and	broad	majorities,	and	this	
68 
leads	the	political	contenders	to	subtract	the	monetary	policy	ex	ante	from	the	scope	of	
the	government,	lest	it	be	exploited	for	electoral	purposes.	
Such	 interpretation	 seems	 to	 be	 confirmed	 by	 the	 negative	 correlation	 of	
HOUSESYSTEM	(which	points	 to	 the	presence	of	a	mixed	electoral	 system,	 i.e.,	partly	
majority‐based	and	partly	proportional).	The	countries	where	such	electoral	 laws	are	
in	place	are	characterized	by	greater	political	 fragmentation	and	by	a	stricter	control	
over	the	government	by	the	opposition.	Therefore,	their	incentive	to	commit	is	weaker.	
This	result	 is	 further	confirmed,	 in	part,	by	 the	party	variables.	 In	 fact,	OPP3VOTE	
(rate	of	votes	of	an	opposition	made	up	of	three	parties)	 is	significant	and	negatively	
correlated.	This	means	that	highly	fragmented	parliaments	have	a	negative	impact	on	
the	degree	CBI.	The	EXECSPEC	variable	(which	specifies	whether	the	governing	parties	
support	any	special	interests)	has	a	negative	impact	on	the	degree	of	CBI.	Finally,	the	
GOV2SEAT	variable	(the	share	of	votes	of	2‐party	governments)	has	a	positive	impact.	
	
3.4.	Conclusions	
This	paper	 confirms	 the	 role	of	 federalism	as	one	of	 the	determinants	of	 a	 country’s	
incentive	 to	 commit	 to	 monetary	 policy	 stressed	 by	 Farvaque	 (2002)	 and	 Moser	
(1999),	while	 the	 role	 of	 the	 checks	 and	 balances	 does	 not	 look	 significant.	 Another	
finding	is	the	existence	of	an	“external	constraint”,	which	seems	to	guide	the	individual	
countries	 in	 their	 choice	 of	 the	 institutional	 design	 of	 the	 monetary	 policy.	 In	
particular,	 such	 constraint	 is	 posed	 both	 by	 written	 rules	 (i.e.,	 compliance	 with	 the	
convergence	 criteria	 to	 join	 the	 EMU),	 and	 by	 the	 correlation	 between	 the	 country’s	
business	cycle	and	the	world	business	cycle.	
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Chapter	IV: 	
Political	 Stabilization	 by	 an	 independent	
Central	Bank	
 
 
 
 
4.1.	Introduction	
The	 question	 of	 the	 Central	 Bank,	 its	 political	 independence,	 its	 tasks,	 and	 how	 it	
fulfils	 them,	 has	 returned	 to	 the	 centre	 of	 political	 discussion.	 The	 Anglo‐American	
subprime	 crisis	 of	 2007	 and	 the	 European	 sovereign	 debt	 crisis	 of	 2011	 generated	
intense	pressure	by	politicians,	financial	institutions,	employers	and	trade	unions	for	a	
further	extension	of	the	competence	of	Central	Banks	in	financial	supervision,	and	for	
expansion	of	the	objectives	and	degrees	of	freedom	in	the	monetary	policy	that	Central	
Banks	implement.	
This	paper	examines	a	 case	 in	which	 the	Central	Bank	must	pursue	 its	 objectives,	
while	 diverse	 actors,	 such	 as	 political	 institutions	 (government	 or	 parliament),	
financial	institutions	(commercial	banks,	investment	funds,	insurance	companies)	and	
in	general	all	organized	interest	groups	(lobbies)	apply	strong	pressure	on	the	Central	
Bank	 in	 order	 to	 ‘capture’	 it	 and	 ensure	 monetary	 policy	 decisions	 which	 do	 not	
conflict	with	their	interests.63	
This	 is	 a	 problem	 common	 to	 all	 processes	 of	 delegation	 by	 a	 principal	 –	 the	
government,	parliament	or	politicians	in	the	broad	sense	–	to	an	agent	–	the	‘authority’	
or	an	independent	bureaucrat.	
                                                 
63	Canova	(2007,	p.	3)	discussed	the	non‐state	actors	that	impacted	on	the	present	global	economic	order	
by	capturing	state	institutions	–	the	regulated	industry	capturing	the	regulator	–	often	with	promises	of	
future	employment,	political	 support,	and	campaign	contributions.	But	he	mentioned	 that	 there	was	a	
“relative	silence	regarding	the	capture	of	Central	Banks,	perhaps	the	most	significant	agency	capture	by	
non‐state	actors	in	today's	de‐jure	international	financial	setup”. 
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The	core	question	is	this:	what	are	the	costs	and	benefits	of	granting	independence	
to	these	regulatory	authorities?	
A	body	of	economic	literature	(Stigler,	1971;	Posner	1974;	Laffont	and	Tirole,	1993;	
Laffont	and	Martimort,	1999;	Faure‐Grimaud	and	Martimort,	2001)	has	sought	to	give	
an	answer	to	this	question	by	analysing	the	interactions	among	a	regulatory	agency,	its	
political	principals,	and	the	interest	group	which	is	supposed	to	be	regulated.	
In	 the	 case	 of	 monetary	 policy,	 the	 conflict	 of	 interest	 among	 economic	 agents,	
which	in	turn	reflects	their	diversity,	 is	essential	for	interpretation	of	these	costs	and	
benefits.	
The	 conflict	 of	 interest	 relates	 to	 the	 creditors/debtors	 issue	 in	 the	 economy.	
Inflation	reduces	the	real	weight	of	a	non‐indexed	debt	–	i.e.	one	which	remains	fixed	in	
nominal	terms	–	while	disinflation	aggravates	that	weight.	For	debtors,	inflation	means	
lower	 real	 debt,	 whereas	 disinflation	 means	 higher	 debt.	 Thus	 generated	 is	 a	
symmetrical	 redistributive	 effect:	 inflation	 redistributes	 from	 creditors	 to	 debtors;	
disinflation	does	so	from	debtors	to	creditors.	In	a	context	of	this	kind,	the	banks	and	
large	financial	groups64	are	anti‐inflation	actors.65	By	contrast,	small	business	owners	
and	farmers,	who	have	an	incentive	to	favour	‘surprise	inflation’	in	order	to	pay	lower	
real	 wages,	 or	 all	 economic	 actors	 exposed	 to	 the	 banking	 sector,	 are	 pro‐inflation	
groups.66	
To	be	noted	is	that	interest	groups	(lobbies)	have	a	particularly	influential	role	only	
if	 they	can	corrupt	and	acquire	particular	economic	 information	also	available	 to	 the	
Central	 Banker:	 in	 this	 case	 the	 lobbies	 have	 an	 interest	 in	 inducing	 the	 monetary	
authority	to	conceal	important	information	so	that	they	can	gain	an	advantage.	
                                                 
64	On	this	see	Posen	(1995),	who	argues	that	the	financial	sector	is	generally	the	main	supporter	of	the	
Central	Bank’s	political	independence. 
65	 Kane	 (1980)	 argues	 that	 builders	 and	 construction	 unions	 also	 form	 an	 anti‐inflationist	 group	 for	
similar	reasons. 
66	Of	course,	there	have	been	moments	in	history	–	for	example,	the	financial	crisis	of	2007	–	when	also	
the	financial	sector	has	found	it	convenient	to	ease	its	debts. 
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The	 institutional	 design	 of	 monetary	 policy	 –	 for	 example,	 the	 degree	 of	
independence	 of	 the	 Central	 Bank	 –	 may	 also	 influence	 the	 relationship	 between	
interest	groups	and	the	monetary	authority	(Cukierman,	2013).	
It	 can	 be	 also	 hypothesised	 that	 the	 more	 a	 Central	 Bank	 is	 independent	 of	 the	
government,	the	more	vulnerable	it	will	be	to	the	pressure	of	interest	groups.	
All	 these	 aspects	 have	 been	 analysed	 by	 Gabillon	 and	 Martimort	 (2004),	 who	
consider	a	‘two‐tier’	model	of	monetary	policy	where	the	Central	Banker	is	subject	to	
both	explicit	influence	by	the	elected	political	principal	through	a	contract	and	implicit	
influence	 by	 anti‐inflation	 interest	 groups	 seeking	 to	 ‘capture’	 monetary	 policy.	 The	
degree	of	political	independence	therefore	influences	the	agency	costs	paid	to	control	
the	 Central	 Banker.	 The	 result	 obtained	 by	 Gabillon	 and	 Martimort	 (2004)	 is	 that	
political	 independence	 increases	 the	 agency	 costs	 (agency	 cost	 effects)	 but	 prevents	
greater	fluctuations	in	inflation	due	to	exogenous	political	uncertainty	with	respect	to	
the	 election	 result	 (stabilization	 effect).	 On	 comparing	 the	 two	 effects,	 ex‐ante	 social	
welfare	increases	in	the	case	of	political	independence.	
This	 paper	 investigates	 how	 the	 independence	 of	 the	 Central	 Bank	 influences	 the	
election	 outcome	 when	 political	 uncertainty	 is	 endogenized	 in	 Gabillon	 and	
Martimort’s	model,	 considering	 forward‐looking	 voters	who	make	 their	 decisions	 by	
comparing	the	policy	platforms	proposed	by	the	two	main	political	competitors.	
The	 rest	 of	 the	 paper	 is	 organized	 as	 follows.	 Section	 2	 presents	 a	 summary	 of	
Gabillon	 and	 Martimort’s	 model;	 Section	 3	 describes	 our	 extension	 of	 this	 model;	
finally,	Section	4	sets	out	the	conclusions.	
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4.2.	The	Gabillon‐Martimort	model	
Gabillon	and	Martimort		(2004)	provide	an	explanation	for	a	possible	link	between	
the	degree	of	 independence	of	 a	Central	Bank	 (CB)	and	policy	 stabilization.	The	 first	
key	 ingredient	 of	 	 the	 model	 is	 the	 possibility	 of	 capture	 of	 these	 agencies	 by	 the	
interest	groups	in	the	financial	sector.	Indeed,	in	a	world	of	information	asymmetries,	
regulators	 accumulate	 information	 about	 the	welfare	 effects	 of	 different	policies	 and	
they	 can	 be	 bribed	 to	 manipulate	 information.	 The	 second	 ingredient	 is	 political	
uncertainty.	The	extent	to	which	a	Central	Bank	is	affiliated	to	a	political	party	affects	
the	likelihood	that	this	particular	agency	remains	in	place	as	political	powers	alternate	
in	 office.	 The	 status	 of	 the	 Central	 Bank	 thus	 significantly	 changes	 the	 collusive	
opportunities	between	this	Central	Bank	and	the	financial	industry.	
In	this	section,	we	summarize	the	main	elements	of	the	Gabillon‐Martimort	model.	
This	will	serve	the	purposes	of	the	next	section,	in	which	we	proceed	with	extension	of	
this	model.		
Contrary	 to	 the	 literature	 on	 monetary	 institutions	 that	 takes	 the	 contractual	
approach,	the	CB’s	incentive	mechanisms	are	not	designed	by	a	social	planner,	but	by	
partisan	 political	 principals67	 who	 want	 to	 please	 different	 constituencies	 and	 thus	
express	 different	 concerns	 for	 the	 trade‐off	 between	 price	 control	 and	 surprise	
inflation	 depending	 on	 whether	 they	 represent	 a	 leftist	 or	 a	 rightist	 constituency.68	
Because	of	information	asymmetry	between	the	CB	and	the	government,	there	is	also	
scope	for	collusion	between	private	interest	groups	and	the	CB.	However,	the	scope	for	
capture	depends	on	the	exact	control	rights	that	principals	retain	over	the	CB.	
	
                                                 
67	 The	 political	 principal	 can	 be	 conceived	 as	 the	 elected	 legislative	 or	 executive	 branch	 of	 the	
government. 
68	It	is	a	contract	between	an	elected	political	principal,	a	CB,	and	the	private	sector	in	a	two‐tier	model	
of	monetary	policy. 
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4.2.1	Preferences	
CB:	The	CB	receives	a	monetary	transfer	s	from	whichever	political	principal	has	been	
elected	to	perform	the	monetary	policy.	The	CB’s	utility	is	V	=	s.	
This	transfer	can	be	viewed	as	the	share	of	the	central	bank	budget	and	resources	that	
can	be	diverted	by	the	monetary	authority	for	its	private	use.	Alternatively	it	can	also	
be interpreted	 as	 the	 probability	 of	 being	 promoted	 to	 a	 higher	 position	 in	 the	 civil	
service	times	the	benefits		of	this	higher	position.			
Political	Principals:	A	political	principal	maximises	an	objective	 function	à	 la	Barro‐
Gordon	(1983):		
  sSW eii   2/2 	 (4.1)
where		is	the	inflation	level,	 e 	its	expectations,	 0i 	(with	  RLi , )	is	the	weight	
that	 the	 political	 principal	 gives	 to	 creating	 surprise	 inflation.		 is	 a	macroeconomic	
shock	affecting	both	political	principals’	concerns	for	output	expansion.	s	is	the	transfer	
given	to	the	CB.69	
A	 rightist	 government	 is	 less	 willing	 to	 create	 surprise	 inflation	 than	 a	 leftist	 one.	
0 RL  	represents	the	degree	of	polarization	of	the	society	i.e.	the	difference	
between	the	concerns	for	surprise	inflation	between	a	leftist	party	and	a	rightist	one.	
The	probabilities	of	each	of	these	two	political	principals	being	elected	are	exogenous						
( R  	with	probability	p	and	 L  	with	probability	1	 ‐	p).	 In	 the	next	section	we	
will	change	this	assumption.	
                                                 
69 The Central Bank has no weight in the principal’s objective function, capturing the fact that redistributing 
wealth to bureaucrats as such is not part of the government’s objective.  Alternatively, civil servants represent a 
group with negligible social weight. The main insights of the analysis are robust to the case where parties’ 
objective functions give the same positive (but less than one) weight to the regulator’s utility. (See Laffont and 
Martimort, 1999; Faure-Grimaud and Martimort, 2003, where they show that the separation of powers in 
regulation may act as a commitment against the threat of regulatory capture ). This means considering the 
objective function in this way:   ,2/2 sSW eii   	for	any	 .10     
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Interest	group:	The	anti‐inflationist	group	obtains	a	utility	from	unexpected	inflation	
which	is	equal	to:	  eIG   	with	β>0.70	
	
4.2.2.	Information	structure	
The	 shock	 is	  	 drawn	 from	 a	 common	 knowledge	 distribution	 on	   , 	 with	
respective	probabilities	1	 ‐	v	 and	v.	 It	 is	possible	 to	normalise	 1 	 so	 that	we	have	
01   .	Anti‐inflationist	incentives	are	thus	greater	when	 	is	realised.	The	CB	
and	 the	 interest	 group	 have	 complete	 information	 on	 the	 shock	 .	 This	 information	
structure	has	already	been	discussed	in	the	literature	by	Peek,	Rosemgren,	and	Tootell	
(1999),	who	 analyze	 the	 relationship	 between	monetary	 policy	 and	 problems	 in	 the	
banking	sector,	which	may	serve	as	an	early	indicator	of	deteriorating	macroeconomic	
conditions.	
Instead,	at	the	time	when	the	CB’s	incentives	are	designed,	the	political	principals	and	
the	 (non‐financial)	 private	 sector	 remain	 uninformed	 about	 the	 exact	 value	 of	 this	
shock.	
The	 CB	 can	 conceal	 verifiable	 evidence	 that	 the	 economy	 is	 doing	 badly	   	 and	
instead	 announce	 that	  ˆ .	 The	 mere	 possibility	 that	 the	 CB	 can	 conceal	 such	
information	 is	 the	 ‘key’	 to	 understanding	 the	 scope	 for	 collusion	 with	 an	 anti‐
inflationist	interest	group.	Conversely,	the	CB	can	issue	credible	reports	about	the	real	
state	of	the	economy.71	
	
                                                 
70	The	pro‐inflationist	interest	group	can	be	easily	seen	in	the	model.	In	this	case	the	utility	of	this	group	
is:	  eIG   	with		>	0. 
71 A ‘credible report’ means that the CB presents documents produced by its research department showing that 
the economy is in a good or bad state. 
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4.2.3.	Incentive	contract	
Study	of	the	properties	of	mechanisms	designed	to	prevent	collusion	between	several	
members	 of	 an	 organization	 has	 become	 a	 highly	 active	 area	 of	 research	 since	 the	
pioneering	work	of	Tirole	(1986).	
When,	as	in	our	case,	a	supervisor	(CB)	and	an	agent	(Financial	Sector)	have	complete	
information	 about	 an	 event	 (the	 real	 situation	 of	 the	 economy),	 while	 a	 principal	
(Political	 Principal)	 is	 not	 informed	 about	 this	 event,	 we	 can	 verify	 that	 agent–
supervisor	 coalitions	 can	 be	 formed	 to	 maximize	 private	 objectives	 and	 potentially	
defeat	the	purpose	for	which	that	supervision	has	been	established.	Our	analysis	will	
now	take	account	of	the	possibility	that	such	collusive	behaviour	of	the	agent	and	the	
supervisor	may	 occur.	We	 can	 assume	 that	 the	 two	 parties	 agree	 by	 way	 of	 a	 side‐
contract.	 This	 side‐contract	 will	 reduce	 the	 ability	 of	 the	 principal	 to	 extract	
information	 from	 the	 supervisor.	 To	 avoid	 such	 collusion,	 the	 principal	 can	 in	 turn	
reward	the	supervisor	for	every	report	on	the	true	state	of	the	economy.	
The	 optimal	 contract	 is	 always	 the	 contract	 that	 deters	 collusion.	 Should	 collusion	
occur,	at	 the	optimum	the	principal	can	always	alter	the	contract	by	making	quantity	
transfers	 independent	 of	 the	 supervisor’s	 report,	 and	 collusion	 will	 be	 deterred	
because	 it	 is	 no	 longer	 useful	 to	 the	 agent.	 This	 is	 known	 as	 the	 collusion‐proofness	
principle.	
Hence,	 to	 deter	 collusion,	 the	 principal	 must	 be	 sure	 to	 reward	 the	 supervisor	 for	
reporting	the	truth	by	an	amount	that	is	exactly	equal	to	the	maximum	bribe	that	the	
agent	 can	 offer	 the	 supervisor	 to	 keep	 quiet:	 anything	 less	 will	 open	 the	 door	 to	
collusion,	and	anything	more	will	be	a	waste	of	money.	
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4.2.4.	CB	contracts	and	Collusion	technology	
The	 grand‐contract	 between	 the	 elected	 political	 principal	 and	 the	 CB	 consists	 of	
wages	 s	 and	 inflation	 targets	 .	  iis , 	 (resp.	  iis , )	 represents,	 respectively,	 the	
wage	and	inflation	target	when	the	economy	is	going	well	 	(resp.	goes	badly,	 ).	
The	 side‐contract	 or	 collusion	 between	 the	 CB	 and	 the	 interest	 group	 consists	 of	
secret	 side‐transfers.	 The	 CB	 has	 all	 the	 bargaining	 power	 in	 the	 design	 of	 side‐
contracts.	When	the	economy	is	going	badly,	the	anti‐inflationist	interest	groups	want	
the	CB	to	report	 	to	keep	inflation	low.	From	the	false	report	of	the	CB	to	the	political	
principal,	the	interest	group	earns:		
   ieiieii   )( .	
The	interest	group	is	not	willing	to	bribe	the	CB	to	misreport	when	  	realizes,	since	
doing	so	would	increase	inflation.	However,	because	of	the	illegal	nature	of	capture,	the	
side‐contract	between	this	group	and	the	CB	suffers	from	some	transaction	costs72.	The	
exchange	of		units	of	bribes	only	yields	the	CB	a	private	benefit	 from	holding	office:	
2
2)( 
rkK  ,	 where	 10  k 	 and	 r	 >0,	 so	 that	 the	 transaction	 costs	 of	 side‐
contracting	are	equal:		‐	K().73		
	
4.2.5.	The	legal	status	of	the	CB	
The	CB	has	political	independence	(PI)	when	he	cannot	be	fired	by	the	newly‐elected	
political	 principal.	 Under	 political	 control	 (PC)	 the	 CB	 is	 in	 power	 if	 the	 party	 with	
                                                 
72 See Tirole (1992) for a first discussion of the origins of these transaction costs. 
73	Gabillon	and	Martimort	(2004)	assume	that	K(.)	 is	strictly	concave	and	increasing	in	the	interval	(0,	
k/r).	These	two	assumptions	capture	the	fact	that	transferring	more	wealth	to	the	CB	makes	it	easier	for	
the	interest	group	to	affect	his	decision‐making	but	the	marginal	efficiency	of	doing	so	decreases. 
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which	he	 is	 affiliated	 is	 elected.	 In	 this	 case,	 the	 principal	 has	 control	 rights	 on	who	
should	be	the	head	of	the	Central	Bank.	
	
4.2.6.	Timings		
The	timing	of	the	game	depends	on	the	legal	status	of	the	Central	Bank.		
Under	political	control	it	is	as	follows:	
T	=	0:	 The	 electoral	 outcome	 realizes,	 and	 the	 preferences	 of	 the	 elected	 political	
principal	are	known	to	all	players	including	the	private	sector	of	the	economy.		
T	=	 1:	 The	 CB	 receives	 a	 grand‐contract	 from	 the	 political	 principal	 that	 has	 just	
been	 elected.	This	 contract	 stipulates	wages	 and	 inflation	 targets.	The	private	 sector	
forms	its	expectations	on	inflation	and	negotiates	wage	contracts.		
T	=	2:	Ex‐post	collusion	stage.	If	the	CB	has	accepted	the	grand‐contract,	he	offers	a	
side‐contract	 to	 the	 interest	group.	This	side‐contract	consists	of	a	bribe	 in	exchange	
for	hiding	the	item	of	information	that	he	has	available.	This	side‐contract	is	accepted	
or	rejected.		
T	=	3:	 	is	learned	by	the	CB	and	the	interest	group.		
T	 =	 4:	 The	 CB	 makes	 an	 announcement	 on	 the	 state	 of	 the	 economy,	 and	 the	
corresponding	 inflation	 target	 and	wage	 are	 implemented.	 Side‐transfers,	 if	 any,	 are	
exchanged.	
Importantly,	under	political	control	the	CB	and	the	interest	group	cannot	agree	on	a	
side‐contract	before	political	uncertainty	 is	 resolved.	 Instead,	 an	 independent	CB	 and	
the	interest	group	can	also	agree	on	an	ex‐ante	side‐contract.	
With	an	independent	CB,	the	timing	of	the	game	is	in	part	as	above:		
T	 =	 0:	 Both	 political	 parties	 propose	 their	 electoral	 platforms	 non‐cooperatively.	
These	 platforms	 consist	 of	 incentive	 contracts	 to	 the	 CB.	 These	 grand‐contracts	
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stipulate	budgets	 and	 inflation	 targets	 conditionally	on	whether	 the	offering	party	 is	
elected.	The	CB	accepts	or	rejects	both	grand‐contracts,	being	still	uninformed	on	the	
state	of	the	economy	.	
T	=	1:	Ex‐ante	collusion	stage.	If	the	CB	has	accepted	the	grand‐contracts,	he	offers	a	
side‐contract	 to	 the	 interest	 group.	 This	 side‐contract	 is	 now	 conditional	 on	 the	
electoral	outcome.	
T	=	2:	The	electoral	outcome	realizes	and	the	preferences	of	the	political	principal	
are	known	to	all	players	including	the	private	sector	of	the	economy,	which	now	forms	
its	expectations	on	inflation.		
Stages	T	=	3	and	T	=	4	are	then	the	same	as	with	affiliated	CBs.		
	
4.2.7.	A	benchmark	with	complete	information	
Under	 complete	 information,	 the	 first	 best	 inflation	 targets,	 i and	 i ,	 offered	 by	
the	elected	political	principal	i	maximize	expected	welfare	defined	as:	
 iiMax , 	    

 

  eiiiieiiii vv  2)1(2
22
	
s.t.	 iiei vv  )1(  .	
Rewriting	 the	 principal’s	 objective	 as	 a	 function	 of	 average	 inflation	 ei 	 and	 the	
difference	in	inflation	targets	   ii 	the	principal’s	problem	becomes:	
 ieiMax ,
    .2)1(2
22



  iii
e
i vv  	
In	the	case	of	full	commitment	to	a	policy	rule,	the	optimal	monetary	policy	requires:	
0FBei 	
The	difference	in	inflation	targets	between	both	states	of	the	world	is	thus:	
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0  iFBi 	
The	 above	 commitment	 policy	 has	 been	 extensively	 criticized	 for	 not	 being	 time‐
consistent.	 Gabillon	 and	 Martimort	 investigate	 instead	 how	 this	 policy	 is	 robust	 to	
political	 pressures.	 Taking	 this	 perspective	 highlights	 that	 different	 institutional	
designs	 offer	 different	 responses	 to	 agency	 problems.	 They	 find	 that:	
PC
L
PI
L
PI
R
PC
R   .74	 However,	 granting	 political	 independence	 to	 the	 CB	
somewhat	 insulates	monetary	policy	 from	political	 fluctuations:	a	 stabilization	effect.	
The	 cost	 of	 independence	 is	 nevertheless	 that	 the	 CB	 is	 more	 prone	 to	 capture	 by	
interest	groups:	a	delegation	effect.	The	stabilization	effect	is	always	strong	enough	to	
dominate	the	delegation	effect.	Hence,	ex	ante	social	welfare	is	greater	under	political	
independence	than	under	political	control.	
	
4.3.	An	extension	of	Gabillon‐Martimort’s	model	with	
endogenous	political	uncertainty	
In	 this	 section,	 election	 probabilities	 are	 thus	 endogenized,	 with	 each	 party’s	
probability	of	success	depending	on	both	 its	own	and	the	other	parties’	policies.	This	
approach75	 considerably	 revises	 the	 properties	 of	 the	 classic	 partisan	 model.	 Most	
notably,	we	demonstrate	that	endogenous	voting	will	have	important	consequences	for	
the	magnitude	of	the	partisan	effect.	
                                                 
74	The	difference	in	inflation	targets	under	political	control	is:	
vr
vkiPC
i /1
/
2
 
 	with	  RLi , .	
The	 difference	 in	 inflation	 targets	 under	 political	 independence	 is:	  
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75 A similar approach is considered by Alesina  (1988), Balke (1988) and Ellis (1991). 
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Let	 us	 now	 endogenize	 political	 uncertainty	 in	 Gabillon‐Martimort’s	 model	 by	
assuming	 that	 forward‐looking	 voters	 decide	 their	 ballot	 by	 comparing	 the	 expected	
payoffs	 that	 they	will	 obtain	 with	 each	 party.	 Voters	 are	 ideologically	 differentiated	
with	respect	to	the	trade‐off	that	they	would	implement	between	surprise	inflation	and	
price	 stabilization	 i.e.	 with	 respect	 to	 their	.76	 This	 parameter	 may	 in	 this	 case	 be	
interpreted	as	representing	the	voter’s	location	in	the	wealth	distribution.	
	
4.3.1.	Monetary	policy	under	political	control	
Let	 us	 first	 consider	 the	 case	when	 the	 Central	 Banker	 is	 under	 political	 control.	
Because	 agent	 	 is	 indifferent	 between	 a	 rightist	 policy	 R 	 and	 a	 leftist	 policy	
implementing	 L ,	it	must	obtain	the	same	expected	payoff	with	both	policies.	Hence:	
   LR SWSW    	
Following	 Gabillon	 and	 Martimort	 (2004),	 we	 now	 write	 social	 welfare,	 in	 regime	
political	control	with	party	  RLi , ,	under	asymmetric	information	and	the	threat	of	
capture,	thus:	
   iSW         iPCiiiiei ACvv  


  212
22
77		 						(4.2)	
where	      iiPCi KvAC   1 	is	the	agency	cost	associated	with	the	delegation	of	
monetary	policy	to	the	CB.78	
                                                 
76	This	depends	on	differences	in	the	ideologies	if	voters	are	rightist	or	leftist. 
77	 Even	 in	 the	 case	 of	 monetary	 policy	 offered	 when	 the	 central	 banker	 benefits	 from	 political	
independence,	the	SW	function	is	the	same;	only	the	agency	cost	AC	changes. 
78	In	effect,	an	optimal	monetary	policy	proposed	by	principal	i	must	implement	collusion‐proofness	at	
minimal	 agency	 cost:	       iissiPCi svsvAC ii  1min, 	 s.t.	 a	 collusion‐proofness	 constraint	 and	
participation	 constraint.	 For	 the	 first	 constraint,	 the	 Central	 Banker	must	 be	 sufficiently	 rewarded	 to	
report	 truthfully,	 so	 that	 colluding	 with	 the	 anti‐inflationist	 interest	 group	 becomes	 a	 dominated	
strategy.	The	grand‐contract	must	thus	satisfy	a	collusion‐proofness	constraint:	  iii Kss  .	The	
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Under	 asymmetric	 information	 and	 political	 control,	 the	 optimal	 collusion‐proof	
monetary	policy	offered	by	a	political	principal	i	entails	no	inflationary	bias,	so	that:	
0ei 	
We	now	rewrite	the	social	welfare	function	as	follows:	
   iSW       


  2
2
22 ii
i
ii
rkv  	 			(4.3)	
The	probability	of	the	political	party	i	(with	i=	Right, Left)	being	elected	is	a	function	of	
politically	induced	fluctuations	in	the	variance	of	inflation,	thus:	  RLpP   .	
We	 take	 from	 Friedman	 the	 hypothesis	 of	 variance	 of	 inflation.	 	 Indeed,	 Friedman	
(1977)	 considered	 why	 policy	 makers	 may	 be	 affected	 by	 inflation	 variability.			
Friedman	wanted		to	explain	why	there	is	a	positive	correlation		between	the	level	of		
inflation	and	 the	variability	of	 inflation	across	 countries	and	over	 time	 for	any	given		
country.		In		Friedman’s		analysis,		a		government		may		temporarily	pursue		a		set		of		
policy		goals		(output,		employment)		that		lead		to		high	inflation;		this,		in		turn,		elicits		
strong	 	 political	 	 pressure	 	 to	 	 reduce	 	 the	 debasing	 	 of	 	 the	 	 currency.	 	 Chowdhury		
(1991)		re‐examined		the	relation		between		the		level		and		the		variability		of		inflation		
for	 a	 sample	 of	 sixty‐six	 countries	 over	 the	 1955–90	period.	His	 results	 indicate	 the	
presence	 of	 a	 significant	 positive	 relation	 between	 the	 rate	 of	 inflation	 and	 its	
variability.	
In	 a	 Nash	 equilibrium	 of	 the	 choice	 of	 the	 political	 right‐wing	 party	 platforms, RZ 	
chooses	 R 	so	that	it	maximizes:	
                                                                                                                                                      
left‐hand	side	represents	the	wage	differential	necessary	to	prevent	collusive	behaviour	and	to	induce	a	
truthful	 announcement	 by	 the	 Central	 Banker.	 The	 right‐hand	 side	 represents	 the	 benefits	 that	 the	
Central	Banker	 can	obtain	 from	his	 collusive	 relationship	with	 the	anti‐inflationist	 interest	group.	For	
the	second	constraint,	the	Central	Banker	prefers	to	enter	the	public	sector	rather	than	obtain	a	utility	
equal	 to	 zero,	 so	 that	 the	 participation	 constraint	 must	 be	 satisfied:	 0is .	 Note	 that	 when	
0  ii ,	 the	 two	 constraints	 imply	 also	 0is .	 This	 last	 participation	 constraint	 can	 be	
omitted	 in	 what	 follows	 as	 long	 as	 the	 stake	 for	 collusion	 remains	 positive.	 For	 further	 details	 on	
collusion‐proofness	constraint	and	participation	constraint	see	Gabillon	and	Martimort	(2004,	p.	364). 
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        LRLRRRL RSWpSWp    1 	 				(4.4)	
Then:	
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RZ 	now	takes	 into	account	the	 impact	of	 its	policy	choice	on	the	probability	of	being	
elected.	The	corresponding	first‐order	condition	(FOC)	is	now	written	as:	
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(4.5)
After	some	algebra	we	obtain:	
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(4.6)	
In	the	case	of	the	left,	 LZ chooses	 L so	that	it	maximizes:	
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The	corresponding	FOC	is	now	written	as:	
83 
       
       
        022'
1
2
22
2
'
2
2
2


 

 


 










 






 
LL
L
LL
LLLRL
rkvRLp
rkvp
R
r
Rk
R
RLvRLp



	
(4.8)	
It	follows	that:	
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(4.9)	
(6)	and	(9)	represent	a	system	of	nonlinear	differential	equations.	We	solve	this	system	
numerically.	The	results	of	the	simulations	are	shown	in	figures	(1)	(2)	(3)	and	(4)	for	
different	values	of	some	parameters.	
	
Figure:	4–1	 Figure:	4–2	
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Figure:	4–3	 Figure:	4–4	
	
Direct	observations	show	that	the	electoral	effect	is	negative	with	the	left	and	positive	
with	the	right.79	 Indeed,	reducing	(resp.	 increasing)	the	difference	 in	 inflation	targets	
now	increases	the	probability	that	the	left	(resp.	right)	is	elected	and,	for	this	reason,	
the	left	offers	a	platform	shifted	downwards.	
	
	
4.3.2.	Monetary	Policy	under	political	independence	
Under	the	political	 independence	of	the	Central	Banker,	monetary	policy	is	carried	
out	 for	both	political	principals.	For	 this	 reason,	 the	Central	Banker	 can	offer	a	 side‐
contract	to	the	anti‐inflationist	interest	group	before	political	uncertainty	is	resolved.80		
                                                 
79 See note 74 to compare this results with those by Gabillon-Martimort. 
80	Gabillon	and	Martimort,	 in	order	 to	prevent	collusion	between	 interest	groups	and	central	bankers,	
consider	an	ex	ante	collusion‐proofness	constraint:		         LRLLRR ppKsspssp   11 	
The	left‐hand	side	above	represents	the	wages	expected	to	prevent	collusive	behaviour;	the	right‐hand	
side	represents	the	bribe	that	the	anti‐inflation	group	is	willing	to	pay	to	the	Central	Banker	to	make	him	
lie	in	his	announcement	of	the	economic	shock.	The	Central	Banker	strictly	prefers	to	commit	to	a	side‐
contract	before	political	uncertainty	resolves	rather	than	wait	 for	 the	outcome	of	 the	election.	 Indeed,	
because	the	efficiency	of	side‐contracting	K(.)	is	a	strictly	concave	function	of	the	collusive	stake:		          LRLR KppKppK   11 	
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Therefore,	with	political	independence,	the	agency	cost	associated	with	the	delegation	
of	monetary	policy	to	the	CB	is	written	thus	in	the	case	of	a	rightist	government:	
           LLLRRPIR sspppKvpAC  1111  (4.10)
in	the	case	of	a	leftist	government:	
          RRLRLPIL sspppKvpAC   111 1 (4.11)
Because	 agent	 	 is	 indifferent	 between	 a	 rightist	 policy	 R 	 and	 a	 leftist	 policy	
implementing	 L ,	it	must	obtain	the	same	payoff	with	both	policies.	To	simplify,	we	
focus	on	 the	 case	where	both	parties	pay	 the	 same	wage	 to	 the	 independent	Central	
Banker	 in	 an	 interior	 equilibrium,	 i.e.,	we	posit	 a	 particular	 distribution	 of	 the	 gains	
from	dealing	with	a	common	bureaucrat.	
	The	identity	of	the	swing	voter		is	now	such	that:	
           LLRR KvSWKvSW    11 (4.12)
In	a	Nash	equilibrium,	 RZ 	chooses	 R 	so	that	it	maximizes:	
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)1(111
11 	
and	then	follows:	
                                                                                                                                                      
The	 optimal	monetary	 policy	 proposed	 by	 principal	 i	must	 implement	 collusion‐proofness	 at	minimal	
agency	 cost:	       iissiPIi svsvAC ii  1min, 	 s.t.	 a	 collusion‐proofness	 constraint	 and	 participation	
constraint.	The	participation	constraints	are	 identical	 to	the	case	of	political	dependence	 0is ,	 from	
which	it	follows	that	 0is .	For	every	detail	on	this	point	see	Gabillon	and	Martimort,	(2004,	p.368). 
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The	corresponding	FOC	becomes:		
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After	some	algebra	we	obtain:	
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(4.14) 
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In	a	Nash	equilibrium,	 LZ 	chooses	 L 	so	that	it	maximizes:		
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and	then	follows:	
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The	corresponding	FOC	becomes:	
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It	follows	that:	
(4.15) 
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(14)	 and	 (16)	 represent	 a	 system	 of	 nonlinear	 differential	 equations.	 We	 solve	 this	
system	numerically.	The	results	of	the	simulations	are	shown	in	figures:	(5)	(6)	(7)	and	
(8)	for	different	values	of	some	parameters.	
Figure:	4–5	 Figure:	4‐6	
	
Figure:	4–7	 Figure:	4‐8	
(4.16) 
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For	both	parties,	the	electoral	effect	still	includes	a	term	taking	the	same	form	as	with	a	
politically	 dependent	 Central	 Banker.	 However,	 there	 appears	 a	 new	 term	 which	
captures	the	impact	of	the	choice	of	the	platform	on	the	agency	cost	of	delegation	to	an	
independent	Central	Banker.	
More	importantly,	the	greater	sensitivity	of	the	swing	voter	to	inflation	variations(  )	
under	 independence	may	 increase	 the	convergence	of	 the	platforms	towards	middle‐
road	 policies.	 This	 is	 clear	 on	 comparing	 the	 results	 of	 the	 system	 (1)	 (which	 is	 the	
institutional	 monetary	 regime	 under	 political	 dependence)	 with	 the	 results	 of	 the	
system	(2)	(which	is	the	institutional	monetary	regime	under	political	independence).	
Figure:	4–9	 Figure:	4–10	
Figure:	4–11	 Figure:	4–12	
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This	would	reinforce	Gabillon‐Martimorts’	finding	that	the	independent	Central	Banker	
makes	policies	converge	further	one	towards	the	order	
	
	
4.4.	Conclusions	
The	foregoing	analysis	has	examined	the	interesting	feedback	between	institutions	
and	election	results.	In	this	case,	the	amount	of	political	uncertainty	and	the	choice	of	
institutional	design	have	been	determined	simultaneously	in	the	model.	Endogenizing	
political	 uncertainty	 reinforces	 the	 stabilization	 effect.	 A	 rightist	 (resp.	 leftist)	
policymaker	increases	(resp.	decreases)	the	variance	of	inflation	and	now	looks	much	
more	like	a	leftist	(resp.	rightist)	policymaker.	
This	 finding	 strengthens	 the	 hypothesis	 that	 the	 independence	 of	 the	 CB	 is	 the	 best	
institutional	 design	with	which	 to	 protect	 the	 general	 interests	 of	 ‘society’.	 In	 fact,	 a	
Central	Banker	independent	from	the	political	principal	that	appoints	it	represents	the	
best	 control	 by	 the	minority	with	 respect	 to	 decisions	 taken	 by	 the	 elected	 political	
majority.	
This	line	of	research	could	continue	in	various	directions.	The	first	is	consideration	
of	political	 systems	more	 complex	 than	a	 two‐party	one:	 that	 is,	multi‐party	 systems	
and	coalition	governments,	which	are	generally	associated	with	parliamentary	political	
regimes.	 The	 political	 economics	 literature81	 emphasises,	 in	 fact,	 that	 these	
characteristics	 increase	 political	 uncertainty.	 This	 suggests	 that	 the	 benefits	 of	 the	
Central	Bank’s	political	independence	are	greater	in	parliamentary	systems:	an	aspect	
which	should	be	analysed	both	theoretically	and	empirically.	
                                                 
81	See	Persson	and	Tabellini	(2000;	2003). 
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A	second	direction	for	further	inquiry	within	the	framework	analysed	is	theoretical	
and	 empirical	 investigation	 of	 the	 possible	 separation	 of	 banking	 supervision	 from	
monetary	 policy.	 This	 should	 increase	 the	 transaction	 costs	 deriving	 from	 collusion	
between	banks	and	monetary	authorities.	
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Conclusions	
This	thesis	has	analysed	various	aspects	of	monetary	policy,	with	special focus	on	the	
institutional	framework	within	which	it	is	implemented	by	the	institutions	in	charge.	
The	main	message	that	 the	thesis	has	sought	 to	convey	 is	 that	 the	observability	of	
the	 goals	 of	 a	 Central	 Bank	 by	 the	 private	 sector	 may	 play	 a	 decisive	 role	 both	 in	
monetary	policy	decisions	and	in	the	choice	of	the	institutional	design.	
The	 starting	 point	 of	 the	 discussion	 has	 been	 the	 literature	 on	 the	 political	 and	
institutional	 foundations	 for	 the	 goals	 of	 the	 monetary	 institutions.	 This	 literature	
focuses	almost	completely	on	the	analysis	of	the	“time	inconsistency”	problem,	which	
examines	the	interaction	between	policies	and	agents’	expectations.	This	is	a	feature	of	
policies	 that,	 although	 optimal	 at	 present,	 may	 prove	 less	 desirable	 in	 the	 future,	
particularly	 when	 the	 agents	 anticipate	 the	 incentives	 of	 the	 policymaker,	 thus	
thwarting	monetary	policies	and	generating	inefficient	equilibria.	
This	literature	has	developed	in	the	past	thirty	years	since	the	works	of	Kydland	and	
Prescott	(1977)	and	Barro	and	Gordon	(1983a,	1983b).	It	focuses	on	the	one	hand	on	
study	of	the	basic	determinants	of	the	time	inconsistency	problem	and,	on	the	other,	on	
possible	 institutional	 solutions.	Different	 studies	have	shown	 that	 time	 inconsistency	
determinants	can	be	referred	to	the	sequential	structure	that	is	a	necessary	feature	of	
stabilization	policies	 in	a	world	characterized	by	non‐indexed	contracts,	as	well	as	 to	
the	existence	in	the	economy	of	a	conflict	of	interests	among	different	economic	agents	
with	different	goals.	According	to	this	interpretation,	if	no	conflicts	of	interests	were	in	
place,	 the	 policymaker	 and	 the	 private	 sector	 would	 behave	 as	 a	 “team”,	 i.e.	 would	
decide	 how	 to	 act	 in	 order	 to	 achieve	 the	 same	 goal:	 therefore,	 no	 agent	 would	 be	
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encouraged	 to	 surprise	 the	 rest	 of	 the	 team	 to	 obtain	 benefits	 (Chari,	 Kehoe	 and	
Prescott,	1989).	
The	economic	theory	offers	two	basic	solutions	to	the	problem	of	time	inconsistency	
of	 the	monetary	 policy.	 The	 first	 solution	 is	 founded	 on	 the	 introduction	 of	 specific	
monetary	rules	or	 institutional	and	legal	constraints	that	materialize,	 in	practice,	 in	a	
variety	of	reforms,	including	the	decision	to	ensure	the	independence	of	the	monetary	
authority,	or	 to	set	a	specific	target	 inflation	rate,	among	others.	The	second	solution	
considers	 self‐disciplinary	 mechanisms	 as	 substitutes	 for	 formal	 rules.	 Examples	 of	
such	mechanisms	 include	 the	 effects	 of	 reputation	 and	 signalling	 in	 the	 case	 of	 long	
timeframes	 and	 asymmetrical	 information	 between	 the	 monetary	 authority	 and	 the	
private	sector.	
Part	 one	 of	 the	 thesis	 introduced	 a	 model	 that	 belongs	 to	 the	 class	 of	 models	
included	in	this	latest	branch	of	the	literature.	In	particular,	we	studied	the	connection	
–	observed	when	a	 time	 inconsistency	problem	exists	–	between	 the	observability	of	
the	 goals	 of	 the	monetary	 institution	and	 the	 equilibrium	 strategies	 implemented	by	
the	latter.	This	model	yielded	innovative	technical	and	economic	results.	
From	 the	 technical	 viewpoint,	 the	 study	 of	 equilibrium	 strategies	 in	 a	 simple	
signalling	model	made	 it	 possible	 to	 obtain	 the	 results	 of	 equilibrium	 in	 a	monetary	
policy	 game	 studied	by	D'Amato	and	Pistoresi	 (1996)	 and	Sibert	 (2002)	without	 the	
constraints	 introduced	 by	 these	 works	 to	 support	 different	 types	 of	 monetary	
institutions.	 This	 allowed	 identification	 of	 the	 conditions	 for	 the	 model	 parameters	
under	which	a	pure	separating	equilibrium	emerges,	and	the	conditions	under	which	
there	 exists	 a	 hybrid	 equilibrium	whereby	 certain	 types	 of	 Bankers	 play	 separating	
strategies	 (Vickers,	1986;	D’Amato	and	Pistoresi	1996;	Sibert,	2002)	and	others	play	
pooling	strategies	similar	to	those	studied	by	Backus	and	Driffill	(1985).	
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From	 the	 economic	 viewpoint,	we	 have	 highlighted	 some	 emerging	 relations	 –	 in	
equilibrium	–	between	the	degree	of	observability	and	transparency	of	 the	monetary	
goals	of	the	Central	Banker	and	the	inflation	rate	set	by	the	latter.	
The	 existence	 of	 an	 equilibrium	 between	 the	 degree	 of	 observability	 of	 the	
government’s	 decisions	with	 respect	 to	monetary	 institutions,	 on	 the	 one	 hand,	 and	
inflation	 strategies	 on	 the	 other,	 induced	 us	 to	 investigate	 the	 relation	 between	
incentives	for	strategic	delegation	and	the	degree	of	transparency	of	delegation	to	the	
monetary	institutions.	
In	part	two	we	used	the	per‐capita	number	of	newspapers	in	the	different	countries	
as	 a	 proxy	with	 which	 to	 study	 the	 relation	 between	 the	 degree	 of	 observability	 to	
private	 agents	 of	 the	 goals	 of	 the	monetary	 institutions	 and	 the	 level	 of	 institutional	
commitment	to	monetary	stability	goals.	Simple	cross‐country	regressions	showed	that	
this	assumption	is	strongly	supported	by	full	sample	data	(and	in	each	sub‐sample	of	
OECD	and	non‐OECD	countries).	
Two	other	testable	implications	were	derived	from	extensions	of	the	Rogoff	(1985a)	
model	to	open	economies.	In	particular,	our	data	delivered	the	following	results:	1.	the	
degree	of	 independence	proved	to	be	negatively	related	to	openness	among	the	non‐
OECD	 countries	 (in	 accordance	 with	 a	 straightforward	 extension	 of	 the	 model	 by	
Romer,	1993);	2.	The	degree	of	independence	was	positively	related	to	the	strength	of	
the	 correlation	with	 the	 international	 business	 cycle	 in	 the	 sub‐sample	 of	 the	 OECD	
countries	(in	accordance	with	D’Amato	and	Martina,	2005).	
These	 results	 seem	 to	 be	 perfectly	 compatible	 with	 the	 approach	 to	 strategic	
monetary	policy	delegation:	the	data	seem	to	show	that,	in	countries	where	the	degree	
of	 observability	 and	 transparency	 of	 the	 institutions	 and,	 accordingly,	 the	 degree	 of	
observability	of	commitment	by	private	agents	are	sufficiently	high,	governments	tend	
to	adopt	institutional	solutions	to	the	time	inconsistency	problem.	
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The	 conclusion,	 albeit	with	 all	 the	 caveats	 of	 both	 the	 theoretic	 and	 the	 empirical	
analysis,	seems	to	be	that,	in	an	economy	where	agent	expectations	play	a	fundamental	
role	 in	 determining	 the	 outcome	 of	 policies,	 as	 envisaged	 by	 the	 theory	 of	 strategic	
delegation,	 adopting	 an	 institutional	 approach	 is	 facilitated	 by	 the	 degree	 of	
observability	by	private	agents	of	the	institutions.	
The	 implication	of	both	these	two	chapters	 in	regard	to	decisions	on	the	design	of	
the	monetary	institutions	seems	to	be	that	the	top‐down	establishment	of	institutions,	
whose	 goals	 are	 substantially	 unclear	 to	 private	 agents,	 is	 not	 theoretically	 or	
empirically	 viable	 if	 the	 degree	 of	 transparency	 and	 the	 ability	 of	 private	 agents	 to	
construe	and	understand	the	institutional	goals	are	not	sufficiently	high.	In	order	to	set	
up	(monetary)	institutions	that	may	prove	credible	for	private	agents,	the	latter	should	
be	able	to	observe	them	from	the	bottom.		
Part	three	contained	an	empirical	analysis	of	the	ability	of	the	institutional	political	
system,	 combined	 with	 certain	 economic	 variables,	 to	 influence	 the	 degree	 of	
independence	of	 the	Central	Bank.	 In	 fact,	 the	 lack	of	 transparency	 in	 a	political	 and	
institutional	system,	as	well	as	the	lack	of	constraints	and	controls	over	politicians,	are	
the	main	reasons	for	the	failure	of	certain	policy	reforms	(Acemoglu	et	al.,	2008).82	
The	 data	 suggest	 that	 Central	 Bank	 Independence	 is	 positively	 related	 to	 the	
presence	of	federalism,	the	features	of	the	electoral	system	and	parties,	the	correlation	
between	 the	shocks	 to	 the	 level	of	economic	activity	 in	 the	countries	 included	 in	 the	
sample	and,	for	a	sub‐sample	of	economies,	the	convergence	criteria	for	entry	into	the	
European	Monetary	Union	(EMU).	
                                                 
82	 The	 1995	 Reserve	 Bank	 of	 Zimbabwe	 Act,	 which	 legislated	 a	 greater	 degree	 of	 autonomy	 for	 the	
central	 bank,	 is	 the	 classic	 example	 of	 the	 ineffectiveness	 of	 institutional	 reform	 in	 the	 absence	 of	 a	
functioning	system	of	accountability.	
96 
Several	recent	papers83		have	updated	measures	of	transparency	and	independence	
of	 central	 banks	 by	 introducing	 a	 large	 cross‐country	 database	 on	 the	 timing	 of	
legislative	changes	 in	central	bank	design	 for	more	than	100	countries	during	period	
1970‐2012.	 These	 new	 datasets	 are	 useful	 means	 with	 which	 to	 conduct	 cross‐
sectional	and	time	series	studies	in	diverse	fields.	In	particular,	it	is	very	interesting	for	
future	research	to	analyse	how	the	new	monetary	policy	instruments	(operation	twist,	
quantitative	easing),	in	response	to	the	recent	financial	and	sovereign	debt	crisis,	have	
influenced	the	likelihood	of	reforms	in	central	bank	design.	
In	part	 four	we	extended	 the	Gabillon	and	Martimort	model	 (2004).	 In	 that	paper	
the	authors	consider	a	model	of	monetary	policy	by	which	the	central	banker	is	subject	
both	to	the	explicit	influence	of	the	political	principal	elected84	by	contract	and	to	the	
implicit	influence	of	the	anti‐inflation	interest	groups	(lobbies)85	that	seek	to	“capture”	
monetary	 policy	 to	 protect	 their	 own	 interests.	 Gabillon	 and	 Martimort	 show	 how	
different	 legal	 statuses	 of	 the	 Central	 Bank86	 are	 indeed	 associated	 with	 different	
opportunities	 for	 individual	 lobbies	 to	 redirect	monetary	 policy.	 Thus	 the	 degree	 of	
political	 independence	 influences	 the	 agency	 costs	 incurred	 to	 control	 the	 central	
banker.	 Therefore,	 while	 political	 independence	 increases	 agency	 costs	 (agency	 cost	
effects),	 it	 prevents	 greater	 fluctuations	 of	 inflation	 brought	 about	 by	 (exogenous)	
political	 uncertainty	with	 respect	 to	 the	 electoral	 result	 (stabilization	 effect).	 If	 both	
effects	 are	 compared,	 social	 welfare	 increases	 ex	 ante	 in	 the	 case	 of	 political	
independence.	 Our	 extension	 consisted	 in	 endogenizing	 political	 uncertainty.	 In	 our	
                                                 
83 Dincer  and  Eichengreen (2014), Garriga (2016). 
84	 The	 authors	 only	 consider	 two	 political	 parties.	 According	 to	 the	 “political	 party”	 literature,	 both	
parties	have	different	preferences	with	respect	to	the	inflation/employment	tradeoff.	In	particular,	the	
party	that	defends	the	right‐wing	constituency	is	more	concerned	about	price	stability,	whereas	the	left‐
wing	party	is	more	concerned	with	inflationary	surprise	to	increase	employment.	
85	These	groups	are	represented	by	major	banks	and	financial	companies	highly	interested	in	controlling	
inflation.	
86	The	central	banker	can,	in	fact,	be	independent	of	political	power.	Therefore,	if	he	is	in	office	upon	the	
election	 of	 a	 new	 government,	 he	 remains	 in	 office,	 or	 can	 be	 affiliated	 to	 the	 political	 power	 and	
therefore	subject	to	the	spoil	system,	i.e.	be	substituted	every	time	a	new	political	principal	is	elected.	
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model,	voters	were	forward‐looking	and	made	their	decisions	by	comparing	the	policy	
platforms	offered	by	competing	political	principals.	This	extension	of	the	model	made	
it	possible	to	analyse	the	interesting	feedback	between	the	institutions	and	the	election	
result.	 The	 amount	 of	 political	 uncertainty	 and	 the	 choice	 of	 the	 institutional	 design	
are,	in	this	case,	determined	at	the	same	time	in	the	model.	In	our	case,	too,	the	idea	is	
confirmed	that	the	political	independence	of	the	central	bank	is	the	optimal	approach	
for	the	institutional	design	of	monetary	policy	in	a	world	of	political	uncertainty.		
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